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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MYRA L. TAYLOR, RONALD H. 
OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON, and 
JENNIFER VAN BOERUM aka 
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON 
Plaintiffs/Appellees 
v. 
AMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Ohio corporation 
DefendanVAppellant 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
James A. Mcintosh (2194) 
JAMES A McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
1399 South 700 East, #17 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Jill M. Aggeler (5654) Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees Myra L 
Paul H. Matthews (2122) Taylor, Ronald H. Olson, Carol D. Olson, 
KIRTON & McCONKJJE and Jennifer Van Boerum aka Jennifer 
60 East South Temple, #1800 Heather Olson 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
American Fire and Casualty Company 
ADDENDUM TO 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
PRIORITY NO. (15) 
Appellate Court No. 960Q&-CA 
Trial Court Civil No. 930902492 
ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXHIBIT 
NO. 
DESCRIPTION 
1 "ORDER PERMITTING APPELLEES TO SUPPLEMENT 
RECORD ON APPEAL" dated January 3,1996. Allows Appellees 
to include the official file and record in the underlying lawsuit in 
the Court of Judge Timothy R. Hanson, Civil No. 900907125PI. 
2 "MINUTE ENTRY" dated June 22,1995, issued by Judge Frank G. 
Noel with respect to the hearing held on May 24, 1995, pertaining 
to both parties' Motions for Summary Judgment. 
3 "SUMMARY JUDGMENT signed by the Honorable Frank G. 
Noel on September 8, 1995. 
4 Miller's STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED Vol. 
I, page 215. 
5 HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE POLICY issued by American Fire 
and Casualty Company to the Olsons. 
6 "COMPLAINT in the underlying lawsuit COUNTS is on pages 
9-12 of the said Complaint (S.R. 9-12). 
7 Covering pages dated November 16, 1987, from Frank Grant, 
Plaintiffs' Accident Reconstruction Expert pertaining to the accident 
in the underlying lawsuit 
8 Statement of MICHELLE PAXTON. taken by Frank Grant on 
November 3, 1987. 
9 Statement of STEPHANIE SMITH, taken by Frank Grant on 
November 6, 1987. 
10 "SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT dated November 21, 1987, from 
Frank Grant discussing Jennifer Heather Olson's blood alcohol 
content of .14 percent 
"TOXICOLOGY REPORT' dated October 23, 1987, signed by 
Bruce Beck at the Public Safety Toxicology Section, showing a 
blood alcohol content for Jennifer Heather Olson of .14 percent. 
12 Certain pages from the "CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES OF 
RONALD H. OLSON AND CAROL D. OLSON TO THE 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES" (S.R. 78, 
86, 87, 90, 92, and 96). 
13 Certain pages from the Deposition of JENNIFER HEATHER 
OLSON including S.R. 454, 470-475, 477-492, 513-516. 
14 Certain pages from the Deposition of HEIDI NELSON including 
S.R. 388, 393, 395, 398, and 405. 
15 Certain pages from the Deposition of KRISTI BRINGHURST 
including S.R. 284. 
16 Certain pages from the Deposition of JENNIFER PIA including 
S.R. 307-313. 
17 Certain pages from the Deposition of SCOTT LEVY including S.R. 
346, 358-359, 362. 
18 Certain pages from the Deposition of MARK MUIR including S.R. 
412, 421-422, 425. 
19 Certain pages from the Deposition of STEVEN KENT JONES 
including S.R. 432, 446-449. 
20 Letter dated July 22, 1992, from H. F. Carlson, Claims Supervisor, 
for the American Fire and Casualty Company to Michael N 
Martinez, Esq., attorney for the Olsons, acknowledging an 
obligation on the part of American Fire to represent the Olsons in 
the underlying lawsuit if certain facts could be demonstrated. This 
letter is found at R. 100. 
21 "MINUTE ENTRY" dated September 29, 1992, pertaining to the 
final Pretrial Conference held before the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson establishing policies and procedures to be used at the trial 
of the underlying lawsuit Found at S.R. 162-164. 
22 "STIPULATION" dated November 19, 1992, and signed by all of 
the parties and their counsel in the underlying lawsuit. This 
Stipulation sets out the procedures the parties intend to follow at 
trial and also pertains to an assignment to Myra L. Taylor of the 
Olsons' claims against their Homeowner's insurer in exchange for 
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an agreement by the Plaintiffs and USAA not to execute on any of 
the Olsons' personal assets. This Stipulation is found at S.R. 177-
184. 
23 COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT of comments made by the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson at the trial held on November 19, 
1992, in the underlying lawsuit and explaining Judge Hanson's 
methodology for reviewing Findings of Fact, Exhibits, Depositions, 
etc. before arriving at a final decision. This Transcript is found at 
S.R. 234-243. 
24 COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT of the testimony of the 
Olsons in the underlying lawsuit, the proffer of their counsel 
Michael N. Martinez and the Court's questioning of each of the 
three Olsons separately with regard to their understanding of the 
Stipulation and the Plaintiffs' proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment This Transcript is found 
at S.R. 244-249. 
25 Plaintiffs' proposed "FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW showing pencilled changes made by the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson. This document is found at S.R. 192-206. 
26 Plaintiffs'proposed "FINAL JUDGMENT' showing Judge Hanson's 
pencilled change in the amount of general damages in paragraph 1 
on page 2. This document is found at S.R. 207-209. 
27 Letter dated January 25 1993, from Judge Timothy R. Hanson to 
James A. Mcintosh, Esq., attorney for Myra Taylor, and Michael N. 
Martinez, Esq., attorney for the Olsons in the underlying lawsuit. 
This letter pertains to Judge Hanson's review of the evidence, the 
depositions, transcripts, exhibits, etc. and the changes he made in 
the Plaintiffs' proposed FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, and FINAL JUDGMENT. This letter directs Plaintiffs' 
counsel James A. Mcintosh to prepare new FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and a new FINAL JUDGMENT. This 
document is found at S.R. 190-191. 
28 "FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW" signed 
by Judge Timothy R. Hanson on January 27, 1993. This document 
is found at S.R. 210-224. 
29 "FINAL JUDGMENT1 signed by Judge Timothy R. Hanson on 
January 27, 1993. This document is found at S.R. 225-227. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of March 1996 two copies of the above and 
foregoing"ADDENDUM OF APPELLEES" were hand-delivered to the following: 
Jill M. Aggeler, Esq. 
Paul H. Matthews, Esq. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
AMES A. McINTOSH 
ctarpditi\fik*tiyloMpp\iddendU!B.toc 
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EXHIBIT "1 
JAMES A. McINTOSH, ESQ. -- No. 2194 
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Attorneys for Appellees 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA L. TAYLOR, RONALD H. 
OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON, AND 
JENNIFER VAN BOERUM aka 
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON 
Appellees 
v. 
A M E R I C A N F I R E A N D 
CASUALTY COMPANY, an Ohio 
Corporation 
Appellant 
Based upon the "Appellees' Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal" dated 
January 3, 1996, and the parties' "Stipulation Permitting Appellees to Supplement Record 
on Appeal" dated January 3, 1996, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Appellees are hereby permitted to supplement the record on appeal to 
include the official file and record in the lawsuit in Judge Timothy R. Hanson's Court as 
Civil No. 900907125PI entitled MYRA L. TAYLOR. Plaintiff v. RONALD H. OLSON. 
CAROL D. OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON. Defendants. 
F I L E D 
JAN 3 1995 
CLERK SUPREME COURT, 
UTAH 
ORDER PERMITTING 
APPELLEES TO SUPPLEMENT 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appellate Court No. 950448 
Third Judicial District Court 
Salt Lake County 
Civil No. 930902492 CN 
(Judge Frank G. Noel) 
2. The Appeals Clerk in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, is directed to prepare an Index including the supplemented record 
and to paginate the said supplemented record as directed by Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and by the Clerk of this Court. 
3. Both parties may use the suppJemenred record on appeal in any Briefs, 
Addenda, or other documents which are filed in this Supreme Court. 
DATED this 3rd day of January 1996. 
BY THE COURT 
JUSTICE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of January 1996 a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing ORDER PERMITTING APPELLEES TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD 
ON APPEAL was hand-delivered to the following: 
Jill M. Aggeler, Esq. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
sG^A* ft'M*%H&Jt 
/ JAMES A. McINTOSH 
c:\wpdata\fiIcs\taylor.app\order 
-2-
EXHIBIT "2" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Myra L. Taylor, Ronald H. Olson, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Carol D. Olson and Jennifer Van Boerum : 
a/k/a Jennifer Heather Olson, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
: Civil No. 930902492 CN 
vs. : 
: JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
American Fire and Casualty Company, an : 
Ohio Corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
The court has reviewed the parties5 motions for summary judgment together with the 
memos filed in connection therewith, has heard oral argument and after having taking the matter 
under advisement now rules as follows: 
The court is of the opinion that the State of Utah recognizes the distinct tort of a parent's 
failure to properly supervise and control the conduct of a minor child. The homeowner's 
insurance policy in question covers the circumstances in that portion of plaintiffs' complaint 
alleging the Olsons' failure to properly supervise and to control the conduct of their minor child. 
Accordingly, the defendant had a duty to defend the Olsons in the underlying Taylor/Olson 
lawsuit. The defendant was aware of said lawsuit, was repeatedly requested to defend the 
Olsons under the terms of the policy but refused to do so. Under these circumstances the 
defendant is not entitled to collaterally attack the findings of the trial judge wherein it was 
0 012 3 2 
TAYLOR V. AMERICAN PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
determined, after trial, that the Olsons' failure to supervise and properly control the conduct of 
their minor child was the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
Accordingly the court grants the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The parties are asked to consult with one another to determine if they can agree that the 
issue of attorney's fees be submitted to the court on an affidavit. If not then the court will 
notice the matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney's fees. 
The court will certify this as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54b of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Counsel for plaintiffs is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this ^ < ^ d a y of Jiine, 1995. 
0 012 33 
TAYLOR V. AMERICAN PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this cy^-day of June, 1995. 
James A. Mcintosh 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Donald J. Purser 
Jill M. Aggeler 
PURSER & EDWARDS 
Attorney for Defendants 
39 Market Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2104 
U3<2- Sd'j^^— 
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EXHIBIT "3" 
JAMES A. McINTOSH, ESQ. -- No. 2194 
JAMES A. McINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA L. TAYLOR, RONALD H. 
OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON, AND 
JENNIFER VAN BOERUM aka 
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
A M E R I C A N F I R E AND 
CASUALTY COMPANY, an Ohio 
Corporation 
Defendant 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
! Civil No. 930902492CN 
[ (Judge Frank G. Noel) 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing on Wednesday, 
May 24, 1995, between the hours of 8:30 A.M. and 10:00 A.M. before the Honorable 
Frank G, Noel pursuant to the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs and 
Defendant; the Plaintiffs being represented by the law firm of James A. Mcintosh & 
Associates P.C, appearing through counsel James A. Mcintosh; the Defendant being 
represented by the law firm of Purser, Edwards & Shields, L.L.C, appearing through 
counsel Jill M. Aggeler; the Court having reviewed the parties' Motions for Summary 
Yulrr .;•-::: '.strict 
SEP 0 8 1995 
c^hli^fim^ ...... 
Judgment together with the Memoranda filed in connection therewith; the Court having 
heard arguments of counsel and having taken the matter under advisement; the Court 
having, on June 22, 1995, signed that certain "Minute Entry," a copy of which is attached 
to this Summary Judgment as Exhibit "1" and is by reference incorporated herein and made 
a part hereof; the Court being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED. AND DECREED AS A SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
3. The Homeowners' Insurance Policy ("Policy") issued by the Defendant covers 
the circumstances in that portion of Plaintiffs' Complaint alleging the Olsons failed to 
properly supervise and control the conduct of their minor child. The Homeowners' 
Insurance Policy is attached as Exhibit "1" to that certain documenl entitled "Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Regarding Insurance Policy Liability," dated January 23, 1995 ("Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum"), which is by reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
4. The Defendant had a duty to defend the Olsons in the underlying 
Taylor/Olsons' Lawsuit, Civil No. 900907125PI in this Court, a copy of which underlying 
Complaint is attached to the Plaintiffs5 Memorandum as Exhibit "2" and is by reference 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. The Defendant was aware of said lawsuit, 
was repeatedly requested to defend the Olsons under the terms of the Policy but refused 
to do so. 
5. The Plaintiffs are hereby awarded judgment against the Defendant in the 
amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) which is the face amount of the said 
Policy. 
6. The Plaintiffs are hereby award judgment against the Defendant for interest 
from January 27, 1993, the date the underlying judgment was signed by the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the full amount of 
the judgment of $203,794.14 pursuant to the provisions of "SECTION 2 - ADDITIONAL 
COVERAGES" on page 13 of the said Policy. Interest will continue at the rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annum on the full amount of Judge Hanson's judgment of $203,794.14 
from January 27, 1993, until the Defendant pays or tenders or deposits in Court the said 
principal amount of $100,000 together with the amount of eight thousand three hundred 
forty-five dollars ($8,345.00) awarded as attorney fees in accordance with paragraph 7 below. 
7. The Plaintiffs are hereby awarded judgment against the Defendant for 
attorney fees which the Olsons incurred in the underlying Taylor/Olsons' lawsuit to their 
attorney, Michael N. Martinez, Esq., in the amount of five thousand seven hundred seventy-
one dollars and twenty-five cents ($5,771.25) together with interest on said amount of two 
thousand five hundred seventy-three dollars and seventy-seven cents ($2,573.77) for a total 
amount of eight thousand three hundred forty-five dollars ($8,345.00). This $8,345.00 will 
bear interest at the rate of nine and twenty-two hundredths percent (9.22%) per annum 
from the entry of the judgment until paid. 
8. Attorney fees requested by Plaintiffs for services rendered by their attorney 
James A. Mcintosh, Esq. in this Court and in the two proceedings in the Courts of Judge 
Dee Vc Benson and Judge David Sam in the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah will be deferred and decided as part of the Plaintiffs' bad-faith claims in their 
Complaint in this Court and no decision is being made as to those fees in this Summary 
Judgment. 
9. This judgment and all portions herein are certified as "final" pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In this connection, the 
Court expressly finds and determines that there is no just reason for delay and expressly 
directs the entry of judgment as stated herein. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this Q day of A»gW 1995 
BY THE CO 
FRANK G. NOEfc 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
.4. 0 ti i 4 i\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of August 1995 a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered to the following: 
Jill M. Aggeler, Esq. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
( /AMES A. McINTOSH 
C:\wpdata\files\tay lor.2^udgmntZsum 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
^ V RttENEO ^ 
Myra L. Taylor, Ronald H. Olson, 
Carol D. Olson and Jennifer Van Boerum 
a/k/a Jennifer Heather Olson, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
American Fire and Casualty Company, an 
Ohio Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Civil No. 930902492 CN 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
The court has reviewed the parties' motions for summary judgment together with the 
memos filed in connection therewith, has heard oral ai'gument and after having taking the matter 
under advisement now rules as follows: 
The court is of the opinion that the State of Utah recognizes the distinct tort of a parent's 
failure to properly supervise and control the conduct of a minor child. The homeowner's 
insurance policy in question covers the circumstances in that portion of plaintiffs' compiaint 
alleging the Olsons' failure to properly supervise and to control the conduct of their minor child. 
Accordingly, the defendant had a duty to defend the Olsons in the underlying Taylor/Clson 
lawsuit. The defendant was aware of said lawsuit, was repeatedly requested to defend the 
Olsons under the terms of the policy but refused to do so. Under these circumstance:; the 
defendant is not entitied to collaterally attack: the findings of the trial judge wherein it was 
(IflUOf 
TAYLOR V. AMERICAN PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
determined, after trial, that the Olsons' failure to supervise and properly control the conduct of 
their minor child was the sole proximate cause of thfe accident. 
Accordingly the court grants the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The parties are asked to consult with one another to determine if they can agree that the 
issue of attorney's fees be submitted to the court on an affidavit. If not then the court will 
notice the matter for an evidentiary hearing regarding attorney's fees. 
The court will certify this as a fmal judgmejit pursuant to Rule 54b of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Counsel for plaintiffs is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this ^ <^4ay of June, 1995. 
TAYLOR V. AMERICAN PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry, 
postage prepaid, to the following on this C7~2-day of June, 1995. 
James A. Mcintosh 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Donald J. Purser 
Jill M. Aggeler 
PURSER & EDWARDS 
Attorney for Defendants 
39 Market Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2104 
a*- :A7^-
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EXHIBIT "4 
MILLER'S 
STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES 
ANNOTATED 
by 
Susan J. Miller 
and 
Philip Lefebvre 
VOL I 
POLICIES 
MILLERS STANDARD INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 
-f o r- m s M O 
HO 00 03 04 91 
2.2 lb6-c 
2.2 lc - d. 
2.2 Id -• 
2.2 
2.2 
2.2 
2.2 
2.2 
2.2 
ldl — 
ld2 — 
2.2 ld3 — 
le — f. 
lei — 
2.2 le2 — 
2.2 le3 — 
leA 
leAl-
2.2 leA2 — 
2.2 
2.2 
2.2 
leA2a 
leA2b 
leA3-
2.2 leA4 
2.2 leA4a 
2.2 
2.2 
leA4b 
leA4c 
Arising out of the rental or holding for rental 
of any part of any premises by an "msuied " 
This exclusion does not apply to the rental or 
holding for rental of an "insured location" 
(1) On an occasional basis if used only as a 
residence 
(2 ) In part for use only as a residence unless 
a single family unit is intended for use by 
the occupying family to lodge more than 
two roomers or boarders or 
(3) In part as an office, school studio or pri-
vate garage. 
Arising out of the rendering of or failure to 
render professional services. 
Arising out of a premises 
(1) Owned by an "insured". 
(2) Rented to an "insured" or 
(3) Rented to others by an "insured", 
that is not an "insured location". 
Arising out of 
(1) The ownership, maintenance, use loading 
or unloading of motor vehicles or all other 
motorized land conveyances including 
trailers owned or operated by or rented or 
loaned to an "insured". 
(2) The entrustment by an "insured' of a motor 
vehicle or any other motorized land 
conveyance to any person or 
(3) Vicarious liability whether or not 
statutorily imposed for the actions of a 
child or minor using a conveyance ex 
eluded m paragraph (1) or (2) above 
. This exclusion does not apply to 
(1) A trailer not towed by or earned on a mo-
torized land conveyance 
(2) A motorized land conveyance designed for 
recreational use off public roads not sub-
ject to motor vehicle registration and 
(a) Not owned by an 'insured" or 
(b) Owned by an 'insured" and on an "in-
sured location" 
(3) A motorized golf can when used to pl«iy 
golf on a golf course 
(4) A vehicle or conveyance not subject to 
motor vehicle registration which is 
(a) Used to service an "insureds" resi-
dence 
(b) Designee for assisting the hand-
icapped or 
— (c) In dead storage on an "insured lo-
cation 
g. Arising out of 
(1) The ownership maintenance u'$e loading 
or unloading of an excluded watercraft 
described below 
(2) The entrustment by an "insured' of an ex-
cluded watercraft described below to any 
person or 
(3) Vicarious liability whether or not 
statutorily imposed for the actions of a 
child or minor using an excluded 
watercraft described below 
Excluded watercraft are those that are princi-
pally designed to be propelled by engine 
power oi electric motor or are sailing vessels, 
whether owned by or rented to an "insured " 
This exclusion does not apply to watercraft 
(1) That are not sailing vessels and are pow-
ered by 
(a) Inboard or inboard-outdrive engine or 
motor power of 50 horsepower or less 
not owned by an "insured" 
(b) inboard or inboard-outdrive engine or 
motor power of more than 50 horse-
power not owned by or rented to an 
"insured" 
(c) One or more outboard engines or mo-
tors with 25 total horsepower or less 
(d) One or more outboard engines or mo-
tors with more than 25 total horse 
power if the outboard engine or motor 
is not owned by an "insured" 
( • ) Outboard engines or motois of more 
than 25 total horsepower owned by an 
"insured" if 
(») You acquire them prior to the policy 
period and 
(a) You declare them at policy in-
ception or 
(b) Your intention to insure is re 
ported to us in writing withm 45 
days after you acquire the out-
board engines or motors 
( I I ) You acquire them during the policy 
period 
This coverage applies for the policy 
period 
(2) That are sailing vessels with or without 
auxiliary power 
(a) L«ss than 26 feet in overall length 
(b) 26 feet or more m overall engih not 
owned by or rented to an insured 
— 2.2 If 
2.2 lfl 
2.2 lf2 
2.2 lf3 
— 2 . 2 IfA 
— 2 . 2 lfAl 
_ 2.2 lfA2 
__ 2.2 IfA3 
2.2 lfA3a 
2.2 lfA4 
2.2 lfA4a 
_ 2.2 lfA4al 
2.2 lfA4a2 
2.2 lfA4b 
2.2 lfA4c 
2.2 lfA5 
2.2 lfA6 
HO 00 03 04 91 Coovnght insurance Services Qff'ce inc 1990 Page 13 of 18 
Includes copyrighted material of Insurance Services Office, Inc. 
with its permission. Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc. 1990 
92a ' O l - I . F> - 2 1 5 
EXHIBIT "5" 
YOUR NEW 
HOMEOWNERS POLICY 
American Fire & Casualty ("< >mpany 
604 Courtland Street, OHondo. Flonda 32804 ' I / 
HO 84 1 ) 84 
YOUR HOMEOWNERS POLICY QUICK REFERENCE 
SECTION I 
YOUR 
PROPERTY 
SECTION II 
YOUR 
LIABILITY 
SECTION 1 
and 
SECTION II 
DECLARATIONS PAGE 
Your Name 
Location of Your Residence 
Policy Period 
Coverages 
Amounts of Insurance 
Deductible 
AGREEMENT 
DEFINITIONS 
COVERAGES 
Property Coverages 
Loss of Use 
Additional Coverages 
Debris Removal 
1 Trees, Shrubs and Plants 
Credit Card 
PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
EXCLUSIONS 
CONDITIONS 
Insurable Interest 
Duties After Loss 
Loss Settlement 
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•HICAM r-i'u ANu CASUAL( I-^MPA'JY of The Ohio Cas' '«., Croup of Insur.irur ( omp.inu's 
IMfHWNCR OrCLARATION 
POIICY NO 
DMA 107P159-C 
POLICY PERIOD 
12:01 AM STANDARD TIMt AT RESIULNCr PREMISES 
ST TER A G E N T 
43 '31 0104 
FROM 
09-27- f lo 
TO 
09-27-07 
TERM 
I1NE YEAR 
INSUREO 
RONALD H C CAROL OLSON 
1930 LOGAN AVE 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84100 
AGENT 
CARSON SMITH C ASSOCIATES INC 
2525 SOUTH MAIN ST SUITt- 8 
SALT LAKf CITY UT 84115 
FIRST MORTGAGEE 
MOUNTAIN WEST SCL ASSN 
2835 FAST 3300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKT CITY UTAH 84109 
1ST LOAN NUMBER 2ND LOAN NUMBER 
E DESCRIBED RESIDENCE PREMISES IS LOCATED AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS-
ZIP CODE 
84 108 
LIABILITY COVERAGE PROPERTY COVERAGE 
DWELLING 
fcrtfltSOO 
B.OTHER 
STRUCTURES 
$8t850 
C.PERSONAL 
PROPERTY 
$44t250 
D.LOSS OF 
USE 
S17f700 
F • PPRSONAL 
LIABILITY 
(ALHOCCURRINCF 
nootooo 
F MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
TOOTHERS 
EACH PERSON 
Si
 f 0 0 0 
'HASIC 
REMIUM 
U70.00 
ADDITIONAL 
PREMIUM 
*ZbtQQ 
TOTAL PREMIUM 
*196tQQ 
TIBU - PROPERTY COVERAGE, IN CASE OF A LOSS WE COVER ONLY THAI PART OF THE LOSS OVER THE DEDUCTIBLE SIATED 
VERAGE A HAS BEEN INCREASED FROM $86t500 
REFLECT THE INCREASED COST OF CONSTRUCTION IN 
J? AREA. 
:RE HAS BEEN A DEDUCTIBLE REVISION IN YOUR 
.ICY* IF YOU DESIRE TO MAINTAIN YOUR PREVIOUSt 
^ER DFDUCTIBLEt PLEASE CONTACT YOUR AGENT*. 
tLY REMITTANCE 
»PFf T A t r n ^ 
OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT QUE WILL BE 
50 FLAT ALL 
2 
PRtM 
GROUP 
26 
PROf 
ClASS 
03 
PERILS* 
N O OF 
FAMILIES 
I 
T O W N 
TRUCTION* F R A M E * 
YEAR 
CONST 
50 
CURRENT EDITION OF FORMS WILL BE SUBSTITUTED AT EACH RENEWAL DAK fOR 
THE EARLIER EOITIONS IF REVISED DURING THE PREVIOUS POLICY TERM 
HO-3 
HO-300 
OC-254 
HO-52 
HO-322 
HO-325 
OC-772 
0 4 - 8 4 
1 1 - 8 4 
0 4 - 8 4 
0 9 - 8 5 
12-85 
11-R5 2 6 . 0 0 
INSURANCE IS PROVIDED" ONLY WITH REJECT TO TME~ 
COVERAGES FOR WHICH A LIMIT OF LIABILITY IS SPECIflFD 
SUBJECT TO A l l CONDITIONS OF THIS POIICY 
SECRETARY (J P PRESIDENT 
MAT/XL Qlltfl 1A 
C.KICAN riRF. AND CASUALTY C^PAMY of The Ohio Casualty Croup ol Insurant i* ( omp.inn-
- POUCY N O 1 
\ 0 1 0 7 8 1 5 9 
:o. 
2 5 
— ST. TER AGF.NT — , 
43 31 0104 
1 DU6 DAiEx 1 
99-2 7-96] 
[S $ 
TOTAL AMOdNTDUE-
$ 19 6 . 0 0 
JNALD H C CARDL OLSON 
^YOR (IF PREMIUM I S : 
1UNTAIN WEST $CL ASSN 
iMAKtCHECKSMVABLETO, AND RETURN tHIS STUB WITH YOURfAYMENTTOh'' 
AMERICAN FIR8 ANO CASUALTY COMPANY 
136 NORTH THIRD STREET 
HAMILTONt OHIO 45025 
010781595 433101046 56030000255 00196006 00000000 1111(364 
HOMEOWNERS 
SPECIAL AMENDATORY ENDORSEMENT Form OC-254 
(11-84) 
1. SECTIONS ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
Credit Card. Fund Transfer Card, Forgery and Counterfeit Money 
We increase the amount of this coverage from $500 to $1,000 without additional charge. 
2. We provide Outboard Motor and Inboard-Outdrive Motor Liability without additional charge. 
SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS 
Coverage E - Personal Liability and Coverage F - Medical Payments to Others - Section f. Water-
craft (1) and (2) are changed to read: 
(1) with inboard motor power owned by an insured; 
(2) with inboard motor power of more than 50 horsepower rented to an insured; 
Item f. Watercraft (4) is deleted. 
RENEWAL PLAN HO 52 
( M 4 84) 
This policy is changed as follows 
1 Policy Period in the Declarations is deleted and replaced as follows 
Policy Period 12 01 A M Standard Tune at the residence premises for months from 
to and for successive policy periods as stated below 
2 If we elect to continue this insurance we will renew this policy if you pay the required renewal premium for 
each successive policy period subject to our premiums rules and forms then in effect You must pay us pr lor 
to the end of the current policy period or else this policy will expire 
3 If a mortgagee is named in this policy we will continue this insurance for the mortgagee s interest for ten days 
after written notice of termination to the mortgagee and then this policy will expire 
*Entnes may be left blank if shown elsewhere in this policy for this coverage 
All other provisions of this policy apply 
Copyright Insurance Services Office Inc 1984 HO-52(Ed 4 84) 
NO SECTION II —LIABILITY COVERAGES FOR HOME DAY CARL BUSINESS 
LIMITED SECTION l — PROPERTY COVERAGES FOR HO-322 
HOME DAY CARE BUSINESS (Ed 9 85) 
If an insured regularly provides home day care ser-
vices to a person or persons other than insureds and 
receives monetary or other compensation for such 
services, that enterprise is a business pursuit Mutual 
exchange of home day care services however is not 
considered compensation The rendering of home 
day care services by an insured to a relative of an 
insured is not considered a business pursuit 
Therefore, with respect to a home day care enterprise 
which is considered to be a business pursuit, this 
policy0 
1 does not provide Section II—Liability Coverages 
because business pursuits of an insured are 
excluded under exclusion 1 b of Section II — 
Exclusions. 
THIS ENDORSEMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A REDUCTION OF COVERAGE 
does not provide Section I—Coverage B coverage 
where other structures are used in whole or in 
part for business. 
limits coverage for property used on the resi-
dence premises for the home day care enterprise 
to $2,500 because Coverage C—Special Limits 
of Liability—item 9 imposes that limit on busi-
ness property on the residence premises; 
limits coverage for property used off the resi-
dence premises for the home day care enterprise 
to $250. because Coverage C—Special Limits o( 
Liability—item 10 imposes that limit on business 
property off the residence premises. 
Copyright, Insurance Services Office. Inc . 1985 HO-322 (Ed 9 85) 
HO-325 
(Ed 12-35) 
COMMUNICABLE DISEASE EXCLUSION 
SECTION II - EXCLUSIONS 
The? fol lowing exclusion is added' 
Coveiage E • Personal Liability and Cuveiage F - Medical Payments to Others do not apply to bod i ly in jury 
or p r o p e r l y damage which anses out ol the transmission of a communicable disease by an insured . 
HO-325 (Ed 12 85) 
Copyright Insurance Servir.^ OM'.C r- 1 9Cf-
00-772(11-85) 
FULL VALUE CONTENTS COVERAGl: ENDORSEMENT 
SECTION I 
For an additional premium, covered losses to the 
fol lowing property are settled at replacement cost at 
the time of loss: 
a. Coverage C —Personal Property; 
h. If covered in this policy, awnings, carpeting, 
household appliances, outdoor antennas and 
outdoor equipment, whether or not attached 
to buildings. 
Condition 3. Loss Settlement does nol apply to proper-
ty described in paragraphs a. and b. above. 
Personal Property Replacement Cost coverage also ap-
plies to articles or classes of property separately 
described and specifically insured in this policy. 
1. PROPERTY NOT ELIGIBLE 
Property listed below is not eligible for replacement cost 
settlement. Any loss will be settled at actual cash value 
at the time of loss but not more than the amount re-
quired to repair or replace. 
a. antiques, fine arts, paintings and similar articles 
of rarity or antiquity which cannot be replaced. 
b. memorabilia, souvenirs, collectors items and 
similar articles whose age or history contribute 
to their value. 
c. articles not maintained in good or workable 
condit ion. 
d. articles that are outdated or obsolete and are 
stored or not being used. 
e. watercraft, inboard motorboats, outboard 
motorboats, outboard motors, inboard/out-
board motorboats, inboard/outdrive motor-
boats, houseboats, sailboats, boat accessories 
and equipment, boat trailers and boat carriers. 
2 REPLACEMENT COST 
a. We will pay no more than the least of the 
following amounts: 
(1) replacement cost at the time of loss 
wi thout deduction for depreciation; 
(2) the full cost of repair at the time of loss; 
(3) the limit of liability that applies to Coverage 
C; or 
(4) any special limits of liability stated in this 
policy. 
b. When the replacement cost for the entire loss 
under this endorsement is more than $500, we 
will pay no more than the actual cash value for 
the loss or damage until the actual repair or 
replacement is complete. 
c. You may make a claim for loss on an actual 
cash value basis and then make claim within 
180 days after the loss for any additional liability 
in accordance wi th this endorsement. 
All other provisions of this policy apply. 
HO-300 
SPECIAL P R O V I S I O N S (Ed. 4-84) 
Utah 
SECTIONS | AND II—CONDITIONS 
5. Cancellation. The following is added to para-
graphs ti(2),(3) and (4): 
However, if any one of the following conditions 
exist at any building that is covered in this policy, 
we may cancel this policy by letting you know at 
least 5 days before the date cancellation takes 
effect. 
(a) The building has been vacant or unoccupied 
60 or more consecutive days. This does not 
apply to: 
(i) seasonal unoccupancy; or 
(ii) buildings in the course of construct ion, 
renovation or addition. 
Buildings with 65% or more of the rental units 
or floor area vacant or unoccupied are con-
sidered unoccupied under this provision. 
(b) After damage by a covered peril, permanent 
repairs to the building; 
(i) have not started; and 
(ii) have not been contracted for-
within 30 days of payment of ioss. 
(c) Th$ building has: 
(i) an outstanding order to vacate; 
(ii) an outstanding demolition order: or 
(iii) been declared unsafe by governmental 
authority. 
(d) Fixed and salvageable items have been or are 
being removed from the building and are not 
being replaced. This does not apply to re-
moval that is necessary or incidental to any 
renovation or remodeling. 
(e) Failure to: 
(i) furnish necessary heat, water, sewer ser-
vice or electricity for 30 consecutive days 
or more, except dur.ng a period of sea-
sonal unoccupancy; or 
(ii) pay property taxes that are owing and 
have been outstanding for more than one 
year following the date due, except that 
this provision will not apply where you are 
in a bona fide dispute wi th the taxing 
author i ty regarding payment of such 
taxes. 
All other provisions of this policy apply. 
HO-300 (Ed. 4-84) Utah 
Copyright, Insurance Services Office, Inc., 1984 
Homeowners 3 
Special Form 
Ed. 4-84 
AGREEMENT 
We will provide the insurance described in this policy in return for the premium and compliance with all applicable 
provisions of this policy. 
DEFINITIONS 
In this policy, "you" and "your" refer to the named insured" shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a 
resident of the same household. "We." "us** an6 "ou r " refer to the Company providing this insurance. In addition, 
certain words and phrases are defined as follows: 
1. "bodily injury" means bodily harm, sickness or 
disease, including required care, loss of services 
and death that results. 
2. "business" includes trade, profession or occupa-
tion. 
3. " insured" means you and residents of your 
household who are: 
a. your relatives; or 
b. other persons under the age of 21 and in the 
care of any person named above. 
Under Section II, "insured" also means: 
c. w i th respect to animals or waterc ra f t to 
which this policy applies, any person or orga-
nization legally responsible for these animals 
or watercraft which are owned by you or any 
person included in 3a or 3b above. A person or 
organization using or having custody of these 
animals or watercraft in the course of any 
business or without consent of the owner is 
not an insured; 
d. w i th respect to any vehicle to which this 
policy applies: 
(1) persons while engaged in your employ or 
that of any person included in 3a or 3b 
above: or 
(2) other persons using the vehicle on an 
insured location with your consent. 
4.f "insured location" means: 
a. the residence premises; 
b. the part of other premises, other structures 
and grounds used by you as a residence and: 
(1) which is shown in the Declarations: or 
(2) which is acquired by you during the policy 
period for your use as a residence; 
c. any premises used by you in connection with a 
premises in 4a or 4b above; 
d. any part of a premises: 
(1) not owned by an Insured; and 
(2) where an insured is temporarily residing; 
e. vacant land, other than farm land/owned by 
or rented to an insured; 
f. land owned by or rented io an Insured on 
which a one or two family dwelling is being 
built as a residence for an insured; 
g. individual or family cemetery plots or burial 
vaults of an insured; or 
h. any part of a premises occasionally rented to 
an insured for other than business use. 
5. "occurrence1 ' means an accident, including 
exposure to conditions, which results, during the 
policy period, in: 
a. bodily injury; or 
b. property damage. 
6. "property damage" means physical injury to. 
destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property. 
7. "residence employee" means: 
a. an employee of an insured whose duties are 
related to the maintenance or use of the resi-
dence premises, including household or 
domestic services; or 
b. one who performs similar duties elsewhere 
not related to the business of an insured. 
HO-3 Ed. 4-84 Copyright. Insurance Services Office. Inc.. 1984 Page 1 of 15 
8. "residence premises" mean 
o. the one family dwelling, other structures, ond 
grounds: or 
b. that par t of any other building; 
where you reside and which is shown as the "resi-
dence premises" m the Declarations 
COVERAGE A—Dwelling 
We cover: 
1. the dwelling on the residence premises shown in 
the Declarations including structures attached to 
the dwelling: and 
2. materials and supplies located on or next to the 
residence premises used to construct, alter or 
repair the dwelling or other structures on the resi-
dence premises. 
This coverage does not apply to land, including land on 
which the dwelling is located. 
COVERAGE B—Other Structures 
We cover-other structures on the residence premises 
set apart from the dwell ing by clear space. This 
includes structures connected to the dwelling by only 
a fence, utility line, or similar connection. 
This coverage does not apply to land, including land on 
which the other structures are located. 
We do not cover other structures: 
1. used in whole or in part for business; or 
2. rented.or held for rental to any person not a 
tenant of the dwelling, unless used solely as'a pri-
vate garage. 
The limit of liability for this coverage will not be more 
than 10% of the limit of liability that applies to Cover-
age A. Use of this coverage does not reduce the Cov-
erage A limit of liability 
COVERAGE C —Personal Property 
We cover personal property owned or used by an 
insured while it is anywhere in the world At your 
request, we will cover personal property owned by: 
1. others while the property is on the part of the 
residence premises occupied by dn insured; 
2. a guest or a residence employee, while the prop-
erty is in any residence occupied by an insured. 
••7c5idc.ee prem •' also means a two family dwell-
ing where you reSKirrfn at least one of the l.imily units 
and which is shown as the "residence premises" in 
the Declarations. 
Our limit of liability for personal property usually 
located at on insured's residence, other than the resi-
dence premises, is 10% of the limit of liability for Cov-
erage C. or $1000. whichever is greater. Personal 
property in a newly acquired principal residence is not 
subject to this limitation for the 30 days from the lime 
you begin to move the property there. 
Special L imi ts of L iab i l i ty . These l imits 6a not 
increase the Coverage C limit of liability The special 
limit for each numbered category below is the tolal 
limit for each toss for all property in that category. 
1. $200 on money, bank notes, bullion, gold other 
than goldware. silver other than si lverware, 
platinum, coins and medals. 
2. $1000 on securities, accounts, deeds, evidences 
of debt, letters of credit, notes other than bank 
notes, manuscr ipts, passports. • t ickets and 
stamps. 
3. $1000 on watercraft. including their trailers, fur-
nishings, equipment and outboard motors. 
4. $1000 on trailers not used with watercraft. 
5. $1000 on grave markers. 
6. $1000 for loss by theft of jewelry, watches, furs, 
precious and semi-precious stones. 
7. $2000 for loss by theft of firearms. 
8. $2500 (or loss by theft of silverware, silver-plated 
ware, goldware. gold-plated ware and pewter-
ware. This includes flatware, hollowware. tea sets. 
trays and trophies made of or including silver, 
gold or pewter. 
9. $2500 on property, on the residence premises, 
used at any time or in any manner for any busi-
ness purpose. 
10. $250 on proper ty , away from (he residence 
premises, used at any time or in any manner for 
any business purpose. 
SECTION I —PROPERTY COVERAGES 
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Property Not Covered. We do m over 
1. art ic les separately described and specifically 
insured in this or other insurance, 
2. animals, birds or fish; 
3. motor vehicles or all other motorized land con-
veyances This includes 
a. equipment and accessories, or 
b any device or instrument for the transmitting 
recording, receiving or reproduction of sound 
or pictures which is operated by power from 
the electrical system of motor vehicles or all 
other motorized land conveyances, including 
(1) accessories or antennas, or 
(2) tapes, wires, records, discs or other 
media for use with any such device or in-
strument, 
while in or upon the vehicle or conveyance 
We do cover vehicles or conveyances not sub/ect 
to motor vehicle registration which are 
a. used to service an insured's residence, or 
b. designed for assisting the handicapped. 
4. a i rcraf t and parts Aircraft means any contr i 
vance used or designed for flight, except model or 
hobby aircraft not used or designed to carry peo-
ple or cargo, 
5. properly of roomers, hoarders and other tenants, 
except property of roomers and boarders related 
to an insured; 
6. property in an apartment regularly rented or held 
for rental to others by an insured; 
7. property rented or held for rental to others off the 
residence premises; 
8. a. books of account, drawings or other paper 
records; or 
b. e lectronic data processing tapes, wires 
records, discs or other software media, 
containing business data But we do cover the 
cost of blank or unexposed records and media 
9. credit cards or fund transfer cards except as pro-
vided in Additional Coverages 6 
COVERAGE D—Loss Of Use 
The limit of liability for Coverage D is the total limit for 
all the coverages that follow 
1 . If a loss covered under this Section makes that 
part of the residence premises where you reside 
not fit to live in, we cover at your choice, either of 
the following However, if the residence premises 
is not your principal place of residence we will not 
provide the option under paragraph b below 
a Additiona ,mg Expense, meaning any nee 
essary increase in living expenses incurred by 
you so that your household can maintain its 
normal standard of living, or 
b Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair rental 
value of that part of the residence premises 
where you reside less any expenses that do 
not continue while the premises is not fit to 
live in 
Payment under a or b will be for the shortest 
time required to repair or replace the damage or 
if you permanently relocate, the shortest time 
required for your household to settle elsewhere 
2. If a loss covered under this Section makes that 
part of the residence premises rented to others 
or held for rental by you not fit to live in, we cover 
the 
Fair Rental Value, meaning the fair rental 
value of that part of the residence premises 
rented to others or held for rental by you (ess 
any expenses that do not continue while the 
premises is not fit to live in 
Payment will be for the shortest time required to 
repair or replace that part of the premises rented 
or held for rental 
3 If a civil authority prohibits you from use of the 
residence premises as a result of direct damage 
to neighboring premises by a Peril Insured Against 
in this policy, we cover the Additional Living 
Expense or Fair Rental Value loss as provided 
under 1 and 2 above for no more than two weeks 
The periods of time under 1, 2 and 3 above are not 
l imited by expiration of this policy 
We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation of 
a lease or agreement 
ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
1. Debris Removal . We will pay your reasonable 
expense for the removal of 
a debris of covered property if a Peril Insured 
Against causes the loss, or 
b ash, dust or particles from a volcanic eruption 
that has caused direct loss to a building or 
property contained in a building 
This expense is included in the limit of liability that 
applies to the damaged property If the amount to 
be paid for the actual damage to the property plus 
the debris removal expense is more than the limit 
of liability for the damaged property, an addi 
tional 5% of that limit of liability is available for 
debris removal expense 
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We will also pay your reasonau«e expense for the 
removal of fallen trees from the residence prem-
ises if 
a. coverage is not afforded under Addit ional 
Coverages 3 Trees, Shrubs and Other Plonts 
for the peril causing the loss, or 
b. the tree is not covered by (his policy 
provided the tree damages covered property and 
a Peril Insured Against under Coverage C causes 
the tree to fall Our limit of liability for this cover-
age will not be more than $500 in the aggregate 
for any one loss 
2. Reasonable Repairs. We will pay the reasonable 
cost incurred by you for necessary repairs made 
solely to protect covered property from further 
damage if a Peril Insured Against causes the loss 
This coverage does not increase the limit of liobil 
i ty that applies to the proper ty being repaired 
3. Trees, Shrubs and Other Plants. We cover trees, 
shrubs, plants or lawns, on the residence prem-
ises, for loss caused by the following Perils In-
sured Against Fire or lightning. Explosion Riot or 
civil commotion. Aircraft, Vehicles not owned or 
operated by a resident of the residence premises, 
Vandalism or malicious mischief or Theft 
The limit of liability for this coverage will not be 
more than 5% of the limit of liability that applies 
to the dwelling, or more than $500 for any one 
tree, shrub or plant We do not cover property 
grown for business purposes 
This coverage is additional insurance 
4. Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay up 
to $500 for your liability assumed by contract or 
agreement for fire department charges incurred 
when the fire department is called to save or pro-
tect covered proper ty f rom a Peril Insured 
Against We do not cover fire department service 
charges if the property is located within the limits 
of the city, municipality or protection district fur-
nishing the fire department response 
This coverage is additional insurance No deduct-
ible applies to this coverage 
5. Property Removed. We insure covered property 
agamsl direct loss horn any cause while being 
removed from a premises endangered by a Peril 
Insured Against and for no more than 30 days 
while removed This coverage does not change 
the limit of liability that applies to the property 
being removed 
6. Credit Card, Fund Transfer Card, Forgery and 
Counterfeit Money. 
We will pay up to $500 for 
a the legal obligation of an insured to pay be-
cause of the theft or unauthorized use of 
credit cards issued to or registered in an 
insured's name 
b lossre^ulti ^<rom theft or unauthorized use 
of a fund transfer card used for deposit 
withdrawal or transfer of funds issued to or 
registered in an insured's name, 
c loss to an insured caused by forgery or altera-
tion of any check or negotiable instrument 
and 
d loss to an insured through acceptance in 
£;ood faith of counterfeit United States or 
Canadian paper currency 
We do not cover use of a credit card or fund 
transfer card 
a by a resident of your household 
b by a person who has been entrusted with 
either type of card or 
c if an insured has not complied with all terms 
and conditions under which the cards are 
issued 
All loss resulting from a series of acts committed 
by any one person or in which any one person is 
concerned or implicated is considered to be one 
loss 
We do not cover loss arising out of business use or 
dishonesty of an Insured. 
This coverage is additional insurance No deduct-
ible applies to this coverage 
Defense 
a We may investigale and settle any claim or 
suit that we decide is appropriate Our duty to 
defend a claim or suit ends when the amount 
we pay for the loss equals our limit of liability 
b If a suit is brought against an insured for liabil-
ity under the Credit Card or Fund Transfer 
Card coverage, we will provide a defense at 
our expense by counsel of our choice 
c We have the option to defend at our expense 
an insured or an insured's bank against any 
suit for the enforcement of payment under 
the Forgery coverage 
7. Loss Assessment. We will pay up to $ 1000 for your 
share of any loss assessment charged during the 
policy period against you by a corporation or 
association of property owners This only appl es 
when the assessment is made as a result of each 
direct loss to the property, owned by all members 
collectively, caused by a Peril Insured Against 
under Coverage A—Dwelling, other than earth-
quake or land shock waves or tremors before, 
dunng or after a volcanic eruption 
Thus coverage applies only to loss assessments 
charged against you as owner oi tenant of the 
residence premises. 
We do not cover loss assessments charged against 
you or a corporation or association of property 
owners by any governmental body 
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Collapse. We insure for direct physical loss1 to cov-
ered property involving collapse of a building or 
any part of a building caused only by one or more 
of the following: 
a. Perils Insured Against in Coverage C—Per-
sonal Property* These perils apply to covered 
building and personal property for loss in-
sured by this additional coverage; 
b. hidden decay; 
c. hidden insect or vermin damage; 
d. weight of contents, equipment, animals or 
people; 
e. weight of rain which collects on a roof; or 
f. use of defective material or methods in con-
struction, remodeling or renovation if the col-
lapse occurs during the course of the con-
struct ion, remodeling or renovation. 
Loss to an awning, fence, patio, pavement, swim-
ming pool, underground pipe, flue, drain, cesspool, 
septic tank, foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead, 
pier, wharf or dock is not included under items b, 
c, d, e, and f unless the loss is a direct result of the 
collapse of a building. 
Collapse does not include sett l ing, crack ing, 
shrinking, bulging or expansion. 
This coverage does not increase the limit of liabil-
ity applying to the damaged covered property. 
SECTION I—PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
COVERAGE A—DWELLING and 
COVERAGE B—OTHER STRUCTURES 
We insure against risks of direct loss to property 
described in Coverages A and B only if that loss is a 
physical loss to property; however, we do not insure 
loss: 
L involving collapse, other than as provided in Addi-
tional Coverage 8; 
2. caused by: 
a. freezing of a plumbing, heating, air condition-
ing or automatic fire protective sprinkler sys-
tem or of a household appliance, or by dis-
charge, leakage or overflow from within the 
system or appliance caused by freezing. This 
exclusion applies only while the dwelling is 
vacant , unoccupied or being constructed 
unless you have used reasonable care to: 
(1) maintain heat in the building; or 
(2) shut, off the water supply and drain the 
system and appliances of water; 
b. freezing, thawing, pressure or weight of water 
or ice, whether driven by wind or not, to a: 
(1) fence, pavement, patio or swimming pool; 
(2) foundation,.retaining wall or bulkhead; or 
(3) pier, wharf or dock; 
c. theft in or to a dwelling under construction, or 
of materials and supplies for use in the con-
struct ion unti l the dwell ing is finished and 
occupied; 
d. vandalism and malicious mischief or break-
age of glass and safety glazing materials if the 
dwelling has been vacant for more than 30 
consecutive days immediate ly before the 
loss. A dwelling being constructed is not con-
sidered vacant; 
e. constant or repeated seepage or leakage of 
water or steam over a period of weeks, months 
or years from within a plumbing, heating, air 
condi t ioning or automat ic fire protect ive 
sprinkler system or from within a household 
appliance; 
f. (1) wear and tear, marring, deterioration; 
(2) inherent vice, latent defect, mechanical 
breakdown; 
(3) smog, rust, mold, wet or dry rot; 
(4) smoke from agr icul tural smudging or 
industrial operations; 
(5) release, discharge or dispersal of con-
taminants or pollutants; 
(6) settl ing, cracking, shrinking, bulging or 
expansion of pavements, patios, founda-
tions, walls, floors, roofs or ceilings: or 
(7) birds, vermin, rodents, insects or domes-
tic animals. 
If any of these cause water damage not other-
wise excluded, from a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning or automatic fire protective 
sprinkler system or household appliance, we 
cover loss caused by the water including the 
cost of tearing out and replacing any part of a 
building necessary to repair the system or 
appliance. We do not cover loss to the system 
or appliance from which this water escaped. 
3. excluded under Section i—Exclusions. 
Under items 1 and 2, any ensuing loss to property 
described in Coverages A and B not excluded or 
excepted in this policy is covered. 
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COVERAGE C—PERSONAL P R O P L .Y 1-3. Failing objects 
We insure for direct physical loss to the property 
described in Coverage C caused by a peril listed below 
unless the loss is excluded in Section I—Exclusions 
1. Fire or l ightn ing. 
2. Windstorm or hai l . 
This peril does not include loss to the property 
contained in a building caused by rain snow, 
sleet, sand or dust unless the direct force of wind 
or hail damages the building causing an opening in 
a roof or wall and the rain snow sleet, sand or 
dust enters through this opening 
This peril includes loss to watercraft and their 
trailers, furnishings, equipment, and outboard 
motors, only while inside a fully enclosed building 
3. Explosion. 
4. Riot or civi l commot ion . 
5. A i rc ra f t , including self-propelled missiles and 
spacecraft 
6. Vehicles. 
7. Smoke, meaning sudden and accidental damage 
from smoke 
This peril does not include loss caused by smoke 
from agricultural smudging or industrial opera-
tions 
8. Vandalism or mal ic ious mischief. 
9. Theft, including attempted theft and loss of prop-
erty from a known place when it is likely that the 
property has been stolen 
This peril does not include loss caused by theft 
a commit ted by an insured; 
b m or to a dwelling under construction, or of 
mater ials and supplies for use in the con-
struct ion unti l the dwelling is finished and 
occupied, or 
c. from that part of a residence premises rented 
by an insured to other than an insured. 
This peril does not include loss caused by theft 
that occurs off the residence premises of 
a property while at any other residence owned 
by, rented to, or occupied by an insured, 
except while an insured is temporarily living 
there Pioperty of a student who is an insured 
is covered while at a residence away from 
home if the student has been there at any 
t ime during the 45 days immediately before 
the loss. 
b watercraft, including their furnishings, equip-
ment and outboard motors or 
c trailers and campers 
This peril does not include loss to proper ty con 
tamed in a building unless the roof oi an outside 
wall of the building is first damaged by a falling 
object Damage to the falling object itself is not 
included 
11 . Weight of ice, snow or sleet which causes dam 
age to property contained in a building 
12. Accidental discharge or overflow of water or 
steam from within a plumbing, heating a«r condi-
tioning or automatic fire protective sprinkler sys 
tern or from within a household appliance 
This peril does not include loss 
a to the system or appliance from which the 
water or steam escaped; 
b caused by or resulting from freezing except as 
provided in the peril of freezing below or 
c on the residence premises caused by acci-
dental discharge or overflow which occurs off 
the residence premises. 
13. Sudden and accidental tearing apart, cracking, 
burning or bulging of a steam or hot water heat-
ing system, an air conditioning or automatic fire 
protective sprinkler system, or an appliance for 
heating water 
We do not cover loss caused by or resulting from 
freezing under this peril 
14. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning 
or automatic fire protective sprinkler system or of 
a household appliance 
This peril does not include loss on the residence 
premises while the dwellng is unoccupied unless 
you have used reasonable care to 
a maintain heat in the building or 
b shut off the water supply and drain the sys-
tem and appliances of water 
15. Sudden and accidental damage f rom artif icial ly 
generated electrical current. 
This peril does not include loss to a tube tran-
sistor or similar electronic component 
16. Damage by glass or safety glazing mater ia l 
which is part of a building, storm door or storm 
window 
This peril does not include loss on the residence 
premises if the dwelling has been vacant for more 
than 30 consecutive days immediately before the 
loss A dwelling being constructed is not con-
sidered vacant 
17. Volcanic Erupt ion other than Joss caused by 
earthquake, land shock waves or tremors 
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SECTION l — EXCLUSIONS 
1. We do not insure for loss caused direct ly or 
indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is 
excluded regardless of any other cause or event 
contributing concurrently or in any sequence to 
the loss. 
a. Ordinance or Law, meaning enforcement of 
any ordinance or law regulating the construe 
tion, repair, or demolition of a building or other 
structure, unless specifically provided under 
this policy. 
b. Earth Movement, meaning earthquake in-
cluding land shock waves or tremors before, dur-
ing or after a volcanic erupt ion; landslide; 
mudflow; ear th sinking, rising or shif t ing; 
unless direct loss by: 
(1) fire; 
(2) explosion; or 
(3) breakage of glass or safety glazing mate-
rial which is part of a building, storm door 
or storm window; 
ensues and then we will pay only for the ensu-
ing loss. 
This exclusion does not apply to loss l^ y theft. 
Co Water Damage, meaning: 
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, 
overflow of a body of water, or spray from 
any o f these , whether or not driven by 
wind; 
(2) water which backs up through sewers or 
drains; or 
(3) water below the surface of the ground, in-
cluding water which exerts pressure on 
or seeps or leaks through a building, side-
walk, dr iveway, foundat ion, swimming 
pool or other structure. 
Direct loss by fire, explosion or theft resulting 
from water damage is covered. 
d. Power Failure, meaning the failure of power 
or other utility service if the failure takes place 
off the residence premises. But, if a Peril 
Insured Against ensues on the residence 
premises, we will pay only for that ensuing 
loss. 
e. Neglect, meaning neglect of the insured to 
use all reasonable means to save and pre-
serve property at and after the time of a loss. 
f. War, including undeclared war. civil war. 
insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warlike act 
by a mi l i tary force or mil i tary personnel, 
destruction or seizure or use for a military 
purpose, and including any consequence of 
any of these. Discharge of a nuclear wea-
pon will be deemed a warl ike act even if 
accidental. 
g. Nuclear Hazard, to the extent set forth in the 
Nuclear Hazard Clause of Section I — Con-
ditions. 
h. Intentional Loss, meaning any loss arising out 
of any act committed: 
(1) by or at the direction of an insured; and 
(2) with the intent to cause a loss. 
2. We do not insure for loss to property described in 
Coverages A and B caused by any of the following. 
However, any ensuing loss to property described 
in Coverages A and B not excluded or excepted in 
this policy is covered. 
a. Weather condit ions. However, this exclusion 
only applies if weather conditions contribute 
in any way with a cause or event excluded in 
paragraph 1. above to produce the loss; 
b. Acts or decisions, including the failure to act 
or decide, of any person, group, organization 
or governmental body; 
c. Faulty, inadequate or defective: 
(1) planning, :zoning, development, survey-
ing, siting; 
(2) design, specifications, workmanship, re-
pair, construction, renovation, remodel-
ing, grading, compaction; 
(3) materials used in repair, construct ion, 
renovation or remodeling; or 
(4) maintenance; 
of part or all of any property whether on or off 
the residence premises. 
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SECTION I—CONDITIONS 
1, Insurable Interest and Limit of Liability. Even if 
more than one person has an insurable interest in 
the property covered, we will not be liable in any 
one loss: 
a. to the insured for more than the amount of 
the insured's interest at the time of loss; or 
b. for more than the applicable limit of liability. 
2. Your Duties After Loss. In case of a loss to cov-
ered property, you must see that the following are 
done: 
a. give prompt notice to us or our agent; 
b. notify the police in case of loss by theft; 
c. notify the credit card or fund transfer card 
company in case of loss under Credit Card or 
Fund Transfer Card coverage; 
d. (1) protect the property from further dam-
age; 
(2) make reasonable and necessary repairs 
to protect the property; and 
(3) keep an accurate record of repair ex-
penses; 
e. prepare an inventory of damaged personal 
property showing the quantity, description. 
actual cash value and amount of loss. Attach 
all bills, receipts and related documents that 
justify the figures in the inventory; 
f. as often as we reasonably require: 
(1) show the damaged property; 
(2) provide us with records and documents 
we request and permit us to make copies; 
and 
(3) submit to questions under oath and sign 
and swear to them; 
g. send to us, within 60 days after our request, 
your signed, sworn proof of loss which sets 
fo r th , to the best of your knowledge and 
belief: 
(1) the time and cause of loss; 
(2) the interest of the insured and all others 
in the property involved and all liens on 
the property; 
(3) other insurance which may cover the 
loss; 
(4) changes in title or occupancy of the prop-
erty during the term of the policy; 
(5) specifications of damaged buildings and 
detailed repair estimates; 
(6) the inventory of damaged personal prop-
erty described in 2e above; 
(7) receipts for additional living expenses in-
curred and records that support the fair 
rental value loss; and 
(8) evidence or affidavit that supports a claim 
under the Credit Card, Fund Transfer 
Card. Forgery and Counterfeit Money 
coverage, stating the amount and cause 
of loss. 
3. Loss Set t lement. Covered property losses are 
settled as follows: 
a. (1) Personal property; 
(2) Awnings, carpet ing, household appli-
ances, outdoor antennas and outdoor 
equipment, whether or not attached to 
buildings; and 
(3) Structures that are not buildings; 
at actual cash value at the time of loss but not 
more than the amount required to repair or 
replace. 
b. Buildings under Coverage A or B at re-
placement cost without deduction for depre-
ciation, subject to the following: 
(1) If, at the time of loss, the amount of insur-
ance in this policy on the damaged build-
ing is 80% or more of the full replacement 
cost of the building-immediately before 
the loss, we will pay the cost to repair or 
replace, after application of deductible 
and without deduction for depreciation, 
but not more than the least of the follow-
ing amounts: 
(a) the limit of liability under this policy 
that applies to the building; 
(b) the replacement cost of that part of 
the building damaged for like con-
struction and use on the same prem-
ises; or 
(c) the necessary amount actually spent 
to repair or replace the damaged 
building. 
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(2) If. at the time of loss. t he^noun l of insur-
ance in this policy on the damaged build-
ing is less than 80% of the full replace-
ment cost of the building immediately 
before the loss, we will pay the greater of 
the following amounts, but not more than 
the limit of liability under this policy that 
applies to the building: 
(a) the actual cash value of that part of 
the building damaged: or 
(b) that proportion of the cost to repair or 
replace, after application of deduct-
ible and wi thout deduct ion for de-
preciation, that part of the building 
damaged, which the total amount of 
insurance in this policy on the dam-
aged building bears to 80% of the 
replacement cost of the building. 
(3) To determine the amount of insurance 
required to equal 80% of the full replace-
ment cost of the building immediately 
before the loss, do not include the value 
of: 
(a) excavations, foundations, piers or 
any supports which are below the 
undersurface of the lowest basement 
floor: 
(b) those supports in (a) above whi<ch are 
below the surface of the ground inside 
the foundation walls, if there is no 
basement: and 
(c) underground flues, pipes, wiring and 
drains. 
(4) We will pay no more than the actual cash 
value of the damage unless: 
(a) actual repair or replacement is com-
plete: or 
(b) the cost to repair or replace the dam-
age is both: 
(i) less than 5% of the amount of in-
surance in this policy on the build-
ing; and 
(ii) less than $1000. 
(5) You may disregard the replacement cost 
loss settlement provisions and make claim 
under this policy for loss or damage to 
buildings on an actual cash value basis. 
You may then make claim within 180 days 
after loss for any additional liability on a 
replacement cost basis. 
4. Loss to a Pair or Sexrln case of loss to a pair or set 
wc may elect to: 
a repair or replace any part to restore the pair 
or set to its value before the loss; or 
b. pay the difference between actual cash value 
of the property before and after the loss. 
5. Glass Replacement. Loss for damage to glass 
caused by a Peril Insured Against will be set tied on 
the basis of replacement wi th safety glazing 
materials when required by ordinance or law. 
6. Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the 
amount of loss, either may demand an appraisal 
of the loss. In this event, each party will choose a 
competent appraiser within 20 days after receiv-
ing a wri t ten request from the other. The two 
appraisers will choose an umpire. If they cannot 
agree upon an umpire within 15 days, you or we 
may request that the choice be made by a judge 
of a court of record in the state where the resi-
dence premises is located. The appraisers will 
separately set the amount of loss. If the ap-
praisers submit a written report of an agreement 
to us. the amount agreed upon will be the amount 
of loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit their 
differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by 
any two will set the amount of loss. 
Each party will: 
a. pay its own appraiser; and 
b. bear the other expenses of the appraisal and 
umpire equally. 
7. Other Insurance. If a loss covered by this policy is 
also covered by other insurance, we will pay only 
the proportion of the loss that the limit of liability 
that applies under this policy bears to the total 
amount of insurance covering the loss. 
8. Suit Against Us. No action can be brought unless 
the policy provisions have been complied with and 
the action is started within one year after the date 
of loss. 
9. Our Option. If we give you written notice within 30 
days after we receive your signed, sworn proof of 
loss, we may repair or replace any part of the dam-
aged property with like property. 
10. Loss Payment. We will adjust ail losses with you. 
We will pay you unless some other person is named 
in the policy or is legally entitled to receive pay-
m e n t Loss will be payable 60 days after we 
receive your proof of loss and: 
a. reach an agreement with you; 
b. there is an entry of a final judgment; or 
c. there is a filing of an appraisal award with us. 
11 . Abandonment of Property. We need not accept 
any property abandoned by an insured. 
HO-3 Ed. 4-84 Copyright. Insurance Services Office. Inc.. 1984 Page 9 of 15 
12. Mortgage Clause. 
The word "mortgagee" includes trustee. 
If a mortgagee is named in this policy, any loss 
payable under Coverage A or B will be paid to the 
mortgagee and you, as interests appear. If more 
than one mortgagee is named, the order of pay-
ment will be the same as the order of precedence 
of the mortgages. 
If we deny your claim, that denial will not apply to a 
valid claim of the mortgagee, if the mortgagee: 
a. notifies us of any change in ownership, occu-
pancy or substantial change In risk of which 
the mortgagee is aware; 
b. pays any premium due under this policy on 
demand if you have neglected to pay the pre-
mium; and 
c. submits a signed, sworn statement of loss 
within 60 days after receiving notice from us 
of your failure to do so. Policy condit ions 
relating to Appraisal, Suit Against Us and Loss 
Payment apply to the mortgagee. 
If the policy is cancelled or not renewed by us, the 
mortgagee will be noMiled at least 10 days before 
the date cancellation or nonrenewal takes effect. 
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny 
payment to you: 
a. we are subrogated to all the rights of the 
mortgagee granted under the mortgage on 
the property; or 
b. at our option, we may pay to the mortgagee 
the whole principal on the mortgage plus any 
accrued interest. In this event, we will receive 
a full assignment and transfer of the mort-
gage and all securities held as collateral to the 
mortgage debt. 
SECTION If — 
COVERAGE E — Personal Liability 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an in-
sured for damages because of bodily in jury or pro-
perty damage caused by an occurrence to which this 
coverage applies, we will: 
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for 
which the insured is legally liable; and 
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our 
choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraud-
ulent. We may investigate and settle any claim or 
suit that we decide is appropriate. Our duty to set-
tle or defend ends when the amount we pay for 
damages resulting from the occurrence equals 
our limit of liability. 
Subrogation w i l f u l impair (he right of (he mort-
gagee to recover the lull amount ol the mort-
gagee's claim. 
13. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize any 
assignment or grant any coverage that benefits a 
person or organization holding, storing or moving 
property for a fee regardless of any other provi-
sion of this policy. 
14. Nuclear Hazard Clause., 
a. "Nuclear Hazard" means any nuclear reac-
tion, radiation, or radioactive contamination, 
all whether controlled or uncontrolled or how-
ever caused, or any consequence of any of 
these. 
b. Loss caused by the nuclear hazard will not be 
considered loss caused by fire, explosion, oi 
smoke, whether these perils are specifically 
named in or otherwise included within the 
Perils Insured Against in Section I. 
c. This policy does not apply under Section I to 
loss caused directly or indirectly by nuclear 
hazard, except that direct loss by fire result-
ing from the nuclear hazard is covered. 
15. Recovered Property. If you or we recover any 
property for which we have made payment under 
this policy, you or we will notify the other of the 
recovery. At your option, the property will be re-
turned to or retained by you or it will become our 
property. If the recovered property is returned to 
or retained by you, the loss payment will be 
adjusted based on the amount you received for 
the recovered property. 
16. Volcanic Eruption Period. One or more volcanic 
eruptions that occur within a 72-hour period will 
be considered as one volcanic eruption. 
COVERAGES 
COVERAGE F — Medical Payments To Others 
We will pay the necessary medical expenses that are 
incurred or medically ascertained-within three years 
from the date of an accident causing bodily injury. 
Medical expenses means reasonable charges for med-
ical, surgical, x-ray, dental, ambulance, hospital, pro-
fessional nursing, prosthetic devices and funeral ser-
vices. This coverage does not apply to you or regular 
residents of your household except residence em-
ployees. As to others, this coverage applies only: 
1. to a person on the insured location with the per-
mission of an insured; or 
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2. to a person off the insured locat ion, if tlie bodily 
Injury? 
a. arises out of a condition on the insured loca-
t ion or the ways immediately adjoining; 
b6 is caused by the activities of an insured; 
c. is caused uy a ^ ^ i d e n c e employee in the 
course of the residence employee's employ-
ment by an insured; or 
d. is caused by an animal owned by or in the care 
of an insured. 
SECTION II —EXCLUSIONS 
1. Coverage E — Personal Liability and Coverage F 
— Medical Payments to Others do not apply to 
bodily injury or property damage: 
a. which is expected or intended by the insured; 
b. arising out of business pursuits of an insured 
or the rental or holding for rental of any part 
of any premises by an insured. 
This exclusion does not apply to: 
(1) activities which are usual to non-business 
pursuits; or 
(2) the rental or holding for rental of an 
insured location: 
(a) on an occasional basis if used only as 
a residence; 
(b) in part for use only as o residence, 
unless a single family unit is intended 
for use by the occupying family to 
lodge more than two roomers or 
boarders; or 
(c) in part, as an office, school, studio or 
private garage; 
Co arising out of the rendering of or failure to 
render professional services; 
d. arising out of a premises: 
(1) owned by an insured; 
(2) rented to an insured; or 
(3) rented to others by an insured; 
that is not an insured location; 
e. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, loading 
or unloading of motor vehicles or all other 
motor ized land conveyances, including 
trailers, owned or operated by or rented 
or loaned to an insured; 
(2) the entrustment by an insured of a motor 
vehicle or any other motorized land con-
veyance to any person; or 
(3) statutorily imposed vicarious parental lia-
bility for the actions of a child or minor 
using a conveyance excluded in para-
graph (1) or (2) above. 
This exclusion does not apply to: 
(1) a trailer not towed by or carried on a 
motorized land conveyance. 
(2) a motorized land conveyance designed 
for recreational use off public roads, not 
subject to motor vehicle registration and: 
(a) not owned by an insured; or 
(b) owned by an insured and on an 
insured location. 
(3) a motorized golf cart when used to play 
golf on a golf course. 
(4) a vehicle or conveyance not subject to 
motor vehicle registration which is: 
(a) used to service an insured's resi-
dence; 
(b) designed for assisting the handicap-
ped; or 
(c) in dead storage on an insured loca-
t ion. 
f. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maintenance, use, loading 
or unloading of a watercraft described 
below: 
(2) the entrustment by an insured of a water-
craft described below to any person; or 
(3) statutorily imposed vicarious parental lia-
bility for the actions of a child or minor 
using a watercraft described below. 
Watercraft: 
(1) with inboard or inboard-outdrive motor 
power owned by an insured; 
(2) with inboard or inboard-outdrive motor 
power of more than 50 horsepower rent-
ed to an insured; 
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(3 ; that is a sailing vcs. wi lh or without 
auxiliary power, 26 leet or more in length 
owned by or rented to an insured; or 
(4) powered by one or more outboard motors 
with more than 25 total horsepower if the 
ou\board mo\or )s owned by an msured. 
But. outboard motors of more than 25 
total horsepower are covered for the 
policy period if: 
(a) you acquire them prior to the policy 
period and: 
( i ) you declare them at policy incep-
tion; or 
(ii) your in tent ion lo insure is re-
ported to us in writing within 45 
days after you acquire the out-
board motors. 
(b) you acquire them during the policy 
period. 
This exclusion does not apply while the water-
craft is stored. 
g. arising out of: 
(1) the ownership, maiateaaace, use, loadiag 
or unloading of an aircraft; 
(2) the ent rus tment by an insured of an 
aircraft to any person: or 
(3) statutorily imposed vicarious parental lia-
bility for the actions of a child or minor 
using an aircraft. 
An aircraft means any contrivance used or 
designed for flight, except model or hobby 
aircraft not used or designed to carry people 
or cargo. 
h. caused directly or indirectly by wor, including 
undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, rebel-
lion, revolution, warlike act by a military force 
or military personnel, destruction or seizure 
or use for a military purpose, and including 
any consequence of any of these. Discharge 
of a nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike 
act even if accidental. 
Exclusions d., e.e f., and g. do not apply to bodily 
Injury to a residence employee arising out of and 
in the course of the residence employee's em-
ployment by an insured. 
2. Coverage E — Personal Liabil i ty, does not apply 
to: 
a. liability: 
(1) for your share of any loss assessment 
charged against all members of an asso-
c ia t ion , corporat ion or commun i t y of 
property owners: 
(2) under contiact or agieement. How-
ever, this exclusion does not apply to writ-
ten contracts: 
(a) that directly relate to the ownership, 
maintenance or use of an insured 
location; or 
(b) where the l iabil i ty of others is as-
sumed by the insured prior to an 
occurrence; 
unless excluded in (1) above oi elsewhere 
in this policy: 
b. property damage to property owned by the 
Insured; 
c. property damage lo property rented to, oc-
cupied or used by or in the care of the in-
sured. This exclusion does not apply to prop-
erty damage caused by fire, smoke or ex-
plosion; 
d. bodily injury to any person eligible to receive 
any benefits: 
(1) voluntarily provided; or 
(2) required to be provided; 
by the 'insured under any: 
(1) workers* compensation law; 
(2) non-occupational disability law; or 
(3) occupational disease law; 
e. bodily injury or property damage for which 
an insured under this policy: 
(1) is also an insured under a nuclear energy 
liability policy or 
(2) would be an insured under that policy but 
for the exhaustion of its limit of liability. 
A nuclear energy liability policy is one issued 
by: 
(1) American Nuclear Insurers; 
(2) Mutual Atomic Energy Liabil ity Under-
writers; 
(3) Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada; 
or any of their successors; or 
f. bodily injury to you or an insured within the 
meaning of part a. or b. of " i n s u r e d " as 
defined. 
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3. Coverage F — Medical Payment Others, does 
not apply to bodily in jury: 
a. to a residence employee if the bodily in jury: 
(1) occurs off the insured locat ion; and 
(2) does not arise out of or in the course of 
the residence employee's employment 
by an insured; 
b. to any person eligible to receive benefits: 
(1) voluntarily provided, or 
(2) required to be provided; 
under any 
(1) workers' compensation law; 
We cover the following in addit ion to the l imits of 
liability: 
1 . Claim Expenses. We pay: 
a. expenses we incur and costs taxed against an 
insured in any suit we defend; 
b. premiums on bonas required in a suit we 
defend, but not for bond amounts mqre than 
the limit of liability for Coverage E vVe need 
not apply for or furnish any bond; 
c. reasonable expenses incurred by an insured 
at our request, including actual loss of earn-
ings (but not loss of other income) up to $50 
per day, for assisting us in the investigation or 
defense of a claim or suit; 
d. interest on the entire judgment which ac-
crues after entry of the judgment and before 
we pay or tender, or deposit in court that part 
of the judgment which does not exceed the 
limit of liability that applies; 
e. prejudgment interest awarded against the 
insured on that pa? t o\ the ludgment we pay. 
If we make an offer to pay the applicable limit 
of liability, we will not pay any prejudgment 
interest based on that period of time after the 
offer. 
4. 
20 First Aid Expenses. We will pay expenses for first 
aid to others incurred by an insured for bodily 
in jury covered under this policy We will not pay 
for first aid to you or any other insured. 
3. Damage to Property of Others. We will pay, at 
replacement cost, up to $500 per occurrence for 
property damage to property of others caused by 
an insured. 
(I) non-occuj ;nai oisoonuy IOW oi 
(3) occupational disease law; 
c. from any 
(1) nuclear reaction; 
(2) nuclear radiation, or 
(3) radioactive contamination; 
all whether controlled or uncontrolled or how-
ever caused; or 
(4) any consequence of any of these 
d. to any person, other than a residence em-
ployee of an insured, regularly residing on 
any part of the insured location. 
We will not pay for property damage: 
a. to the extent of any amount recoverable 
under Section I of this policy; 
b. caused intentionally by an insured who is 13 
years of age or older, 
c. to property owned by an insured; 
d. to property owned by or rented to a tenant of 
an insured or a resident in your household, or 
e. arising out of: 
(1) business pursuits; 
(2) any act or omission in connection with a 
premises owned, rented or controlled by 
an insured, other than the insured loca-
t ion; or 
(3) the ownership, maintenance, or use of air-
craft, watercraft or motor vehicles or all 
other motorized land conveyances 
This exclusion does not apply to a motor-
ized land conveyance designed for recre-
ational use off public roads, not subject to 
motor vehicle registration and not owned 
by an insured. 
Loss Assessment. We will pay up to $ 1000 for your 
share of any loss assessment charged during the 
policy period against you by a corporation or as-
sociation of property owners, when the assess-
ment is made as a result of: 
a each occurrence to which Section II of this 
policy would apply; 
SECTION ll—ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
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b liability for each act of a ^,rector, officer or 
trustee in the capacity as a director, officer or 
trustee, provided 
(1) the director, officer or trustee is elected 
by the members of a corporation or as-
sociation of property owners, and 
(2) the director, off icer or trustee serves 
without deriving any income f rom the 
exercise of duties which are solely on 
behalf of a corporation or association of 
property owners 
1. Limit of Liability. Our total liability under Covei -
age E for all damages resulting from any one 
occurrence will not be more than the limit of lia-
bility for Coverage E as shown in the Declarations 
This limit is the same regardless of the number of 
Insureds, claims made or persons injured 
Our total liability under Coverage F for all medical 
expense payable for bodily Injury to one person 
as the result of one accident will not be more than 
the lirqit of liability for Coverage F as shown in the 
Declarations 
2. Severability of Insurance. This insurance applies 
separately to each insured This condition will not 
increase our limit of liability for any one occur-
rence. 
3o Duties After Loss. In case of an accident or occur-
rence, the Insured will per form the fol lowing 
duties that apply You will help us by seeing that 
these duties are performed 
a. give written notice to us or our agent as soon 
as is practical, which sets forth 
(1) the identity of the policy and insured; 
(2) reasonably available information on the 
t ime , place and c i rcumstances of the 
accident or occurrence; and 
(3) names and addresses of any claimants 
and witnesses, 
b. promptly forward to us every notice, demand, 
summons or other process relating to the 
accident or occurrence; 
c. at our request, he'p us 
(1) to make settlement, 
(2) to enforce any right of contr ibut ion or 
indemnity against any person or organi-
zation who may be liable to an insured; 
(3) with the conduct of suits and attend hear-
ings and trials 
(4) to secure and give evidence and obtain 
the attendance of witnesses 
This coverage >Ues only to loss assessments 
charged against you as owner or tenant of the 
residence premises. 
We do not cover loss assessments charged 
agamst you or a corporation or association of 
property owners by any governmental body 
Section II — Coverage E — Personal Liability 
Exclusion 2 a (1) does not apply to this coverage 
d under the coverage — Damage to Property of 
Others —- submit to us within 60 days after 
the loss, a sworn statement of loss and show 
the damaged property, if in the insured's 
control, 
e the insured will not except at the insured's 
own cost, voluntarily make payment assume 
obligation or incur expense other than for first 
aid to others at the time of the bodily injury. 
4. Duties of an Injured Person — Coverage F — 
Medical Payments to Others. 
The injured person or someone acting for the 
injured person will 
a give us written proof of claim, under oath if 
required, as soon as is practical, and 
b authorize us to obtain copies of medical 
reports and records 
The injured person will submit to a physical exam 
by a doctor of our choice when and as often as v\e 
reasonably require 
5. Payment of Claim—Coverage F—Medical Pay-
ments to Others. Payment under this coverage <s 
not an admission of liability by an insured or us 
6. Suit Against Us. No action can be brought against 
us unless there has been compliance with the 
policy provisions 
No one will have the right to join us as a party *o 
any action against an insured. Also, no action 
with respect to Coverage E can be brought against 
us until the obligation of the insured has been 
determined by final judgment or agreement 
signed by us 
7. Bankruptcy of an Insured. Bankruptcy or insol-
vency of an insured will not relieve us of our 
obligations under this policy 
8. Other Insurance — Coverage E — Personal Lia-
bility. This insurance is excess over other valid 
and collectible insurance except insurance writ-
ten specifically to cover as excess over the limits 
of liability that apply in this policy 
SECTION ll—CONDITIONS 
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SECTIONS I AND N—CONDITIONS 
1. Policy Period. This policy applies only to loss irl 
Section I or bodily injury or property damage in 
Section II, which occurs during the policy period. 
2. Concealment or Fraud. We do not provide cover-
age for an insured who has: 
a. intentionally concealed or misrepresented 
any material fact or circumstance, or 
bo made false statements or engaged in fraudu-
lent conduct: 
relating to this insurance. 
3. Liberalization Clause. If we adopt a revision 
which would broaden the coverage under this poli-
cy without additional premium within 60 days 
prior to or during the policy period, the br oadened 
coverage will immediately apply to this policy. 
4. Waiver or Change of Policy Provisions. 
A waiver or change of a provision of this policy must 
be in writ ing by us to be valid. Our request for an 
appraisal or examination will not waive any of our 
rights. 
5. Cancellation. 
a. You may cancel this policy at any time by 
returning it to us or by letting us knpw in writ-
ing of the date cancellation is to take effect. 
b. We may cancel this policy only for the reasons 
stated below by letting you know in writing of 
the date cancellation takes effect. This can-
cellation notice may be delivered to you. or 
mailed to you at your mailing address shown 
in the Declarations. 
Proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of no-
tice. 
(1) When you have not paid the premium, we 
may cancel at any t ime by lett ing you 
know at least 10 days before the date can-
cellation takes effect. 
(2) When this policy has been in effect for less 
than 60 days and is not a renewal with us. 
we may cancel for any reason by letting 
you know at least 10 days before the date 
cancellation takes effect. 
(3) When this policy has been in effect for 60 
days or more, or at any time if it is a re-
newal with us, we may cancel: 
(a) if there has been a material misrepre-
sentation of fact which if known to us 
would have caused us not to issue the 
policy; or 
(b) if the risk has changed substantially 
since the policy was issued. 
This can be done by letting you know at 
least 30 days before the date cancellation 
takes effect. 
(4) When this policy is writ ten for a period of 
more than one year, we may cancel for 
any reason at anniversary by letting you 
know at least 30 days before the date 
cancellation t jkes effect. 
c. When this policy is cancelled, the premium for 
the period from the date of cancellation to 
the expiration date will be refunded pro rata. 
d. If the return premium is not refunded with the 
notice of cancellation or when this policy is 
returned to us, we will refund it within a rea-
sonable t ime after the date cancel lat ion 
takes effect. 
6. Non-Renewal. We may elect not to renew this 
policy. We may do so by delivering to you. or mail-
ing to you at your mailing address shown in the 
Declarations, written notice at least 30 days be-
fore the expiration date of this policy. Proof of 
mailing will be sufficient proof of notice. 
7. Assignment. Assignment of this policy will not be 
valid unless we give our written consent. 
8. Subrogation. An insured may waive in writing be-
fore a loss all rights of recovery against any per-
son. If not waived, we may require an assignment 
of rights of recovery for a loss to the extent that 
payment is made by us. 
If an assignment is sought, an insured must sign 
and deliver all related papers and cooperate with 
us. 
Subrogation does not apply under Section II to 
Medical Payments to Others or Damage to Prop-
erty of Others. 
9. Death. If any person named in the Declarations 
or the spouse, if a resident of the same household, 
dies: 
a. we insure the legal representative of the de-
ceased but only with respect to the premises 
and property of the deceased covered under 
the policy at the time of death; 
b. insured includes: 
(1) any member of your household who is an 
insured at the time of your death, but 
only while a resident of the residence 
premises; and 
(2) with respect to your property, the person 
having proper temporary custody of the 
property until appointment and qualifica-
tion of a legal representative. 
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EXHIBIT "6" 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — NO. 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
^ Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
> Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
n 
'J IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA L. TAYLOR 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON, 
AND JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON 
Defendants 
COUNT 1 
1. On October 17, 1987, ("accident date") the defendant 
Ronald H. Olson was the owner of a 1974 Volkswagen, two-door sedan, 
green in color ("Volkswagen"). Mr. Olson had purchased the said 
Volkswagen from a previous owner Daniel Park Lake. On the said 
October 17, 1987, the Volkswagen was not registered in the state 
of Utah and was uninsured. 
2. On the said accident date the said Ronald H. Olson was 
married to the defendant Carol D. Olson and was living with his 
wife and family at 1930 Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. ^jQOcl Q 1 
(Judge ) 
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On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson was 
sixteen years of age, having been born on April 2, 1971. 
3. On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather 
Olson ("Heather") was driving the said Volkswagen at approximately 
11:55 P.M. on Yalecrest Avenue (1015 South in Salt Lake City, Utah) 
at its intersection with 1900 East ("accident scene") . At the said 
time and place the said defendant Heather was intoxicated and was 
driving the Volkswagen with a blood alcohol content of 
approximately .14 grams in violation of § 41-6-44, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
4. A few minutes prior to the time and place described in 
paragraph 3 above, said defendant Heather was involved in a "hit 
and run" accident in an area less than one mile from the said 
accident scene. 
5. At approximately 11:55 P.M. on the said accident date and 
at the accident scene, the plaintiff Myra L. Taylor was driving her 
1984 Subaru 640 station wagon ("Subaru") in a northerly direction 
along 1900 East Street and in a careful and prudent manner. 
6. On or about the said 11:55 P.M. on the said accident date 
and at the accident scene, the defendant Heather negligently, 
carelessly, recklessly, improperly, unlawfully and illegally 
("negligence") operated her Volkswagen thereby causing a collision 
with the Subaru being driven by the plaintiff. 
7. As a direct and proximate cause of the said defendant's 
negligence, the plaintiff was then and there seriously and 
permanently injured both internally and externally. She suffered 
bruises, contusions, lacerations, shock, headache, muscle spasms, 
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numbness in her joints and members, scarring, strains, fractures, 
and other damages and personal injury so as to render the plaintiff 
partially and permanently disabled for the balance of her life. 
The plaintiff has suffered a loss of the quality of life and 
enjoyment of life she experienced prior to October 17, 1987, and 
has also suffered mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering and 
other mental and emotional trauma. The plaintiff is entitled to 
be awarded general damages in the amount of $500,000 for these 
personal injuries. 
8. As a direct and proximate cause of the said defendant's 
negligence, the plaintiff sustained a loss and impairment of 
earning capacity which will continue for the balance of the 
plaintiff's working life. The plaintiff is entitled to be 
compensated for the loss of this earning capacity in the amount of 
$250,000. 
9. As a direct and proximate cause of the said defendant's 
negligence as described above, the plaintiff has been forced to 
seek medical and surgical care and attention and has incurred sums 
of money for doctors, surgeons, and hospital bills; and will 
continue to incur sums for said bills; that the exact amount of the 
said bills has not been determined at this time; but will be 
determined and known by the time of the trial of this matter; and 
the plaintiff requests leave to amend her complaint to plead the 
said medical costs and expenses at that time. 
10. As a direct and proximate cause of the said defendant's 
negligence as described above, the plaintiff has lost sums of money 
which she might otherwise have earned in her employment; that she 
"
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has been required to take time off from her employment to receive 
medical attention and treatment for the injuries sustained as a 
result of the negligence of the defendant Heather as described 
above, and also for the time to convalescence from the said injury; 
has incurred sums of money to pay for domestic help to assist the 
plaintiff in maintaining her household and the raising of ten (10) 
children during the time of her convalescence from the said 
personal injuries described above; that the exact amount of loss 
of money from her employment and the amounts paid for the domestic 
assistance is not known at this time, but will become known by the 
time of the trial in this matter, and the plaintiff requests leave 
to amend her complaint when the said damages become known. 
11. As a direct and proximate cause of the defendant's 
negligence as described above, the plaintiff's motor vehicle was 
demolished and thereby rendered inoperable. The said motor vehicle 
was owned jointly by the plaintiff and her husband Wayne C. Taylor. 
The said Wayne C. Taylor has assigned any interest he might have 
in damages to the said motor vehicle to the plaintiff Myra L. 
Taylor herein. 
12. The Volkswagen Heather was driving at the accident scene 
and on the accident date and at the time indicated was in violation 
of several safety statutes which have been enacted by the state of 
Utah and other local governing bodies; that the operation of the 
said Volkswagen without being registered or insured also 
constitutes negligence on the part of the said defendant Heather. 
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WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the 
defendant Jennifer Heather Olson on this COUNT 1 as follows: 
1* For the sum of $500,000 general damages. 
2. For the sum of $250,000 loss of earning capacity. 
3. For the amount of special damages incurred by the 
plaintiff for medical, hospital, doctors, prescriptions and other 
expenses and charges described in this complaint* 
4. For the amount of special damages incurred by the 
plaintiff for loss of wages, cost of domestic help, and the other 
out-of-pocket expenses described above. 
5. Together with interest on all said amounts described 
hereinabove at the highest legal rate both before and after 
judgment; together with costs of court and such other relief the 
court deems appropriate. 
COUNT 2 
("PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR HBA0?B£R*S mi&tlt AND MALICIOUS MISCONDUCT") 
13. The plaintiff incorporates by reference all the 
allegations in COUNT 1 into this COUNT 2. 
14. The conduct of the defendant Heather in driving a motor 
vehicle without registration and which was uninsured, in being in 
an intoxicated condition at the time of the accident, in having 
been involved in a "hit and run" collision within a few minutes of 
the accident with Myra L. Taylor; and in otherwise disregarding the 
rights and safety of the said Myra L. Taylor in the manner in which 
the said Heather drove her Volkswagen, was wilful, malicious, 
wanton, and intentional ("malicious misconduct"). 
~
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15. As a direct and proximate cause of the malicious 
misconduct of the said defendant Heather as described above, the 
plaintiff sustained the personal injuries, property damage, and 
other damages more fully described in COUNT 1 above. 
16. Because of the malicious misconduct on the part of the 
said defendant Heather, the plaintiff is entitled to punitive 
damages against the said defendant. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the 
defendant Heather on this COUNT 2 as follows: 
1. For all of the damages requested in the prayer in COUNT 
1. 
2. For punitive damages in an amount to be determined at the 
time of the trial in this matter. 
3. For interest on the said amount of punitive damages at 
the highest legal rate allowed by law both before and after 
j udgment. 
COUNT 3 
(M3¥A*0¥0RX LIABILITY Off KONALD H,.OLSOH FOR HEATHER*S MISCOHDUCT") 
17. The plaintiff incorporates by reference all the 
allegations in the preceding counts into this COUNT 3. 
18. Section 41-2-115, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides that any negligence or wilful misconduct of a minor 
younger than eighteen (18) years of age when operating a motor 
vehicle upon a highway is imputed to the person who has signed the 
application of the minor for a permit or license. The said section 
further provides the person signing the application for a permit 
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or a license is jointly and severally liable with the minor for any 
damages caused by the negligent or wilful misconduct. 
19. At the time of the negligence and malicious and wilful 
misconduct as described in COUNTS 1 and 2 above, the defendant 
Ronald H. Olson had signed the application for a permit or license 
of the defendant minor Jennifer Heather Olson. Pursuant to § 41-
2-115 the said Ronald H. Olson is jointly and severally liable with 
Heather for any and all of the damages claimed in COUNTS 1 and 2 
above. 
20. Section 41-2-116, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides that the owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly 
permitting a minor younger than eighteen (18) years of age to 
operate the vehicle upon a highway or a person who gives or 
furnishes the motor vehicle to the minor, are each jointly and 
severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the 
negligence of the minor in operating the vehicle. 
21. The defendant Ronald H. Olson is jointly and severally 
liable with his minor daughter Heather pursuant to § 41-2-116 for 
any damages negligently caused by the said minor as set forth more 
fully in COUNT 1 above. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the 
defendants Ronald H. Olson and Jennifer Heather Olson jointly and 
severally on this COUNT 3 for all of the damages requested in 
COUNTS 1 and 2 above. 
~7~ 
ft A a a a 
COUNT 4 
(w&iaBTItfTT O? RONRW) B< QfcSOff AUD CARO& D, OI.SON FOR 
NBGK&KSBHT ENTROSTMBUT OF MOTOR VEHICLE TO THEIR MIKOR DAUGHTER 
HEATHER") 
22. The plaintiff incorporates by reference all the 
allegations in the preceding counts into this COUNT 4. 
23. The defendants Ronald H. Olson and Carol D. Olson are the 
parents of the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson. On October 17, 
1987, the said parents were living in the same household with the 
said minor child. On the said date the said parents improperly 
permitted their minor daughter to use the Volkswagen automobile 
which was under the control of the said parents. At the said time, 
the parents knew or should have known their minor daughter intended 
to or was likely to use the motor vehicle and to conduct herself 
in an activity and in a manner as to create an unreasonable risk 
of harm to others. 
24. The said parents had previously known or should have 
known prior to the said accident date about Heather's drinking 
intoxicating beverages; however, the said parents failed to take 
adequate precautions or to properly instruct their minor child 
about the dangers of driving while under the influence of alcohol. 
25. The parents further failed to take the necessary 
precautions to see that their minor child would not take the 
Volkswagen automobile on the highways in an unregistered condition 
and without the vehicle insurance required by the statutes of the 
state of Utah. 
-
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26. The conduct of the parents in entrusting the motor 
vehicle to the minor child under the circumstances set forth above 
in this complaint constitute negligence for which the parents are 
liable for any damages caused by the said minor child. 
27. The said parents are liable for all the damages claimed 
by the plaintiff in the previous counts in this complaint. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the three 
defendant and each of them jointly and severally in this COUNT 4 
for the relief requested in the previous counts in this complaint. 
COUNT 5 
("LIABILITY OF RONALD H* OLSON AND CAROL T>. OLSON FOR FAILURE 
TO FROPERL* SUPERVISE A#$ CONTROL TBS CONDUCT OF THEIR MINOR CHILD 
HEATHER**) 
28c The plaintiff incorporates by reference all the 
allegations in the preceding counts into this COUNT 5. 
29. As parents of the said minor child Heather, the 
defendants Ronald H. Olson and Carol D. Olson had a duty to 
supervise and control the conduct of the said minor child so as to 
prevent the minor child from intentionally harming others or from 
so conducting herself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily 
harm to them, 
30. The said parents knew or had reason to know that they had 
the ability to control Heather and they knew or should have known 
of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. The 
parents knew the automobile did not contain current valid 
registration as required by Utah statutes nor was the Volkswagen 
automobile insured for personal injury or property damage to others 
"
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as required by Utah statutes* 
31. The parents knew the minor child had driven the car 
without registration and without insurance on previous occasions; 
however, the parents did not exercise the required supervision and 
control to stop Heather from using it on the accident date. 
Rather, they allowed the minor child to have access to the keys to 
the said automobile and to otherwise be able to use and operate the 
motor vehicle. 
32. The parents also knew that on prior occasions as well as 
on the accident date the minor child Heather had been using license 
plates from her older sister Heidi's automobile, the said use being 
in violation of the state statutes pertaining to motor vehicles. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, the said parents did not do 
anything to stop this practice and thereby permitted the minor 
child to take the Volkswagen on the public streets and highways in 
the state of Utah with an improper registration and without 
adequate insurance. 
33. The parents knew or should have known the minor child had 
been consuming alcoholic beverages for a period of time prior to 
the accident date. The parents also knew the minor child consorted 
with other friends and acquaintances who were accustomed to 
drinking alcoholic beverages when they were together. The parents 
knew or should have known their minor child Heather had driven 
previously after having taken alcoholic beverages. 
34. Notwithstanding this knowledge of Heather's drinking 
habits, the parents allowed Heather to have access to the 
Volkswagen which had invalid license plates, lacked adequate 
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insurance, and under circumstances where the parents knew or should 
have known Heather was attending a party where intoxicating 
beverages were going to be consumed and knew or should have known 
that Heather would be driving the motor vehicle after consuming the 
said intoxicating beveragesc 
35. The parents knew that they had the ability to control 
their minor daughter's access to and use of the said Volkswagen, 
and also knew the necessity for exercising the said control; 
however, they neglected to so control or supervise Heather to 
prevent her from using the said Volkswagen under the circumstances 
set forth in this count and other counts in this complaint. 
36. The parents knew or should have known their minor 
daughter Heather had not had sufficient driving experience to be 
driving the Volkswagen on October 17, 1987, under the circumstances 
described in this complaint without adult supervision and control; 
yet the parents neglected to provide this adult supervision and 
control, thereby resulting in the accident described more fully in 
COUNT 1 above. 
37. The parents were negligent in failing to retain 
sufficient control and discipline over their minor daughter Heather 
and in failing to provide adequate supervision for Heather to 
insure Heather would not take the Volkswagen automobile under the 
circumstances set forth in this count and other counts in this 
complaint* 
38. This lack of control and supervision on the part of the 
parents constitutes negligence on their part. 
-11-
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39. The said parent's negligence contributed as a proximate 
and direct cause to the accident on October 17, 1987, as described 
more fully in COUNT 1 of this complaint. As a direct and proximate 
result of this negligence on the part of the parents, the plaintiff 
sustained the damages which she claims in the preceding counts in 
this complaint. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the three 
defendants and each of them jointly and severally on this COUNT 5 
for the relief requested in the foregoing counts in this complaint. 
DATED this 5th day of December, 1990. 
MYR£/L. TAYLOB/ 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
TAMES A. MCINTOSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 5th day of December, 1990, personally appeared before 
me MYRA L. TAYLOR, who being first duly sworn, did depose and say 
that she has read the above and foregoing Complaint, knows the 
contents thereof, that the same are true of her own knowledge, 
except as to matters therein alleged upon information and belief 
and, as to those matters, she believes them to be true. 
•nun r> n ^ ^ a w t w x 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
Notary Public 
STATE Of UTAH 
My Commtaton Expires 
December 11,1993 
2038 Royal Cr. SIC. UT 84108 
- 1 2 -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of December, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing COMPLAINT was hand 
delivered to the following: 
Michael N. Martinez, Esq. 
349 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
-13-
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EXHIBIT "7" 
Frank Grant 
4821 South 1395 East • Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 • Phone (801) 277-7085 
November 16, 1987 
Jim Mcintosh 
Attorney at Law 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Re: Myra L. Taylor 
This accident occurred when a car eastbound on Yalecrest 
Ave. driven by Jennifer Heather Olson passed a yield 
sign and struck the left front of a car northbound on 
1900 East driven by Myra L. Taylor. 
In addition to the initial impact on the right front 
of the Olson car and the left front of the Taylor car, 
additional damage was sustained in a secondary impact 
to the right side of the Olson car and to the left side 
of the Taylor car. The impact then forced the Taylor 
car to the right where it hit head-on into a tree. 
Both 1900 East and Yalecrest Ave. are asphalt two-lane 
roads. There was a yield sign in place and clearly 
visible controlling traffic on Yalecrest Ave. The 
sight distance is restricted ny shrubbery on the south-
west corner of the intersection. This shrubbery extends 
from the sidewalk to the house on the southwest corner. 
The speed limit on both streets was posted at 25 MPH. 
The accident occurred at about 11:55 P.M. It was dark 
with no street lights. The weather was clear and the 
road was dry. There were no roadway defects that would 
have any bearing on the accident. 
Post impact analysis indicates an impact speed of 39 MPH 
on the Olson car and an impact speed of 33 MPH on the 
Taylor car. There was no indication of application of 
brakes on the part of either driver prior to impact. 
Due to the shrubbery obstructing the view, both drivers 
Accident Analyst 
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would have a clear view of the other for about 1.18 
seconds prior to impact. The average time required for 
perception and reaction is about 1.5 seconds. Under 
these circumstances, neither driver would have the time 
or the distance to have taken any successful evasive 
action. In order for Taylor to have been able to stop 
in time she would have to have been traveling at less 
than 15 MPH. At the time the Olson car came into view 
the Taylor car was about 56 feet away. This would not 
allow her time to perceive, react and skid to a stop 
at any speed greater than about 15 MPH. 
In my opinion, excessive speed of the Taylor car was not 
a contributing factor in the cause of this accident. 
There was no indication of any vehicle defects on either 
car. Witnesses stated that both cars had headlights on 
at the time of impact. 
Witnesses stated that they detected evidence of the use 
of alcohol by Jennifer Olson. Due to the fact that Olson 
was a juvenile and there is possible additional charges 
pending against her, the City Police Department is re-
luctant to disclose the results of a blood alcohol test 
performed on Olson shortly after the accident. 
The license plates on the 1974 Volkswagen driven by 
Jennifer Olson (945 ARV) were registered to a 1986 
Suzuki owned by Heidi Olson. 
The car driven by Jennifer Olson was involved in a traffic 
incident on Guardsman Way at Sunnyside Ave. a few minutes 
before, L-tihis accident happened with a vehicle driven by 
Michelle Paxton. Olson made a left turn in front of 
Paxton. The damage was slight but Olson did not stop. 
Paxton was following the Olson car at the time of this 
accident in an attempt to identify the driver. 
Jennifer Olson was cited for failure to yield the right 
of way and hit and run as a result of her actions at 
Sunnyside Ave. and Guardsman Way. She was also cited 
for failure to yield the right of way, no drivers license, 
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no insurance and improper registration. Her car was 
impounded. 
Jennifer Heather Olson does have a valid drivers license 
which expires on April 2, 1991. She has no traffic viol-
ation of record as of November 13, 1987. 
In my opinion, the sole cause of this accident was the 
actions of Jennifer H. Olson in failing to comply with 
the yield sign as required in UCA Section 41-6-74.10 (b), 
She was also traveling at an excessive rate of speed of 
about 14 MPH over the posted speed limit and failing to 
reduce speed when approaching an intersection. 
% 
Frank Grant 
Encl. 
Traffic incident report Case # 87-97547 
Statements of Michelle Paxton, Gary Knowles, Jason 
Boren, Stephanie Smith and Officer Louie Numiz 
Photos of accident site 
Photos of Taylor vehicle 
Scale map 
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Frank Grant 
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November 3, 1987 
James Mcintosh Re: Myra Taylor 
Statement of MICHELLE PAXTON, 1704 Herbert Ave. Salt 
Lake City, UtHu ' 
Qo Michelle, I think your mother told you my name is 
Frank Grant. 
A. Uh huh. 
Q, I'm a private investigator looking into this accident. 
A. Uh huh. 
Q. I understand you were involved with that same car. 
A. Uh huh. 
Qo A little bit earlier? 
Ac Right. 
Q. Where was that? 
A. That was on 8th South and I think itfs Guardsman Waye 
I think that*s the Street it was. Do you want me to 
tell you what happened? 
Q. Sure. 
A. Well, I just turned right on 9th South and so I was 
headed north and the girl was headed south but she 
was turning east. Okay so she was turning left and 
the light was green so I had the right of way and she 
didn't yield for me. She just kept, she just went 
right on through. I could tell she wasn't going to 
stop so I put on my brakes and she, we both just kind 
of hit, you know. 
Q. Not very hard, though? 
A. No, not very hard but I mean I couldn't tell how hard 
she hit me and she just took off. She didn't stop 
and I turned around and honked and she didn't stop. 
I didn't know what she had done to my car, the damage 
or anything. All I knew is she had hit me so I 
followed her and was honking and she wouldn't stop. 
She was pretty well down the street and then she turned 
up and then she turned up and was going east up the 
Accident Analyst 
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the streeto We couldn't have been going more than 
35 but I got halfway up the block and she was at the 
top of the block and the Subaru was headed north and 
she didn't yield. 
Q. I see. Did you ever talk to this young lady, this 
Jennifer Olsen? 
A, No, huh uh. 
Q. Never talked to her at all? 
A. No, but I know who she is. I never talked to her that 
night because she took off. 
Q. You stopped at the scene I assume? 
A. Right and I ran in and called the police. 
Q. You think she was doing around 35 up through there. 
A. That's what the policeman told me. I had no idea. 
I was so frustrated I didn't know what I was doing. 
She hit my car, you know. She just was leaving. 
Q. How badly was she hurt? 
A. I really don't know because when they pulled her out 
of the car I was talking with the policeman so I don't 
know. I know that she has been wearing a neck brace. 
I know there was some injuries to her. The first 
thing I did after I saw the accident, I ran up to 
the Subaru and I could tell she wasn't really in very 
good shape. I said, "Are you okay?" She said, "I 
don't think so." She was bleeding and everything. 
Q. Did you ever see the Subaru before the--? 
A. Oh! I saw it coming. 
Q. You saw it coming? 
A. I knew there was going to be an accident. I mean I 
was far enough behind her, I could see it coming, 
yeah. 
Q. Could you see it's headlights, the Subaru? 
A. Yeah, that's how I saw it. 
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Q. Were both of them on or just one? 
A. I don't remember. There was another person with me 
in the car. He might remember. 
Q. Who was that? 
A. Jason Boren. But I know that's how I did notice it. 
I could see the lights. 
Q. How could I get a hold of Jason? 
A. Hiw number is 532 2683. 
Q. Is that Boren? 
A. Yes and he was with me the entire time. 
Q. Did you ever get close enough to the lady in the VW 
to tell whether or not you could smell any alcohol? 
A. I, well, I mean no but I could tell there was something 
definitely something wrong with her. This has nothing 
to do with it but I had seen her the night before drunk 
driving. 
Q. Oh huh. 
A. Because she goes to, I had seen her at the High School 
football game and she was drunk and I told my friends 
and they said, "Heather, do you want us to drive you 
home?11 and she said, "No11. So she got in her car and 
drove away drunk. 
Q. Now, this was on a different occasion? 
A. That was two days before. This was Thursday. 
Q. This was on a Thursday you are talking about now? 
A. That she had been drunk driving. 
Q. And this accident happened on Saturday? 
A. Right and I know that there is a girl who was driving 
by who was also at the scene and was Heather's friend 
but she didn't see the accident happen. She was there 
when they pulled her out of the car and she told me 
she did smell alcohol. 
Q. Do you know who that was? 
A. Her name is Stephanie Smith but I'm not sure of her 
phone number because it's unlisted but I could get it 
for you if you want. 
EXHIBIT "9" 
Frank Grant | 
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November 6, 1987 
Jim Mcintosh Re: Myra Taylor 
Statement of STEPHANIE SMITH, 1212 Princeton Ave. Salt 
Lake City, Utlfu rfy£ -//// 
Q. Stephanie, my name is Frank Grant. I'm an accident 
investgator. 
A. Uh huh, 
Q. Did you know the girls in this accident? 
A. Uh huh, I knew both of them. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Just a minute, the one girl I went to Jr. High with. 
The one that got in the accident. 
Q. Yes. 
A. And I thought it was her and I pulled over and it was 
her and then I talked to Shelly, the girl she hit 
sooner because I go^to school with here She just told 
me what had happened. 
Q. Who is Shelly? 
A. Shelly Paxton, Michelle Paxton. 
Q, Okay, I'm with you, 
A. She was the girl that Heather had hit earlier. 
Q. Yes. 
A. On Guardsman, I think it was. 
Q. How well do you know Heather? 
A. Well, I was friends with her, like three years ago 
but I haven't really been since. 
Q. Did you talk to her at the accident scene? 
A. A little bit, I tried to but she kind of was 
hysterical. 
Qe Hysterical from what, do you know? 
A. I guess just the accident. I think she had been 
drinking too. 
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Q. Could you smell it on her? 
A. Yeah, you could kind of smell it in the area. 
Q. Do you know where she had been that night? 
A. I don't know where she had been. I think she had 
been at a party or something. 
Q. Do you have any idea where that party might have been? 
A. No, I don't. I'm sorry. 
Q. How long after the accident do you think before you 
got there? 
A. Oh, not very long at all because the only other people 
there was a guy in the Isuzu Trooper that I guess had 
seen Heather back a ways so he followed her to make 
sure she got home and then Michelle Paxton and the 
person on the front lawn it happened on was the only 
persons there. 
Q. So it must have been just a few seconds after it 
happened, then? 
A. Just a few seconds, I think. 
Q. Anybody with you? 
A. Yeah, there were. There were three boys with me. 
Q. Did they know Heather at all? 
A, Yeah, they did. Well, two of them did, I mean one 
of them did. One went to Jr. High with me. The 
other two I just met but the one, one of the boys 
I was with knew her better than I did. He had kept 
in touch with her more than I did. 
Q. Had either you or the boys you were with seen her 
earlier that evening? 
A. No, I don't think so, huh uh. 
Qft Does Heather drink quite a bit? 
Ae Well, I don't know but I think she might because 
when we played their high school, when we played 
Highland, at their game, I talked to her after the 
game and she had been drinking. 
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Frank Grant 
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November 21, 1987 
Jim Mcintosh 
Attorney at Law 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Re: Myra Taylor 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 
Results of a blood alcohol test administered at the 
direction of the police shortly after the accident 
indicated a alcohol level of • 147o in Jennifer Olson. 
This indicates that she was under the influence of 
alcohol at the time of the accident. 
UCA Section 41-6-44 stages that any level .08% or 
above a person is presumed to be under the influence. 
The high alcoholic content in Olson at the time could 
very well account for her failure to observe the Paxton 
car on Sunnyside Avenue, her failure to stop at the 
scene of the first accident, her obvious attempt to 
flee before being identified and her failure to use 
due care when approaching the yield sign at the inter-
section of Yalecrest Avenue and 1900 East where she 
was involved in the second accident with Taylor. 
It was rumored that Jennifer Olson had attended a 
party at a private residence that evening. I would 
suggest that the location of this party be investigated 
to determine if alcoholic beverages were served to 
Jennifer Olson. If so who was responsible for allowing 
Jennifer, who is only 16 years of age, to get in such 
an intoxicated state. It is inconceivable that she 
would not display obvious symptoms of intoxication 
with a blood alcohol content of „147o. 
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Information from Salt Lake City Prosecutor Sheryl Luke 
indicates that due to the fact that Jennifer Olson has 
already been charged with failure to yield the right 
of way in this accident would preclude the filing of 
the additional charge of driving under the influence 
of alcohol. 
Jennifer Olsonfs actions on the night of October 17, 
1987 indicates gross negligence and a complete disregard 
for the safety of others. 
Frank Grant 
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STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
STATE HEALTH LABORATORY 
PUBLIC SAFETY TOXICOLOGY SECTION 
44 Medical Drive. Salt Lake City, Utah 84113 
TOXICOLOGY REPORT 
Agency: SALT LAKE CITY P.O. Laboratory No.—kiZzIl l i . 
Suspect(s): OLSEN, JENNIFER Your Agency Case No.—Hzil lM. 
Officer: HUNIEZ, L. 
LABORATORY FINDINGS: 
Blood Alcohol: 0.14 percent (w/v^ ethanol 
Analyzed by Bruce Beck 
N) ol. * 
Sworn and Subscribed to before me this — day of O c t o b e r , 19 
Notary Public 
Tox Lab LE-2 10/83 
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FILED 
DISTRICT COURi 
MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ - No. 2109 
Attorney for Defendants fljjg jjj j(J p? AM 'jjj 
349 South 200 East, Suite 110 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 359-8000 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF" SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA L. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D. ] 
OLSON AND JENNIFER HEATHER ] 
OLSON, ] 
Defendants. 
1 DEFENDANTS, CAROL D. OLSON 
) AND RONALD H. OLSON, 
) CONSOLIDATED RESPONSES TO 
) PLAINTIFFS FIRST SET OF 
1 INTERROGATORIES 
1 Civil No. 900907125PI 
I Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Comes now defendants, Carol D. Olson and Ronald He Olson, 
(hereafter "Olson'8) and respond to the plaintiff's interrogatories 
as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1. State the full name, address and 
telephone number, and official position of each person you 
consulted in compiling your answers to the INTERROGATORIES, and 
indicate why each such person was consulted. 
RESPONSE NO 1. Ronald H. Olson, 1930 Logan Ave., Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84108, (801) 581-1808. 
Gary Howe, Attorney, initial attorney for defendants. 
Dan Flandro, Notary who signed release sheet, Valley Bank, 
1300 South 2100 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
INTERROGATORY NO 2. Identify each and every document, 
including all business records, diaries, correspondence, ledger 
EXHIBIT 2 
A n 
upon unsubstantiated legal conclusions and damage claims. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 18. Identify the owner(s) of the 1974 
Volkswagen automobile ("Volkswagen") described in paragraph 1 of 
the plaintiff's complaint. In this connection, state the name, 
address and telephone nuiaber of the owner on the accident date, and 
state the identity of the person from whom the owner was purchasing 
the motor vehicles. 
RESPONSE NO. 18. Heather Olson, 1930 Logan Ave., Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84108, (801) 581-1808. She borrowed the money from 
Ronald H. Olson who borrowed from Valley Bank. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19. State whether the defendant Jennifer 
Heather Olson ("Jennifer") had any interest in the said Volkswagen 
automobile on the accident date October 17, 1987 ("accident 
date") . If so, state the exact interest the said defendant had in 
the Volkswagen and how she acquired that interest. 
RESPONSE NO. 19. She was buying the car. See Response 18. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20. State why the Volkswagen was not 
registered in the state of Utah on the accident date. 
RESPONSE NO. 20. It was an old car that was going to be 
restored and was not to be driven. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21. State why the Volkswagen was uninsured 
on the accident date. 
RESPONSE NO. 21. It was not meant to be driven. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22. State whether you had ever told 
Jennifer not to use the Volkswagen prior to the accident date. 
RESPONSE NO. 22. Yes. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 23. If your answer to the next-preceding 
e <; . . - G < <; 
interrogatory is in the affirmative, please answer the following 
questions. 
(a) The day and time of day of each and every time prior 
to the accident date that you told Jennifer not to use the 
Volkswagen. 
(b) The identity of the other persons who were present 
when you told Jennifer this. 
(c) The substance of what you told Jennifer about not 
using the Volkswagen. 
(d) The reasons, in detail, why you told Jennifer not 
to use the Volkswagen. 
RESPONSE NO. 23. 
(a) October 17, 1987 at 5:00 p.m. 
(b) Jennifer. 
(c) Do not use the Volkswagen, use the Buick. 
(d) It wasn't road worthy, registered or insured. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 24. Did you have personal knowledge that 
Jennifer had driven the said Volkswagen prior to the accident date. 
If so, please answer the following questions. 
(a) How you obtained the said knowledge. 
(b) The exact dates and time of day Jennifer had driven 
the Volkswagen. 
RESPONSE NO. 24. No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 25. What measures did you take, if any, to 
ensure Jennifer did not use the Volkswagen prior to the accident 
date. 
RESPONSE NO. 25. Told her not to use it. 
0 0 0 0 8 7 
following questions. 
(a) The identity of the friends. 
(b) The dates when Jennifer was with the said persons. 
(c) How you gained your knowledge of the said times when 
Jennifer was with the said persons. 
RESPONSE NO. 34. No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 35. Did Jennifer ever tell you that she had 
been with persons who were consuming alcoholic beverages? If so, 
identify the said persons, the date and time of day when you had 
the conversations and the substance of what Jennifer told you. 
RESPONSE NO. 35. No. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 36. State whether you ever knew of any of 
Jenniferfs personal friends who had been involved in any trouble 
through drinking or consuming alcoholic beverages. In this 
connection, the words "knowledge of any trouble" are meant to mean 
your knowledge of any newspaper accounts, telephone calls, or other 
sources as well as personal knowledge which you had of Jennifer's 
friends being involved in any disciplinary actions of any kind 
either by school officials, by their parents, or by other third 
parties. "Disciplinary action" by school officials means 
suspensions, reprimands, expulsion or any other sanctions by the 
said school officials. "Disciplinary action" by parents means 
grounding, loss of allowances or other privileges, or any other 
sanctions, punishments or penalties. 
RESPONSE NO. 36. Only rumor and gossip which we did not 
substantiate nor pursue due to its dubious nature. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 37. If your answer to the next-preceding 
0 C 0 0 C 0 
(e) Grounded her for six months* 
(f) Same as (e)* 
INTERROGATORY NO. 39. State whether Jennifer ever told you 
she was under the influence of or affected by alcoholic beverages 
at the time of her accident with the plaintiff Myra Taylor. If 
your answer to this interrogatory is yes, please answer the 
following questions. 
(a) The date when Jennifer made this statement to you. 
(b) The place where the statement was made. 
(c) The identity of the other persons who were present 
when the statement wa made. 
(d) The substance of what was said by Jennifer to you 
about her being under the influence of or affected by alcoholic 
beverages at the time of the said accident. 
RESPONSE NO. 39* No. Once informed of the circumstances, we 
did not need Jennifer to confirm she had been drinking. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 40. Did you become aware of any times 
subsequent to the accident with Myra Taylor when a sample of 
Jennifer1s blood was taken to determine the alcoholic content of 
the said blood? If your answer to this interrogatory is in the 
affirmative, please answer the following questions. 
(a) The date and exact time of day when you became aware 
of the taking of the blood sample. 
(b) The identity of the person who first made you aware 
of this matter. 
(c) Did you give your permission for the taking of the 
said blood sample? 
RESPONSE NO, 46. We have received no such information. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 47. State in detail each and every 
instruction, direction, talk or conversation ("instructions") you 
had with your daughter Jennifer to supervise or control her use of 
the Volkswagen automobile. In this connection, include the 
following information. 
(a) The date the instructions were given to Jennifer. 
(b) The place where the instructions were given. 
(c) The identity of other persons who were present when 
the instructions were given. 
(d) The nature of the said instructions. 
RESPONSE NO. 47. See Responses 23 and 42. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 48. State exactly what action you took to 
ensure Jennifer would not have access to the keys to the Volkswagen 
automobile. 
RESPONSE NO. 48. Only one set of keys existed and they were 
in Ronald Olson's room. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 49. State how Jennifer acquired access to 
the keys to the Volkswagen automobile on the date of the accident. 
RESPONSE NO. 49. Took them from Ronald Olson's dresser 
drawer. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 50. After you had instructed Jennifer not 
to use the Volkswagen automobile when it was uninsured and not 
registered, did Jennifer disregard your instructions and use the 
Volkswagen automobile prior to the date of the accident — October 
17, 1987? If so, please answer the following questions, 
(a) The date(s) when she used the Volkswagen. 
0 00 
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Third Juut«iiwt District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT 
STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
MYRA L. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D. OLSON, 
AND JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON, 
OUNTY 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Civil No. 900907125PI 
Deposition of: 
JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON 
Defendants. : 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 14th day of 
October, 1991, the deposition of JENNIFER HEATHER OLSON, 
produced as a witness herein at the instance of the 
Plaintiff, in the above-entitled action now pending in 
the above-named court, was taken before Elaine 
FitzGerald, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary 
Public in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the 
hour of 2s10 PoM. of said day at the Law Offices of James 
A. Mcintosh, Esquire, Suite 14, Intrade Building, 1399 
South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to 
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Q. After you had driven it. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And prior to October? 
A* I think so. 
Q. Do you remember how many times you had driven it 
prior to October approximately when he found out you were 
driving it and told you not to do it again? 
A. No. I remember one time I moved it and he told 
me not to touch it. 
Qe Did you ever take your friends Kristi Bringhurst 
or Jenny Pia for a ride in that car prior to the time of 
the accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you remember how many times you did that? 
A. No. Very few, if more than — I don't know how 
many times. 
Q. Would it have been more than six or less than 
six? 
A. Less than six. 
Q. Okay. Would it have been more than three or 
less than three or about three maybe? 
A. Could be about three maybe. 
Q. Do you remember where you went on those three 
occasions when you took Kristi and Jenny for a ride prior 
to October of '87? 
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Ac I gave Jenny a ride home once from my house I 
2 remember. 
3 Q. And how far does Jenny live from your house? 
4 A, At the time she lived on 15th East* 
5 Q. And you live on 19th East? 
6 A. Uh-huh. 
7 Q. And does she live north or south of you? 
8 A. North. 
9 Q. And were there other times when you took Kristi 
10 or Jenny somewhere else? 
11 A. I drove — I drove the car to school once. 
12 Q. Any other times that you can recall? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. What did you do about getting license plates to 
15 put on the car during those times you drove it, Heather? 
161 A. I found some. 
17 Q. Where did you find them? 
181 A. In the garage. 
19 Q. Do you remember what the number was on the 
20 license plate? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Was it the same one that was on there during the 
23 day of the accident? 
24 A. They were the same plates. 
25 Q. Where were they located in the garage? 
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A. On shelves. 
Q. Do you know who put them there? 
31 A. NO. 
4| Q. How did you happen to take those plates off the 
shelf in the garage and put them on the Volkswagen during 
the times you drove it? 
A. Well, they didn't have plates and I knew it 
couldn't be taken without plates and they were there. 
Q. Did you ever talk to your mom or dad about those 
plates? 
A. No. 
Q. Never got permission from them to use them? 
A. No. 
Q. Where did you get the keys to the car on the 
times you drove it? 
A. My dad kept them in his drawer. 
Q. Where is his drawer? 
A. In his room. 
Q. Which room? 
A. His bedroom. 
Q. Did your dad find out about those times that you 
took the car? 
A. He knew once, as I said, when I moved — that he 
was mad that I moved it, and I don't think he knew about 
the other times. 
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Qc He didn't find out about those and tell you not 
to use it? 
A. I don't know what time he found out about it 
exactly, but he — he did ask me if I had driven it and I 
said yes and he did find out that way, but he didn't know 
exact times I don't think. 
Q. Did your dad ever move the keys to somewhere 
else when he knew you were getting them and driving the 
car? 
A. I think he kept them up there. 
Q. They were always in his drawer in his bedroom; 
is that right? 
Ac As far as I know. 
Q. I'll represent to you, Heather, that your sister 
Heidi said that she thought you had driven that car many 
times to school during the period that you're talking 
about here, and I'm not saying that she's right in that 
because she could have a disagreement with you on that. 
I mean, she may not know how much you drove it. She said 
she was down at BYU, then came home a couple months 
before she got married, but she said her recollection was 
that you drove it several times. Does that refresh your 
memory or would you disagree with her? 
A. I would disagree. I did not drive it. 
Q. You can only recall driving it to school one 
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1 time? 
2 A. Uh-huh. 
3j Q. Could you have driven it more than once? 
4J A. The car? 
5 Q. Yes. 
6 A. Yes. 
7 MR. MARTINEZ: More than once to school? 
8 MR. MCINTOSH: Yes. 
9 THE WITNESS: Oh, more than once to school? 
10 Q. (By Mr. Mcintosh) Yes. 
11 A. I don't remember any other times. 
12 Q. Heather, why would you take this car when your 
13 dad told you not to? 
14 A. Because — I didn't realize how serious it was. 
15 Q. Did your mom ever talk to you about not taking 
16 the car? 
17 A. Maybe just in conversation that I wasn't to take 
18 it. 
19 Q. How did you find out the keys were in your dad's 
20 drawer in his bedroom? 
21 A. Well, he keeps other keys up there. 
22 Q. What would be some of the reasons, Heather, that 
23 you would want to take the car? Were there special 
24 events that you were trying to go to? 
25 A. That night? 
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II Q. No. Prior t© October 1987. 
2 A. Yes. I mean yeah* there — 
3 Q. What war© so®^ ©f the events? 
41 A. Well, the one day we had come home from — for 
5 lunch and we didn't have a way back to school and I took 
6 it# and to give my friend a ride home. 
7 Q. You had a driver's license during this period of 
81 time I think, didn't you? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. So you had had driver's ed and you knew how to 
11 drive; is that right? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Had you ever driven any other cars other than 
14 this Volkswagen prior to the accident? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. What cars did you drive? 
17 A. My dad's* 
18 Q. Okayc Any others? 
19 A. I think before then I had driven my friend's car 
20 once or twice• 
21 Q. Which friend was that? 
22 A. Kristi Bringhurste 
23 Q. What kind of a car did she have? 
24 A. She — it w&m her parents' car. 
25 Q. Okay. What kind of a car is your dad's car? 
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ll A. No. I don't remember. 
2j Q. What did she say to you when you took it on 
these other occasions, like to take your friend home or 
to go to special events or something? 
A. I don't think she knew those specific times. 
Q. Now# you've toLd us that your dad talked to you 
a few times about he was aware you had taken it, right? 
A. Yeah, he found — he knew. 
Q. But you don't think your mother ever knew? 
A. No. I think she found out, but she didn't find 
out those times. She found out when he found out and she 
was there when he talked to me. 
Q. And how did your dad find out about the times 
you had taken it? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. But when he asked you about them, you did admit 
you had taken it; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This is prior to the accident that we're talking 
about; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Heather, I want to ask you some questions about 
your drinking habits, okay? 
A. (Indicating.) 
Q. This is very important in this lawsuit because 
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1 we have a report that your blood alcohol content was 
2 taken, tested right after this accident happened. So I 
3 want to ask you some questions about that. 
4 MR. MCINTOSH: And by the way, Mike, I gave Gary 
5 Howe copies of all that information, the reports from the 
6 Department of Health, and told him what the blood alcohol 
7 count was and everything shortly after the accident 
8 happened when we had that information. 
9 Q. (By Mr. Mcintosh) I'm going to ask you about 
10 alcoholic beverages, and by that I mean beer, champagne, 
11 tequila, vodka, hard liquor, things like that, and I just 
12 want to direct your attention to the period of time prior 
13 to the accident, okay, that's prior to October the 17th 
14 of 1987. I don't really care about anything you have 
15 done since that time. Okay. That's been four years ago. 
16 Tell me what alcoholic beverages you had 
17 consumed at any time prior to the accident. I'm not 
18 talking about just at the party. It could be any time 
19 within the last four, five years prior to that time. 
20 MR. MARTINEZ: Now, you're not asking her if she 
21 had consumed it, you are saying to try and tell you about 
22 specific times or events or — 
23 MR. MCINTOSH: No. I want to ask her if she had 
24 consumed any alcoholic beverages in that period of time. 
25 THE WITNESS: Before the accident? 
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ll Q. (By Mr. Mcintosh) Yes. Within say four, five 
2 years prior to the accident. 
3 A. And which ones? 
4 Q. I just want you to answer first of all had you 
5 consumed any. Just yes or no0 
61 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Okay. Let's go back to the earliest time that 
8 you started drinking alcoholic beverages and I'm going to 
9 give you a frame of reference, On October 17th, when the 
10 accident happened, what grade were you in in school? 
11 A. I was just starting my sophomore — junior year. 
12 Q. This would have been in 1987? 
13 A. Uh-huh. 
14 Q. So you graduated in 1989 then? 
15 A. Uh-huh. 
16 Q. Okay. You are starting your junior year. Had 
17 you been drinking alcoholic beverages since the eighth 
18 grade, Heather? 
19 A. No, not in eighth grade* 
20 Q. I'll represent to you that one of the witnesses 
21 that we took the testimony of last week indicated that 
22 you had been taking it since the eighth grade. Do you 
23 disagree with that? 
24 A. Not in eighth grade. After the eighth grade. 
25 Q. The summer following the eighth grade? 
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A. Uh-huh. 
Q. What alcoholic beverages did you drink then? 
A. Beer. 
Q. Just beer? 
A. And wine coolers. 
Q. Anything else? 
A. No. 
Q. Where did you usually get those drinks? 
A. I believe they were just at places, like at the 
houses. 
Q. Where you would have parties you mean? 
A. At friends' houses. 
Q. And starting with that summer after the eighth 
grade and going through the ninth grade, how often would 
you on an average consume alcoholic beverages? Would it 
be once a week, once a month? Any period of time that 
you can use for a frame of reference? 
A. It was more like I did it and then maybe, you 
know, like twice, and then I remember when I was a 
freshman I didn't want to do it for a long time and 
didn't for a long time. 
Q. A long time to you would mean what? Would it be 
your whole freshman year, all nine months? 
A. No, not my whole freshman yeare 
Q. How many months did you go in your freshman year 
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without drinking alcoholic beverages? 
A. Oh, it was months. 
Q. Would you drink them at Christmastime, during 
the Christmas break? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you remember any specific times that you 
would drink alcoholic beverages in your freshman year? 
A. It was more to the end of the year when I did 
drink again. 
Q. And was that at your friends' houses again? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who were some of the friends that you would 
go to where you drank alcoholic beverages? 
A. Jenny Pia's. 
Q. Anybody else? 
A. We'd go to the Levy's. 
Q. Scott Levy? 
A. Uh-huh. Scott Levy's. 
Q. Okay. Anybody else? 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. Okay. Scott Levy's and Jenny Pia's are the two 
that come to your mind today; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And when you went to the homes of those 
two people, would the alcoholic beverages be there or 
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would you bring some? 
A. I never took any. 
Q. What about the summer after the ninth grade, 
before you went in the tenth grade? Did you drink 
alcoholic beverages then? 
A. I may have because I didn't just drink once or 
twice, but it was -- was a lot of period between them 
because I'd decide I wasn't gonna do it and try and then 
I just — I don't remember. 
Q. Okay. Would you say you did it three or four 
times during the summer between the ninth and tenth grade 
year, or would it be more than that or less than that? 
Ac I remember one specific time that I can think 
of, but I — it was probably more than that. 
Q. Do you have an independent recollection, just 
your best estimate today, as to maybe how many times 
during the summer those three months between your 
freshman and sophomore year? 
A. That I drank? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I remember I hadn't drank for a long time before 
that night. I couldn't give — 
Q. Would it be more than six or less than six? 
A. Less than six because I — 
Q. More than three or less than three or about 
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three? 
A. In the three months prior? 
Q. Three months between your freshman and your 
sophomore year, the summer months, June, July and 
August. 
A. Oh, between the — not before the accident? 
Q. Oh, no. We're talking about — 
MR. MCINTOSH: Let's just take about a 
five-minute break here. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
(Recess taken.) 
Q. (By Mr. Mcintosh) Okay. Heather, let's go back 
to your drinking experiences between your freshman and 
sophomore years then, June, July and August, and ask you 
again during that period of time how often you would have 
drank alcoholic beverages. 
A. I don't know an exact number. 
Q. I understand you don't know an exact number, and 
this is a long ways back here. I'm not trying to, you 
know, have you come up with the exact number. 
A. Okay. 
Q. And I understand that you have done a lot to 
stop drinking alcoholic beverages since this accident. I 
think that's commendable. It's just an unfortunate 
situation that's happened here and we have to go into 
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this. I don't particularly like going into it, but it's 
very important in our lawsuit because it relates to 
punitive damage issues and other issues that we are going 
to be getting into in the trial. 
A. I understand. 
Q. So I have to ask you about this and I just want 
your best recollection. You know, you're the one that 
drank these things. And nobody is here to accuse you of 
anything, Heather. I'm not sitting here as a judge and I 
don't mean to be judgmental of your drinking habits. And 
people drink and they don't drink and it really doesn't 
make any difference to me one way or another, but I do 
have a duty to find out as much as I can about those 
drinking habits because it's important to this lawsuit. 
A. Okay. 
Q. So just with that background, maybe you could 
just tell me, just recollection, if you have a 
recollection of doing this periodically, maybe how many 
times you can recall. 
A. Maybe a couple drinks. 
Q. All right. Let's take your sophomore year at 
school. What would be some of the occasions during the 
sophomore year that you would maybe be drinking? This 
would have been about a year prior to the accident, 
right? 
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some of the times when 
that school year? Was your 
weekends 
be, what, 
as opposed 
Friday or 
to 
Saturday 
nights? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall drinking any other nights of the 
week? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall drinking in connection with events 
like football games or basketball games or things like 
that? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall ever going to any football games 
when you had been drinking? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. I'll represent to you that one of the 
witnesses last week said that they thought you had been 
drinking at a football game on the Thursday prior to the 
accident. Do you recall ever doing that? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. During your sophomore year then, what 
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would be the frequency? Would you do this one weekend a 
month or less than that or more than that? 
A. I may have drank like two weeks in a row and 
then not for a long — 
Q. What would you say for an average during the 
months of the school year? Would it have averaged at 
least once a month? 
A. If you'd spread them out, no, not that much. 
Q. Were there some months when you didn't drink 
once? 
A. Yeah* 
Qe And were there some months when you drank more 
than once? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And the alcoholic beverages that you drank 
during your sophomore year, would they have been the beer 
and the wine that you talked about before? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Did you ever use anything other than the beer 
and wine? 
A* I can't remember what it was, but there is 
something — I think it was a hard — well, I know it was 
a hard alcohol, but I don't know what it was. 
Q. Was it tequila? 
A. No, it wasn't tequila. 
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Q. Do you remember where it was that you had drank 
that? 
A. It was at Jenny Pia's. 
Q. Did Jenny have it there already? 
A. Uh-huh. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever have any of these drinking sessions 
at your house? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, let's take the period of time between your 
sophomore and junior year. Okay. This would be the 
months of June, July and August of 1987. Did you drink 
alcoholic beverages during that summer? 
A. I think I probably did after school ended in 
June, so yes, I did that summer. 
Q. Okay. And could you give us your best estimate 
as to what the frequency would have been? Would it have 
been one weekend a month or more than that or less than 
that for June, July and August? 
A. When I drank that night, I hadn't drank for a 
long time, and so just — because I remember I hadn't for 
a long time. It wasn't — I mean, if I did during the 
summer, it was just after school ended and probably a 
couple of — I mean, I don't know an exact number. 
Q. Maybe a couple of times — 
A. Yeah. 
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Q. — during the summer? 
And were you drinking beer and wine on those 
occasions, too? 
A. Yeah, I'm sure that's what — 
Q. When you would drink, Heather — let's take a 
period of time, maybe a year before the accident. 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. This would have been during your sophomore year 
and the first part of your junior year, maybe a month or 
two before the accident. How many beers would you have 
when you would do this drinking? 
A. I guess it would vary, but --
Q. Give me the minimum amount that you would ever 
drink. Just one bottle or one can? 
A. Yeah. I didn't like — like the beer. 
Q. How many cans of beer have you had at one time 
or bottles of beer at one time? 
A. At one time? 
Q. Maximum amount. 
A. I think I drank like four or — I've never drank 
a whole thing of — 
Q. Six-pack? 
A. Yeah, the six-pack. 
Q. You might have had four or five though? 
A. Four or five, yeah. 
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Q. And during the time that you might have drank 
four or five cans of beer, did you also have some wine? 
A. No. I didn't drink — if — I drank wine 
coolers. I drank wine coolers. 
Q. What do you mean by wine coolers? 
A. They're just the like White Mountain wine 
coolers. They're in a bottle and they're -- they were 
really strong so like I would drink maybe two of those. 
Q. What size were the wine coolers; do you know? 
Are they pints or — 
A. They're in bottles and I don't know that — how 
much fluid is — 
Q. How many ounces is in it or anything? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, let's take the period of time say six 
months prior to the accident, okay? 
A. (Indicating.) 
Q. Let's take that summer prior to your junior year 
and September and October your junior year. Do you 
remember a group of friends that you had consisting of 
Steve Jones, Steve Ebert, Jenny Pia, Kristi Bringhurst, 
Scott Levy and Jeff Gertino, a Muir fellow? Do you 
remember that group? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Do you remember getting together for parties 
Elaine FitzGerald, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
37 
with that group during that six-month period? Some of 
the parties would be at Scott Levy's house? 
A. We'd go up to Levy's. 
Q. I didn't mean to say house. I think it was an 
apartment. I think he lived in Foothill Place 
Apartments? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And did you go to some other people's houses or 
apartments also? 
A. Well, I know a few of their families and we'd go 
to their houses. 
Q. And when you had these gatherings, would it be 
true, Heather, that there was beer and intoxicating 
beverages that were served and usually all the kids that 
came would pitch in and pay a little bit for it? 
MR. MARTINEZ: Well, that assumes a lot of 
facts, like every time they got together there was a 
party and they were drinking. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
Q. (By Mr. Mcintosh) Well, let's take the times 
when you did get together and when you did drink when 
there was alcoholic beverages. On those occasions, I 
think you had some of those parties where there was beer, 
didn't you? 
A. Yeah. 
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Q. In fact, most of the time that you got together, 
there was beer? When you got together, there was beer, 
wasn't there, for that group? 
A. Well, it really depends, because that group, 
there were the kids that came from families who didn't 
approve and we wouldn't --
Q. I understand, but I'll represent to you, 
Heather, that nearly every one of the eight witnesses 
said last time that nearly every time they got together, 
they had beer. Now, would you dispute that? 
A. Well, I can remember a number of times going to 
Ebert's and not drinking or going to Kristi"s house and 
not drinking, but we did have — 
Q. You are aware that Kristi drank beer; are you 
not? 
A. Yeah, but we never drank at her house. 
Q. Okay. Right. Ebert and Kristi Bringhurst. Any 
others? 
A. That we didn't drink at their houses? 
Q. Yes. 
A. We never drank at Jeff Gertino's house. It was 
when -- you know, the specific times were in usually the 
same places. 
Q. Okay. You had these parties with them. They'd 
usually start about 7s00 in the evening and go until 
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ll 12:00 or 12:15 because you had curfew at 12:30; is that a 
2 fair statement? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And usually the group would just get together 
5 and decide whose place they were going to go to on a 
6| particular day; is that right? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And at those times when alcoholic beverages were 
served, you'd usually just have the beer or something 
like that and there wouldn't be food served in connection 
with it; is that right? 
A. You mean they wouldn't give us food or --
Q. That's right. When you would go to their 
places, you'd be there and the beer would be there, but 
they didn't have food to go along with that normally that 
was out with the beer? And by food I mean fried chicken, 
rolls or any cold cuts or anything like that. 
A. No. Maybe eat some chips or something like 
that. 
Q. Might have had some chips or something like 
that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. All right. Let's go to the period of 
time that we're talking about, this accident date, okay, 
Friday, October 16th, and Saturday, early morning hours, 
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your arm or anything, taking some blood from you? 
A, I don't know, I know I got a tetanus shot and I 
don't know what else they did. That's one thing they 
told me, that I was getting a tetanus shot. 
Q. Do you remember anything else about the 
accident? Do you remember anything else that happened in 
the hospital? 
A. I remember just my dad and my neighbor were 
there. 
Q. Which neighbor was that? 
A. Mike Margetts. 
Q. Do you remember anything that happened in the 
hospital as far as anybody that came there to see you? 
A. No. 
Q. Heather, going back to this Volkswagen that you 
had at the time, you said you got the license plates off 
a shelf in the garage. How did you know the license 
plates were there? 
A. I had seen them before. 
Q. When your dad used to take the Volkswagen down 
to Jim's garage, did he get those license plates and put 
them on there when he drove it down to the garage? 
Ac I never saw him, no. 
Q. Did you actually put the license plates on the 
Volkswagen yourself? By that I mean, did you use the 
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screwdriver, put the screws in and affix it there? 
A* Yes. 
Q. You did that every time that you used it; is 
that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you do that this night? 
A. Uh-huh. Yes. 
Q. Did you ask your parents if you could take the 
Volkswagen that night? 
A. No. 
Q. Were your parents home that night? 
A. No. My mom was out of town. 
Q. Was your dad home? 
A. NOc 
Q. Do you know where he was? 
A. No. 
Q. Where was the Volkswagen that night? Was it 
inside the garage or was it outside of the garage? 
A. It was in the driveway. 
Q. Was it behind another car? 
A. No. 
Q* So it was outside the garage, on the driveway, 
but not behind the other car; is that right? 
A« No. 
Q. Okay. Were there any cars in the garage? I 
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Q. When did your mom or your dad find out about 
your having drank beer before? 
A. I think when I was a sophomore. 
Q. How did they find that out? Did you tell them? 
A, No. They -- they — one night they asked me if 
I had been drinking that night. 
Q. You told them you had? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did they just smell alcohol on your breath? 
A. Well, I think it was on my clothes, and I don't 
even remember if I had been drinking that night, but I 
said that I had. 
Q. What did they tell you when they found out you 
had been drinking? 
A. We just talked about it and — 
Q. This was during your sophomore year about a year 
before the accident? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Did they find out after that time that you had 
been drinking again? 
A, No, not that I can remember. 
Q. Did you ever tell them? 
A, No. 
Q. Did they ever talk to you about any of the 
friends that you were going out with? This group that I 
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2 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
0 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
0 
A 
What was that? 
It was a Suzuki Samurai . 
A Suzuki? 
Yes. 
When did you get your Rabbit automobile? 
June of 19S7 -- no, I'm sorry. It was March. 
What year was it? Was it a new one that year? 
No . I'm not sure. 
You're not sure what year it was? 
It was an '84 or '85. 
Rabbit? 
Yes. 
Q Do you still have that automobile? 
A No. 
Q When did you get the Suzuki? 
A I believe August of '86. . It was around then. 
Q And what year was that car? 
A It was new that year. 
Q So it probably would have been an '86? 
A '86. 
Q Who did you buy it from? 
A I believe Steven Wade. 
Q Were you the registered owner? 
A Yes. 
Q And your name at that time would have been what? 
6 
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Q 
that car? 
A 
Q 
A 
believe, it 
0 
Do you have any papers pertaining to the Si;le 
No. 
Where would the papers be? 
I believe he took over the payments and I 
was done through the bank, through Valley 3an 
But you don't remember his name? 
of 
L 6 
7 
8 A I don't. 
9 Q Can you find that out for us? 
10 A I can. 
11 Q Would you call me with his name and address and 
12 telephone number? 
13 A Yes. 
14 0 If I'm not in Just leave that with my secretary. 
15 A Okay. 
16 Q What did you do with the license plates from the 
17 Suzuki when you sold it? 
18 A I don't know. I don't remember. 
19 Q Did you put them on the Volkswagen? 
20 A No. 
21 Q How do you know that if you don't remember what 
22 you did with them? 
23 I A I would imagine that I left them in the garage 
24 at home » 
25 Q Did you get new plates for the Rabbit? 
3 
I never looked. * »\l V..-' \^i ; i G .i ivu- 9 i r,e t ne y wo 
if she was driving on the street... 
Q Did you ever hear your mom or dad ever tell nor 
not to drive that Volkswagen because it wasn't registered? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever hear your mom and dad tell her not 
to tell the Volkswagen because there wasn't insurance on 
it? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever hear your mom and dad tell Heather 
for any reason not to drive the Volkswagen? 
A My morn and dad have told all of us on numerous 
occasions not to drive cars. 
Q What do they tell that? 
A If they don't want us going out, or if we have 
other things they don't always let us drive to places. 
Q Specifically with respect to the Volkswagen, do 
you ever 
that car 
A 
Q 
the six 
A 
Q 
J . A 
remember your folks telling Heather not to drive i 
? 
No . 
Did you ever see Heather drive the car during 
months? 
Yes. 
Was she driving it on a regular basis? 
No, I think maybe to school. 
11 1 
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A 
You don't know 
No 
Q Did Heather ever tell you that your fathei told 
her not to use the Volkswagen because it wasn't in a 
condition to drive it? 
6 A I wasn't living at home. No, I don't know. 
7 Q Prior to June of 1987, had you been to S.YU that 
8 year? 
9 A I was there from August until February. 
10 Q August of '86 and February of '87? 
11 A Right. 
12 Q Then from February of '87 to June when you got 
13 married, you had been living at home? 
14 A Right. 
15 Q During that period of time, four months, from 
16 February to June when you were living at home, again, your 
17 recollection is that you saw Heather driving the 
18 Volkswagen? She would take it to school and use it on 
19 other occasions; is that right? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q I'm going to read to you from interrogatory No. 
22 24 that your parents answered a question that I asked them: 
23 Did you have personal knowledge that Jennifer had driven 
24 the said Volkswagen prior to the accident date, and they 
25 said no. 
1 8 
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1 or on a table. 
2 Q During the night did you notice that other 
3 people would be bringing beer in as they came to the party? 
4 A No, I didn't notice. 
5 Q Do you know who brought the beer that was there 
6 when you got there? 
7 A I don't know who did. 
8 Q Did you notice Heather Olson drinking any beer 
9 while she was there? 
10 A I don't remember. I know — I think she may 
11 have had a beer because I — I'm not positive. I can't 
12 remember exactly, but I think she had had a beer. 
13 Q The other parties that you had where beer was 
14 served over there, did Heather drink beer then? 
15 A I don't know if Heather was at parties other 
16 than that time with me. 
17 Q The other three parties that you mentioned that 
18 this group of friends had, Heather wasn't there at those 
19 parties? 
20 A She could have been at one other one, but I 
21 don't remember Heather being there. 
22 Q Did you ever see Heather drinking alcoholic 
23 beverages before? 
24 A Yes-
25 Q Where was that? 
12 
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A No. 
2 I Q No hard liquor? 
3 I A Not that I can remember, no. 
Q So just beer? 
A Yes. 
6 I Q Did you notice that some of the fellows were 
7 bringing beer in during the night as they came to the 
8 party? 
9 A Probably. They usually did. 
10 Q Where was the beer kept? 
11 A I think just in his refrigerator. 
12 Q At the parties that you had over there 
13 previously, on most of those occasions was it the same kind 
14 of party it was this night? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q You had the same type of alcoholic beverages 
17 normally? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Was there anybody in your group that did not 
20 drink alcoholic beverages? 
21 A I don't think so. 
22 Q Did you know that Heather consumed alcoholic 
23 beverages? 
24 A Yes. 
25 0 How did you know that? 
11 
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5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A Because I had seen her. 
Q Had you see her drink at these prior parties 
that you had also? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you see her drink some alcoholic beverages 
the night of this party that we're talking about? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you actually serve her some of those 
alcoholic beverages? 
A No. 
Q So was it just a matter of most of the kids that 
wanted to have them would go to the refrigerator or the 
table, wherever they were,, and take whatever they wanted? 
A Yes. 
Q You didn't have a bartender or anybody actually 
serving those to anyone? 
A 
Q 
alcoholic 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
the party 
A 
No. 
Did you have a chance to 
beverages that night? 
Yes. 
Do you know how many she 
No. 
Did you have a chance to 
that night? 
Yes, I did. 
observe Heather taking 
had? 
see her when she left 
12 
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1 Q Do you know about when she left? 
2 A Probably — I think that night she left earlier 
3 and she went to another party alone. Ule didn't go with 
4 her. So she probably left around 9:00 or so, I would 
5 think. 
6 Q Do you remember that for sure? 
7 A Well, I can't be positive, but I'm pretty sure 
8 that she left and went somewhere else. 
9 Q I think the sequence of the facts we have, 
10 Jennifer, probably would be that she stayed at that party 
11 most of the evening and some of the boys had taken her ca) 
12 and gone out joyriding and she got kind of mad at them and 
13 when they brought it back she left about midnight. Does 
14 that refresh your memory? 
15 A I think so. That could be because I — I 
16 remember she had — it was so long ago. That could have 
17 been it. 
18 Q Do you remember an incident like that where some 
19 of the boys had taken her car? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q I think she had a Volkswagen? 
22 A Yes, a bug. 
23 Q She got mad at them for taking it and then when 
24 they brought it back she left by herself? 
25 A Right. That sounds right. 
13 
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Q Was that about midnight? 
A Probably, because I remember when I was driving 
3 | home from the party I saw her car. I called -- because my 
4 | house is on the way home from Scott's — I past the 
accident and I called Kristi as soon as I got home and 
said, Did Heather get in an accident. 
7 | Q Did you stop at the accident scene? 
8 I A No, I drove around the block probably two or 
9 j three times because I wasn't sure it was her. I never saw 
10 her. There was a crowd around it and I didn't want to 
11 stop. 
12 Q Did you recognize her car there? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Do you know what condition she was in when she 
15 left that night as far as being under the influence of 
16 alcohol or not? 
17 A Yes, she was. 
18 Q She was under the influence? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q What makes you say that? 
21 A Because she had been drinking. It's just not — 
22 I mean, I'm sure she was. 
23 Q Can you tell us what you base that on, just 
24 facts that led you to believe that? Sometimes people kind 
25 of stumble around, sometimes their speech is slurred, 
14 
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sometimes they do other things. What made you believe that 
she was under the influence? 
A Well, I can't remember that, but she had been 
drinking and I'm sure — I just knew. I guess especially 
after the accident we realized how drunk she was. 
Q How did you find out after the accident how 
drunk she was? 
A She told us what happened. I mean, just the way 
she had hit the lady and ended up on someone's front lawn. 
Q What did Heather tell you about the accident? 
A The whole thing from then on — I mean I guess 
our relationship was just really never the same. It was 
kind of like I guess she bumped into somebody and didn't 
realize that she hit them or something and then they — I 
don't know if they chased her or turned around and followed 
her — I don't remember. And she was trying to get — like 
thinking that they wouldn't catch up to her or something. 
I can't remember. 
Q You're right. There was a hit-and-run just a 
few minutes before this up by Guardsman Way and 9th South, 
and she was leaving that scene when she hit my client, Myra 
Taylor, right around Nelson Crest. You have the right 
sequence there. 
A Then she just blacked out or something I guess 
and ended up in that yard. 
15 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
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Q What did she tell you about her state of being 
intoxicated? 
A She just — I guess she just probably said she 
had been drinking too much. 
Q Okay. 
A And she was mad at those guys for taking her car 
and stuff . 
Q Did she tell you how much she had consumed at 
the party? 
A No. 
Q You have a definite opinion that she was under 
the influence of alcohol when she left? 
A Yes. 
that 
thin 
I di 
than 
had 
Q Did you ever 
condition? 
A I *m sure we 
k that night we rea 
dn't 
Q 
A 
realize how dn 
Until when? 
tell her 
had told 
lized how 
not to drive her 
her before, 
— I mean, 
jnk she was. 
Until the accident. 
we all thought she 
Q 
been 
A 
Q 
Had she been 
over there for 
Yes. 
was. 
drunk on 
parties? 
And did anybody ever 
I guess she 
but I 
I was 
car 
don 
in 
•t 
shocked . 
was drunker 
other occasions when 
talk to her 
you 
and tell her 
16 
she shouldn't go out and drive in that condition at other 
parties? 
A I'm sure they had. 
4 I Q Do you remember anybody saying that? 
5 A Yes, I think so. 
6 Q Who do you remember telling her that? 
7 A I don't remember who, but I'm sure — I can 
8 remember people talking about it and saying you shouldn't 
9 drive — I mean to everybody we would say that. 
10 Q Were her drinking habits at these parties that 
11 you went to such that she did like to drink would you say, 
12 or was it hard to get her to drink? 
13 A No, she liked to. 
14 Q Nobody had to force her to take anything? 
15 A No. 
16 Q In addition to beer that night, was there any 
17 food to eat? 
18 A I can't remember. 
19 Q Most of the parties it was just the beer without 
20 food, wasn't it? 
21 A Yeah. 
22 Q Did you know of any occasions where any of these 
23 people that were there with you, the names we mentioned 
24 including Heather, ever been disciplined by any school 
25 authority for drinking alcoholic beverages? 
1 7 
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food there 
A 
Q 
that night 
A 
grab anyth 
like. . . 
Q 
sandwiches 
A 
Q 
alcoholic 1 
A 
Q 
her at the 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
0 
might have 
A 
G 
night? 
Well, we did. 
Do you remember what you had out for them to eat 
? 
Well, they would go to my cupboard anytime and 
ing they wanted. That's why sometimes I didn't 
Was a matter of you having something out like 
or fried chicken or something? 
No, I didn't cater them. 
What was available for them to have was the 
leverages; is that right? 
Yes. 
Let rne ask you about Heather Olson. Did you see 
party this night? 
Yes. 
Did you see her drinking alcoholic beverages? 
I think she did. 
Did you notice her condition? 
Yes. 
Did you notice how many alcoholic beverages she 
had? 
No, I don't have no idea how many. 
Did you see her condition when she left that 
13 
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l | A I saw her, but I don't know. 
2 | Q Has Heather consumed alcoholic beverages at tl.e 
3 | prior parties that you've had? 
A She may have . 
Q Do you know of your own personal knowledge that 
she had? 
A She probably did- I can't recall which. 
Q You've seen her drink alcoholic beverages at 
these parties? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall when Heather was there that Steve 
Ebert and Steve Jones borrowed her Volkswagen to go get 
something to eat? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you remember thern coming back? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you remember about what time that was? 
A Later . 
Q Between 11:00 and 12=00? 
A Probably. 
0 Do you recall that Heather was upset that they 
had been gone so long with her car? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you remember her leaving shortly after that? 
A I knew she had left, but I don't recall her 
14 
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A No — well, I — I think — I never went there, 
but I think the other guys may have. 
Q Where did you usually get the alcoholic 
beverages that you brought to the parties? 
A Different gas stations. 
Q Did you ever have any problems getting them even 
though you're a minor? 
A Yes. 
Q How did you handle that? 
A Send somebody that looked older . 
Q Who did you usually send? 
A Anybody. Somebody else would try. 
Q Did your father have alcoholic beverages in the 
refrigerator during the times when you weren't having these 
parties? 
A Sometimes. 
Q On this particular night of this party, did you 
drink any of the alcoholic beverages that he supplied? 
A No. 
Q Do you remember that for sure? 
A Yes. 
Q Was there alcoholic beverages in the house or in 
the apartment that night that he brought in? 
A No. 
Q Was there any charge for the party? 
17 
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Q What have you talked about? 
A I was served mine. I didn't thirk L'iat if..: .'. 
about it and they asked me if I was served with one ar.d I 
said, yes, when, this and that, where, wondering what it 
was all about-
Q Did you have a chance to review with them so.r.c 
of the things that happened at the party? 
A Yes, I did. Obviously I didn't recall Jeff a; >. 
Heather being there. When I was served with the SU'OPODre-
tried to think about the night. I couldn't recall eithe-
of them being there. Jeff told me he got served wit^ o ie 
Q Did you observe Heather drinking intoxicating 
beverages at this party? 
A To be honest with you I can't picture it in 
mind, but I believe she was. 
Q Did you observe her condition at the part>? 
A I can't remember, I honestly can't. 
Q Do you know Heather Olson? 
A Yes , I do . 
Q Have you ever been to a party where she was 
there with this group before this night? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you ever seen her drink intoxicating 
beverages at those other parties? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you say thai people might have to 4orco 
her to drink intoxicating beverages? 
A No. 
Q She seemed to enjoy them, didn't she? 
A I don't know. I guess you would have to .-lok 
her . What do you mean by force? 
Q Did she ever have to be forced in the sense that 
she said no she didn't want any and people kept trying to 
make her take it? 
A No. 
Q Most of the people that y^ere in this group at 
this party this night were people that you had seen 
drinking at least beer previously; would that be a fair 
statement? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recall where they got the beer from, 
Mr . Muir? 
A No, I don't. 
Q Where would you get it when you would bring it? 
A There was quite a few gas stations four >ears 
ago that sometimes would not iod. 
0 Did you get it from the gas station just east of 
the Cowboy Grub? 
A I never got it there, no. Usually some of the 
markets in the avenues. 
Q Did she say she was kind of lunning away >Cvo.n 
the other one when she hit Mrs. Taylot? 
A I can't remember. That sounds familiar, but 
that was four years ago so it's a conversation I ca 't 
recall . 
Q I understand. 
A I don't know if she said she was running, but 1 
do remember her saying she struck another car . 
Q Did you have in your mind that this was a 
hit-and-run situation? 
A I can't recall. I would assume so. 
Q Do you know if Heather brought any alcoholic 
beverages to the party? 
A I can't recall that. 
Q Was it usually the fellows that would get the 
beer and things like that? 
A Most of the time, but not always. 
Q Did girls bring some sometimes? 
A Yes. 
C Did you ever have any occasion at any of the 
parties that you went to where Heather was present, to tell 
her you thought she drank too much? 
A No-
Q Were you ever present when anybody else told her 
she drank too much? 
14 
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witness herein at the instance of the plaintiff, in the 
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court, 
was taken before Melinda J. Andersen, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 2:15 p.m. of said day, at the 
offices of Jamas A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, State of 
Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to Subpoena. 
-oOo-
MELINDA Jc AUDI 
CSR No. 281 
INDEPENDENT REPORTING 
SERVICE 
Certified Shorthand Reporters 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)538-2333 
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should 
A 
Q 
A 
few of 
Q 
A 
Q 
be 
her 
driving when she left? 
Of course. 
What did she say to you? 
Well, we gave her the keys and she ran out and a 
girlfriends ran out after her. 
That would have been Jenny and Kristi? 
Yes. 
Were they trying to tell her not to drive? 
A As far as I know. We didn't go outside. 
Q Did you tell her she shouldn't be driving? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Did Steve Ebert tell her that, too? 
A I hope he would. 
Q You definitely remember telling her that? 
A Well, whether I did not, it would seem logical. 
I knew that she shouldn't be driving. I would hope that I 
would say something, but whether I did or not I cannot 
remember. 
Q 
did she dr 
A 
Q 
beverages? 
A 
Q 
At these prior parties that Heather had been to, 
ink alcoholic beverages at those? 
She did, not all of them though.. 
Did you ever have to force her to take alcoholic 
No, of course not. 
She seemed to enjoy them just like the rest of 
1 '•-
you; is that right? 
A Yes. 
3 1 Q Did your group have any limitations on the 
4 J number of drinks that somebody could have at these parties? 
A If it came to the point that we knew someone was 
6 j over drinking, I think we would mention it to them just for 
7 the fact we didn't want them to get caught by their 
8 parents, number one, and we didn't want them to get hurt. 
9 As far as limiting people, no. I think one of things that 
10 we tried to do when the guys would get together -- those 
11 guys I mentioned previously -- when we would go out and 
12 drink and stuff by ourselves, we would always have a 
13 designated driver, so that someone was always chosen that 
14 was not going to drink that night so we wouldn't be 
15 involved in something. 
16 Q Do you know how long Heather had been there 
17 before you got there for the first 20 minutes? 
18 A I don't know that. 
19 Q Was there anybody there to check the condition 
20 of people as they left? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Anybody present to monitor how much a person 
23 drank? 
24 A No, not a designated person. 
25 Q Any police or security personnel present? 
16 
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A No. 
2 I Q Did you ever talk to Heather about this accident 
3 after it happened? 
4 A No, I didn't. 
5 Q Did you ever hear anything about what she told 
6 other people about how intoxicated she was that night? 
7 A No, but by word of mouth you hear — apparently 
8 she was involved in an accident prior to being involved 
9 with these people. I know the girl that she got in an 
10 accident — I think it was Shelly Paxton, if I'm not 
11 mistaken. Just through word of mouth and kind of through 
12 the grapevine I found out about it. As far as addressing 
13 that with Heather, no, I didn't speak with her about that. 
14 Q Anything else you would like to tell us about 
15 the party other than what you talked about? I'm 
16 particularly interested in Heather's condition. Anything 
17 in addition to what you've already said about her condition 
18 as you got back and gave her the keys? 
19 A I don't know how to specifically describe her 
20 exact condition. It's been a long time, obviously. I did 
21 know that she had been drinking and her friends making an 
22 effort to run out and get the keys back from her, obviously 
23 gave me an indication that they had a better judgment from 
24 being there and actually witnessing how much she had 
25 consumed as to whether she would be eligible to drive under 
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1 that condition. 
2 Q The things you told us that you observed led you 
3 to believe that she was under the influence of intoxicating 
4 I beverages; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
MR. McINTOSH: That's all I have, Mr. Jones. 
(The deposition concluded at 2-"30 p.m.)-
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EXHIBIT "20" 
T h e O h i O CaSUal ty G rOUp of Insurance Companies 
CLAIM DEPARTMENT: 706O Union PtrV Avo.. SuH« 360, Mldvtls. Utth 84047 
Uallino AMrmmn- P.O Go* 420. Midvtl*. Ulih S4047-0429 • T*tot)hone: 8CW256-S576 {Ftx - 801-20&-S4721 
GEORGE R. KESt. Omlma Minspir 
H«roW F. C«f*«on, Cairns Supervisor 
July 22. 1992 
Michael N. Martinez & Associates 
Attornoyo at Law 
Kich«l M. Martin**. Eoq . 
447Q Gordon Lano, Suito 100 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Re: Your Client: 
Our Claim No. 
our injured: 
Date of Loss; 
Dear Mr. Martinez: 
Taylor, Myra L, 
UT 2 GFL 88 H R.I 1<5 A 
Olson, Ronald 6e Carol 
10/17/67 
W« have reviewed the deposition of Jennifer (Heather) Olson which WQ« 
forwarded to u« with your July Cf 1992 correspondence. 
We do not believe the deposition demonstrate* a lack of parental 
supervision by Ronald Olson and Carol Olson as alleged. Wc believe that 
such an allocation of necessity would have to be supported by direct 
statements made by Ronald Olson and Carol Olson pertaining to their 
knowledge of Jennifer's use of the vehicle and knowledge of her habita 
of consumption of alcohol. Should you wish to make available to ua 
copies of the deposition of Ronald Olson and Carol Olson, we shall 
further consider the C«sc At this point we must respectfully reiterate 
our position of a denial of Liability coverage afforded by th« Olson'» 
Homeowners policy issued by this Company. 
Vsry truly yourse 
THE AMERICAN FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY 
H. F. Carlson 
Claims Supervisor 
HFC:kk 
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EXHIBIT "21" 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
ONALD H. OLSON, et al.. 
TLE: 
YRA L. 
vs. 
( • PARTIES PRESENT) 
TAYLOR. 
P l a i n t i f f . 
FILE NO. 900907125 
COUNSEL: (^ COUNSEL PRESENT) 
:
 James A. Mcintosh 
:
 Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
:
 Michael N. Martinez 
Attorney for Defendant 
Defendants, 
CLERK HON. TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
JUDGE 
REPORTER DATE: 
BAILIFF 
The above-referenced matter came before the Court for pretrial on 
September 29 , 1992, a t the hour of 
a.nd t h e d e f e n d a n t s were p r e s e n t . 
i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n 
1992. 
Counsel for__ 
t h e 
the 
t r i a l which 
p a r t i e s 
2 :00 
and 
P« 
met 
i s p r e s e 
p r e s e n t ,ed 
m. Counsel fo r 
w i t h t h e Cour t 
t h e 
t o d 
n t l y s c h e d u l e d fo r No-" 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e po 
p l a i n t 
i s c u s s 
member 
s i t i o n s 
i f f 
t h e 
1 9 , 
o f 
liability and potential defenses thereto informally to the Court, and the 
Court discussed with counsel the nature of the claims and the defenses. 
Counsel for the parties summarized the anticipated facts leading up 
to and including the accident which is the subject of the plaintiffs 
Complaint, and it appeared that there was little dispute with regard to 
the facts, including the conduct of the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson 
prior to and at the time of the accident in question. 
Counsel for the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, advised the 
court as to the nature of £Ji£ claimed in.iwrigg—Q£—t^e—pontiffi en4 
advised the Court as to the anticipated evidence relating to special 
damages and general damages. 
0 0 0 1 G 2 
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I n iKU JUUIUIAL. DISTHICT 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
TITLE: ( • PARTIES PRESENT) 
MYRA L . TAYLOR. 
P l a i n t i f f . 
VS. 
RONALD H. OLSONr * t a1_, 
Defendants. 
COUNSEL: 
FILE NO. 900907125 
(y COUNSEL PRESENT) 
CLERK HON TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
JUDGE 
REPORTER 
DATE: 
BAILIFF 
Counsel presented their respective positions relating to the claims 
of punitive, damages. The plaintiff may choose not to pursue punitive 
damages under the circumstances of this case, and will advise the Court as 
the trial date approaches whether or not that remains an issue, or whether 
or not the claim for punitive damages will be abandoned.
 ; 
ThA parties a.erf>*d and the Court is willing to acquiesce in the 
presentation of evidence in this matter through proffer and/or affidavit, 
as opposed to the presentation of live testimony. Special damages and 
permanent partial impairment are not in substantial dispute, and the 
parties will likely be able to agree upon presentation of appropriate 
documentatinn as to those amounts and those percentages- The parties 
through their proffers and the expert testimony offered through reports 
anH proffer will form a hasis for* imposition of general damages and/or 
punitive damages should punitive damages continue to be an issue. 
Th«» PAi-ties ftgrpgd that. »11 depositions that have been tftk?P,—may be 
puhlished for the Court's consideration in this matter. The original of 
l»J 
t.ho d e p o s i t i o n s MBJ r r - p p o t i v g c o u n s e l ' s f i l e s w i l l be presented t o t h e — _ 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DI5THICT 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
ITLE (* PARTIES PRESENT) 
YRA L. TAYLOR. 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
HNAin H. 0LS0Nf et a L r 
.Defendants * 
COUNSEL: 
FILE NO. 900907125 
( • COUNSEL PRESENT) 
CLERK 
REPORTER 
HON. TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DATE: 
BAILIFF 
JUDGE 
Court at the time of trial for formal filing. Based upon the agreement of 
the parties to publish depositions, the Court ordered the depositions 
pnhl-jghAH. 
There being no further business befg/e the Court on this cause, the 
pretrial conclude* at 3:05 p.m. 
nIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
C o p i e s t o : 
James A. Mcintosh. Esq. 
Michael N. Martinez, Esq. 
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EXHIBIT "22" 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ, — No. 2194 ThirdJuuiuJU:-""'** 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation MOV 1 9 ^Ji)2 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg„ South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA L. TAYLOR 
Plaintiff ; 
v. ; 
RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL . D. : 
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER : 
OLSON : 
Defendants : 
'• STIPULATION 
Civil No. 900907125PI 
: (Judge Timothy R. Hanson) 
1. The parties individually and through their respective 
counsel of record, hereby stipulate and agree as hereinafter set 
forth, 
2c The parties acknowledge the above-entitled matter came 
on regularly for final pretrial on September 29, 1992, at the hour 
of 2:00 p.m. and lasted for more than one hour. At this pretrial, 
the parties and the court agreed to certain procedures to be used 
at the time of trial for submitting" testimony through proffers of 
proof, affidavits, medical reports, and other documentation. On 
ft (' n •» \ : 
\J \f \J JL i * 
October 1, 1992, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson entered an order 
pertaining to the said pretrial and setting out the said trial 
procedures. The parties agree to follow Judge Hanson's procedures 
at the trial, which is scheduled to begin at 10:00 a.m. on 
Thursday, November 19, 1992. 
3. The parties agree to be present in court on the said 
trial date to acknowledge and stipulate to any proffers of proof 
that are made through their respective counsel. 
4. Counsel will bring to the trial all original depositions 
which are in their files and the parties agree all such original 
depositions may be published by the court and used by Judge Hanson 
to determine the outstanding issues in this case and the general 
damages to be awarded to the plaintiff. 
5. Using the said procedures established at pretrial, the 
plaintiff will submit documentary evidence in support of her 
special damages. Based on these special damages and also the 
medical and dental reports to be submitted by the plaintiff, the 
parties agree to submit to the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson the 
issue of what general damages the plaintiff would be entitled to. 
Judge Hanson will have the sole discretion to determine the said 
general damages based on the evidence presented at trial and the 
stipulation of the parties with respect to the reasonableness of 
the said general damages. Judge Hanson will not be bound by any 
stipulation or agreement of the parties with respect to the general 
damages, but will be free to determine them according to his own 
personal review of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. 
-2-
6. It is recognized plaintiff's counsel represents not only 
the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, but also United Services Automobile 
Association ("USAA") which was the insurance carrier insuring the 
Taylor vehicle at the time of the accident described in the 
plaintiff's complaint, which complaint is by reference incorporated 
herein and made a part hereof. USAA's involvement in this case is 
to protect their subrogation rights with respect to both the 
uninsured motorist payment of some $20,000.00 and also the no-fault 
payment for medical expenses, loss of wages, and domestic help or 
essential services of some $22,200.10. 
7. The plaintiff agrees to withdraw her claim for punitive 
damages against any of the defendants. 
8. Judge Hanson will be asked to determine the amount of 
special and general damages to which the plaintiff is entitled with 
respect to each separate Count of the five (5) Counts described in 
her complaint and with respect to each claim made in each of the 
said five (5) Counts. Again, Judge Hanson will be invested with 
the sole discretion to make the said findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and judgment based on his review of the evidence submitted 
at trial. 
9. The defendants agree to waive their right to the normal 
thirty-day (30) appeal period allowed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, 
when the final judgment is entered, this matter will become final 
with respect to all issues set forth in the said judgment and the 
defendants will have no right to appeal said judgment. 
10c After the court determines the amount of the judgment, 
including both special and general damages, the defendants agree 
to assign any and all claims they might have against their 
homeowners1 insurance company, or any other insurance companies 
where there might be coverage pertaining to the facts set forth in 
the five (5) Counts of the plaintiff fs complaint . The parties only 
know of the Olsons1 homeowners1 insurance coverage at the present 
time, however, this stipulation is broad enough to include any 
other insurance if such becomes identified in the future. 
11. With respect to the assignment of their claims against 
their homeowners1 insurance company as described in paragraph 10 
above, the parties agree Myra L. Taylor will be entitled to pursue 
any and all claims against the defendants1 homeowners1 insurance 
carrier to the same extent the defendants would be entitled to 
pursue those claims under the terms of their policy or under the 
general common law or statutory law in the state of Utah. In this 
connection, the defendants agree Myra L. Taylor may appear as the 
sole party plaintiff in any subsequent lawsuit against the 
homeowners1 insurance company, or may appear jointly with the said 
Olsons as parties plaintiffs, or she may designate the Olsons to 
appear as the party plaintiff in the said lawsuit. The election 
of who the party plaintiffs would be in the said lawsuit will be 
left up to the sole discretion of Myra L. Taylor to decide at the 
time the lawsuit is commenced. 
12. With respect to the said "assignment" of the defendants1 
rights against their homeowners1 insurance carrier as described in 
paragraphs 10 and 11 above, the said defendants agree to assign, 
to the extent permitted by law, any and all claims they have 
against the said carrier to include, but not necessarily be limited 
to, the $100,000.00 liability coverage, the liability of the 
carrier for any "excess" judgment over and above the said 
$100,000.00 which the court may enter at the time of the trial, and 
any "additional" damages to which the Olsons might be entitled to 
such as personal tort actions for mental anguish, economic loss, 
damage to reputation, etc.. These claims also involve any and all 
claims which the defendants have for attorney fees they have 
incurred in the present action and any and all damages they have 
sustained as a result of the refusal of their homeowners1 insurance 
carrier to defend them in the instant action and/or for the said 
carrier's breach of the duty of good faith dealing with the said 
defendants. 
13. With respect to the said "assignment" as stated in 
paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 above, the defendants and each of them 
agree that they will cooperate with the plaintiff in any lawsuit 
which might later be filed against the defendants1 homeowners1 
insurance company. The defendants direct their counsel, agents, 
and assigns to cooperate with the plaintiff in the said subsequent 
lawsuit, and counsel, agents, and assigns agree to do so. This 
cooperation is to be made without any remuneration of any kind 
being paid by the plaintiff to the defendants or their counsel. 
With respect to this "cooperation," the plaintiff acknowledges the 
defendants will not have any responsibility to pay for any costs 
or attorney fees in connection with any subsequent lawsuit which 
the plaintiff files against the defendants1 homeowners1 insurance 
-5-
carrier. Plaintiff shall indemnify each co-plaintiff against any 
loss, costs, or damages which may or do accrue as a result of any 
action of co-plaintiff in the subsequent lawsuit. 
14. With respect to the "Assignment11 described above and in 
the event the defendants are not permitted by lav/ to assign some 
portion of their claims against their homeowners' carrier to the 
plaintiff because the claims are personal in nature or for whatever 
other reasons, the defendants agree to appear as parties plaintiffs 
in any subsequent lawsuit commenced by Myra L. Taylor against the 
homeowners1 carrier. Any monies collected by any of the defendants 
by virtue of these personal claims which cannot be assigned will 
be the sole property of the said Myra L. Taylor and the defendants 
agree to pay all of such monies to the said Taylor. 
15. In exchange for the said "assignment" as described 
hereinabove, the plaintiff and USAA agree they will not execute on 
any of the personal assets of any of the three defendants, rather, 
the plaintiff will look solely for recovery from the defendants1 
homeowners1 insurance carrier for payments on the said judgment. 
16. The defendants agree to identify for the plaintiff at the 
time of trial the exact identity, including name, address, and 
telephone number, of their homeowners1 insurance carrier. In this 
connection, the parties acknowledge the said carrier has been 
identified in letters written by their counsel as Ohio Casualty 
Insurance Company and also has been identified in letters from the 
insurance company as the "American Fire and Casualty Insurance 
Company." In this connection, the defendants agree to provide the 
plaintiff, at or before the time of trial, with a full and complete 
-6-
copy of the homeowners1 insurance policy, together with all 
endorsements which were in effect on October 17, 1987, the date of 
the accident described in the plaintifffs complaint. 
17 c The defendants represent and agree none of them have made 
any agreements and/or promises to their homeowners1 insurance 
carrier that would release the carrier from any liability to the 
defendants for any of the acts, issues, claims, or assets stated 
in the plaintiff's complaint or that would impair in any way, the 
right of the defendants to pursue any claims they have under the 
terms of the homeowners1 policy for failure of the carrier to 
defend the defendants in the instant lawsuit, for breach of the 
carriers1 duty to deal in good faith with the defendants and/or for 
any other claims the defendants have against the carrier for any 
liability connected with the plaintiff's complaint and the 
carriers' duties with respect thereto. If there have been any such 
agreements, promises, or other documents signed or agreed to by the 
defendants then this Stipulation will be automatically null and 
void and any final judgment entered in this case will be without 
the benefit or protection of this Stipulation. 
18. The parties and their respective counsel are signing this 
Stipulation to be used in connection with any final Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and/or Final Judgment which the court 
enters in this matter. The parties agree and consent this 
Stipulation may be presented to the above-entitled court for 
approval, and if it is approved by the trial judge assigned to hear 
this case — the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson ~ this Stipulation 
may be incorporated into any of the court's final documents by 
reference to the same extent as though each and every separate 
provision in this Stipulation had been included in the said 
documents. 
19. This Stipulation is binding on the parties hereto, their 
heirs, personal representatives, assignees, or successors. In this 
connection the parties state their intention to have this 
Stipulation survive the death of any of the parties. 
DATED this 19th day of November 1992. 
-UJ 
MYRA//L. TAYLOR, Plaintiff 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
AMES A. MCINTOSH 
Attorney for Plaintiff and for United 
Services Automobile Association 
V^ V L: 
RONALD D. OLSON, Defendant 
d, flbn 
CAROL'D. OLSON, Defendant 
JENNIFER4HEATHER OLSON, Defendant 
MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ 
Attorney for Defendants 
-8-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA L. 
vs. 
RONALD 
OLSON, 
OLSON, 
. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
H. OLSON, CAROL D. ) 
and JENNIFER HEATHER ) 
Defendant. 
Case No. 900907125 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
If:.:. 
Th..d Jutiiu.v.; District 
ORG i J t*0 
Ki.t i.AK-7. COUNTY 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled case 
came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Timothy 
R« Hanson, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on the 19th day of November, 1992, 
at 10:00 a.m., and that the following proceedings were 
had.. 
ORIGINAL 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: 
James A. Mcintosh 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 14 intrade Bldg South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Michael N. Martinez 
Attorney at Law 
4479 South Gordon Ln. 
Murray, Utah 84107 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
Page 2 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 November 19, 1992 
3 Partial Transcript 
4 THE COURT: What I intend to do, ladies and 
5 gentlemen, and counsel in this matter, is to review the 
6 exhibits that have been received. To the extent that I 
7 believe it's necessary to relate these Findings of Fact 
8 I to particular witnesses, I want to review some of the .. 
9 ' depositions. Inasmuch as the facts as to how the 
10 : accident occurred are not substantially in dispute, if at 
11 all, I don't need to .spend a lot of time on bow this 
12 accident occurred, except that I will read the factual 
13 recitations to make a determination, because I'm willing 
14 to make a finding of percentage of responsibility here to 
15 determine the percentage of responsibility for the 
16 accident between Ms. Taylor and Ms. Olson. I will 
17 attempt to — I won't attempt, 1 will, based on the 
18 evidence that I have, make a determination as to that 
19 percentage. 
20 The other major issue that I'm primarily concerned 
21 with in this matter is reading all the medical 
22 information, reading the information that's been provided 
23 in relation to the damages claimed in this matter by Ms. 
24 I Taylor, and attempting to put , a figure to that. And in 
25 reaching that type of figure, so you'll all understand 
Page 3 
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1 how that's done, meiny times these types of cases are 
2 tried to a jury, and I tell a jury they are charged with 
3 responsibility of putting a dollar figure on an injury. 
4 And obviously that's not something you can calculate with 
5 precision; it's somewhat subjective. I will attempt to 
6 weigh and evaluate the — a number of things that the 
7 evidence may show. To the extent that the evidence in 
8 this case shows permanent impairment, that's a factor 
9 that I must take into consideration in determining 
10 damages, what the lawyers and judges call pain and 
11 suffering. And that's kind of a general catchall for 
12 change of lifestyle, limitations on what people can do, 
13 and what they can't do, actual pain that has occurred, 
14 inconvenience, emotional upset that's related to that, 
15 and the mental impact that runs with physical injuries. 
16 I will attempt to evaluate all those things, and attach a 
17 figure to it. 
18 But like I say, there's no mathematical formula that 
19 I tell jurys about, or that I could apply myself. 
20 There's really no way with any degree of precision, 
21 because as Mr. Taylor pointed out, I'm sure if everybody 
22 sitting in this courtroom could have had the power to 
23 make this whole thing disappear, we'd all be a lot 
24 happier. But the accident happened. It did happen. 
25 There have been injuries as a result of the accident, and 
Page 
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1 the only way that the legal system that we have in this 
2 country can compensate a person for injuries is 
3 monitarily. There's no other way. Sometimes that's 
4 woefully inadequate, but it's the only way we have to do 
5 it. And so T will try and determine what I believe to be 
6 a reasonable, and a fair figure for the damages that I 
7 determine to exist. 
8 And so what I think I will do, counsel, is this: I 
9 may choose to issue a brief written memoranda about some 
10 of my observations in relation to the evidence. I will 
11 also revi ew the Findings of Fact, and Cone J .usions of Law, 
12 and the final judgment that's been proposed, and 
13 determine whether or not what changes or additions or 
14 deletions need to be made from those Findings of Fact, 
15 and I'll pen and ink those in, and send you a copy of 
16 those changes, and I'll ask Mr. Mcintosh to prepare it in 
17 fina 1 for m. Once I have that document, then I will sign 
18 a final judgment. And that will resolve this Court's 
19 involvement in this matter, at least resolves this case 
20 between Ms. Taylor, and the Olsons. .  
21 Also, I think the record ought to reflect at this 
22 point in time that the Court has had some input into this 
23 matter, and I am satisfied that both sides have carefully 
24 evaluated their positions. Proceeding by way of proffer 
25 is — it's not unheard of, but it's not unusual in this 
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case. But if there is no disputed issues of fact with 
regard to the manner in which this accident occurred, and 
if there's no need to bring in witnesses to testify 
because what they are going to say is not in substantial 
dispute by the other side, then it seems foolish to spend 
a number of days trying a case like this. So's that's 
the reason that I agreed that we could proceed by way of 
proffer in this case as opposed to calling in doctors, 
and having them testify, and having everyone testify 
directly. Some cases are pretty straight forward. This 
appears to be one. And so there's no reason to spend a 
lot of time determining what's going to be inevitable in 
any event, certainly with regard to the issue of 
liability. So when I say the issue of liability, I'm 
talking about how the accident occurred. So I believe 
proceeding by way of proffer in this case was and is 
appropriate, and that's the reason that I have agreed to 
do that, and I assume counsel were equally as comfortable 
with that, otherwise you wouldn't have agreed to proceed 
in that fashion. 
It also appears to the Court that the stipulation 
has been carefully drafted, that it has been reviewed at 
some length by both sides, and that both sides have had 
input, and up until this morning, and including this 
morning, there were ongoing discussions with regard to 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
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1 the proper contents of the stipulation, for example, and 
2 the Findings of Fact that have been offered in this 
3 matter. So it appears that there has been a careful 
4 review not only for the plaintiff, but also for the 
5 defendants as to their position, and that this 
6 stipulation, and the facts that have been agreed to as 
7 far as this accident occurred, as far as how this 
8 accident occurred lidve been done at arms-length. And I 
9 just don't want to leave the impression to anyone, 
10 because it's not my impression that the defendant are 
11 just here to do whatever t :he pla intiffs choose t ;o ha /e 
12 them do to get this matter over with, I do not believe 
13 that has been the case* That has not been my 
14 observation. 
15 And so I'm satisfied this is an arms-length 
16 transaction, if I can use that term. Certainly arms-
17 leng th negot i atIons as to how to resolve this matter, and 
18 a careful analysis of what the facts are, and the facts 
19 are basically as I've already said, not in substantial 
20 dispute. So with those explanations, ladies and 
21 gentlemen, that's what I intend to do. I wish I <:oiiId 
22 tell you how soon I was going to have it done ~ 
23 certainly within the week. And barring some unforeseen 
24 crisis, I would hope to have thd s done before the 
25 holidays next Thursday, and in the mail back to your 
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attorneys so we can finalize this matter. Anything else, 
counsel? 
MR. McINTOSH: Your Honor, may I give the 
Court three copies — copies of three cases that just 
have some general verdicts and amounts that have been 
found in other states? 
THE COURT: Certainly 
MR. McINTOSH: With respect to similar type 
injuries. One of the cases is for $450,000, one of the 
cases is for $150,000, and one of them is for $75,000. I 
wanted you to have both ends of the spectrum. Those are 
probably the three best samplings I could find of this 
type of injury, and what other courts have done. 
THE COURT: I'll be glad to consider those. 
All right. And, of course, so that everyone understands, 
perhaps with a little more clarity how one reaches the 
subjective figures, not only do I rely upon my own 
evaluation of what the evidence shows, and the 
significance of the injuries, and how that might be 
translated into a dollar figure, I want this record to 
reflect, because I don't know who might be reading it in 
the future, but I want this record to reflect that over 
the last ten years there have been a number of personal 
injury cases tried to this Court, so I'm familiar with 
what jurys have done, what I have done on cases that may 
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bear some resemblance, to this in the way of damages, and 
also some significant experiences as a trial lawyer 
before taking the bench, because I specialized in this 
type of area. So there's something to draw on besides 
just kind of plucking a figure out of the sky. So I will 
attempt to make it reasonable, but appropriate. So, 
that's what we'll do. 
Thank you for your efforts, counsel. I think you've 
handled this in an appropriate fashion in view of the 
circumstances, and commend you on your willingness to 
agree where you could to save your clients expense and 
trauma going through a protracted piece of litigation. 
All right. We'll be in recess. Again, thank you for 
your good efforts. 
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EXHIBIT "24" 
c-^c^s-c^ r~ rT^~ 
MYRA L. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COl^ RT^  
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ,A^ _b <A<3 
Case No. 900907125 
Judge Timothy Re Hanson 
RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D. 
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER 
OLSON, 
Defendant. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled case 
came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Timothy 
Re Hanson, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on the 19th day of November, 1992, 
at 10:00 a.m., and that the following proceedings were 
had • 
ORIGINAL 
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James A. Mcintosh 
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1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Michael N. Martinez 
Attorney at Law 
4479 South Gordon Ln. 
Murray, Utah 84107 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
November 19, 1992 
Partial Transcript 
THE COURJ: Mr. Martinez? 
MR. MARTINEZ: We really have nothing to add, 
Your Honor, other than I would proffer to the Court that 
if asked, each of the defendants would agree wi th the 
factual statement as stated in the Findings of Fact, And 
for the record, Your Honor, on the stipulation, 
stipulation paragraph number sixteen states that : >n th i; s 
day, on the date of trial, defendants would provide the 
homeowner's policy, carrier's issued policy, which we 
have provided, so the record will note that. -. -
just for clarification, which I've discussed with Mr. 
Mcintosh, for paragraph seventeen, it states that the 
defendants nor any of them have made any agreement or 
released the insurance carrier, the homeowner's insurance 
carrier from any liability. And that applies strictly to 
any agreement ^L - de of the policy. Other than that, 
Your Honor, we have nothing to add or state. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me ~ so that we 
have a response under oath on many of these issues, Mr. 
and Mrs. Olson, and Ms. Olson, would you raise your 
right-hand, and be sworn, please. And I'll ask you some 
questions about: these facts. 
Page 3 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, .RPR 
A i \ II 9 4 fi 
(Mr. and Mrs. Olson and Ms. Olson were sworn.) 
THE COURT: Please be seated. Have all three 
of you had an opportunity to read this stipulation, your 
signatures on it. 
MR. OLSON.- Yes. 
MRS. OLSON: Yes. 
MS. OLSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: And have you also had an 
opportunity to review the document called Findings of 
Fact. 
MR. OLSON: Yes, we did, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All three of you have read that? 
MS. OLSON: Yes. 
MS. OLSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: In both the stipulation, and 
Findings of Fact, there are certain recitations as to the 
manner in which this accident occurred, and the 
participation of Ms. Olson, and Ms. Taylor, and how this 
accident occurred. Now, I recognize all three of you 
weren't there, but to the extent that you have personal 
knowledge, or to the extent that you have been advised as 
to what occurred on that occasion, do these Findings of 
Fact represent the facts as they occurred as you 
understand them to be, and as you recollect them to be to 
the extent you have personal knowledge? 
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MR. OLSON: 
MRS. OLSON: 
MS. OLSON: 
THE COURT: 
MR. OLSON: 
MRS. OLSON: 
MS. OLSON: 
THE COURT: 
Yes. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
All three of you agree? 
Yes. 
Yes. 
Yes. 
The reason I ask these questions, 
so the record is clear on this, I am satisfied that the 
factual recitation of both the stipulation, and the 
findings are basically the agreement of both parties, and 
I've heard from the Taylors, and now I've heard from the 
three of you, and it appears that there's agreement 
between the parties as to what the facts basically are 
with regard to how this accident occurred. And so that's 
the reason I've asked those questions. I just wanted to 
make sure that you felt that they were a satisfactory 
recitation of the facts. 
All right. Very good. Anything further from the 
defendant, then? 
MR. MARTINEZ: None, Your Honor. We'd rest. 
MR. MclNTOSH: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
Thank you. 
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EXHIBIT "25" 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. ~ No. 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA L 
RONALD 
OLSON, 
OLSON 
. TAYLOR 
Plaintiff , 
H. OLSON, CAROL D. : 
and JENNIFER HEATHER i 
Defendants : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
: civil No. 90090n2SPI 
: (Judge Timothy R. Hanson) 
The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly for trial 
on Thursday, November ] 9 , 3 992 , before the He :>i i,orab] e Timothy R. 
H a nson, Juc ig< • of the above-entitled court, hearing this case 
without a jury; the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, being present in 
court and represented by the law firm James A. M--! rv „,•-. & 
Associ--! -- a Utah professional law corporation, appearing 
through counsel, James Ac Mcintosh; the defendants, Ronald H. 
Olson, Carol D. Olson, and Jennifer Heather Olson being present in 
court and bei i tg represented by counsel, Michae] N Martinez; the . 
court having heretofore entered a Pretrial Order establishing the 
procedures for presenting evidence at the time of the trial; said 
Pretrial Ordei * being incorporated herein by reference and being. 
made a part hereof; the court having received the various proffers 
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of proof, affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence submitted 
by the plaintiff in support of the allegations raised in each of 
the five (5) Counts of her complaint; the court having taken the 
proffer of testimony from the defendants, Ronald H. Olson and Carol 
D. Olson, said proffers being made by their counsel, Michael N. 
Martinez, and approved by the said Olsons; the court having 
published the deposition of all persons heretofore deposed in this 
action; the court having reviewed the said proffers of proof, 
affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence and being fully 
advised in the premises; hereby enters its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 17, 1987, ("accident date11) the defendant 
Ronald H. Olson was the owner of a 1974 Volkswagen, two-door sedan, 
green in color ("Volkswagen") • Mr, Olson had purchased the said 
Volkswagen from a previous owner Daniel Park Lake. On the said 
October 17, 1987, the Volkswagen was not registered in the state 
of Utah and was uninsured. 
2. On the said accident date the said Ronald H. Olson was 
married to the defendant Carol D. Olson and was living with his 
wife and family at 1930 Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108. 
On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson was 
sixteen years of age, having been born on April 2, 1971. 
3. On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather 
Olson ("Heather") was driving the said Volkswagen at approximately 
11:55 P.M. on Yalecrest Avenue (1015 South in Salt Lake City, Utah) 
-2-
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at its intersection with 1900 East ("accident scene"), There was 
a "yield" traffic siqn tdcjnq Ya]eere4" A^ITIUP tt I'hc .Hi 
intersection, which sign required drivers on Ifalecrest Avenue to 
yield the right-of-way to persons on 1900 East. 
4* Ac the sa i ci time and p] ace described i i i paragraph 3 
above, the ^aid defendant Heather was driving under the influence 
of intoxicating beverages and was driving the Volkswagen with a 
blood-alcohc ontent of approximately .14 qr.ims in violation of 
4, • : . ^ ode Annotated, 19 53, as amended. 
5. A : ^ w minutes prior t-.; tue time and place described in 
paragraph ^ - -v*-* said defendant Heather was involved i n a "hi t 
a nd -*; i n an area, ip«« than one mi le from, the said 
accident scene. This hit and run involved another motorist by the 
name of Michelle Paxton. Heather was being pursued by Ms. Paxton 
through a r esidential neighborhood at the time she reached the 
accident scene. 
6 At approximate!v ; i * So P.M. on the said accident date 
* <: r the accident seem • - . laintiff M- : 1 - raylor was driving 
her 1984 Subaru 640 station wagon ("Subaru" m a northerly 
direction along 1900 East Street and in a careful and prudent 
mam *er. 
7. On or about the said 11:55 P«M on the said accident date 
and at the accident scene, the defendant Heather negligently, 
("negligence") operated I ler X ' * x ' ' fen thei: eby causi ng a col lisi on 
with the Subaru being driven L\ the plaintiff. The specific 
grounds of negligence include, b^t are not necessarily limited to, 
the followings 
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(a) A failure to keep a proper lookout. 
(b) Failure to yield the right-of-way to Myra Taylor 
who was driving her car on 1900 East. 
(c) Driving too fast for existing conditions, 
(d) Driving under the influence of intoxicating 
beverages with a blood-alcohol content of approximately twice the 
limit established by the Utah statutes for a presumption of driving 
under the influence of intoxicating beverages. 
(e) Failure to take evasive action to avoid the 
accident. 
(f) Failure to keep her motor vehicle under control. 
jt
 fcv.-v (x^—Driving- a-motor vehicle that—was—not- -insured and 
-also -not- registered; 
g nx.X (h-)—Driving" a motor vehrcrte-w-rfeh license plates which 
-had - not been.-issued- forthe- automobile-Heather^-was-driving-f 
8. As a sole, direct and proximate cause of Heather's 
negligence, Myra L. Taylor was then and there seriously and 
permanently injured. She suffered bruises, contusions, 
lacerations, shock, headache, muscle spasms, numbness in her joints 
and members, scarring, strains, fractures, and other damages and 
personal injury so as to render the plaintiff partially and 
permanently disabled for the balance of her life. 
9. The plaintiff has suffered a loss of the quality of life 
and enjoyment of life she experienced prior to October 17, 1987, 
and has also suffered mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering 
and other mental and emotional trauma as more fully described in 
the evidence plaintiff provided at trial, some of which is dis-
-4-
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cussed hereafter. 
10. Prior to the time of the sal ci acci dent oi :i October 17, 
1987, the plaintiff was 'fehe pictuiiii--o£ health and vigor. She was 
a healthy mother who had given birth to and raised twelve (12) 
children. She was a<_, u^stonied *••• f^kinq lung trips as ,-i family from 
coast-to-coast in the family car She would drive the family car, 
pack the luggage and the food, work tirelessly and enthusiastically 
completing these tasks as a wife and mother. By comparison, the 
plaint .ft is unable to ride in the family car at the time of trial 
without hunching her back and walking bent over because of back 
spasms and pain. 
11. • Prior to the time of the accident, the plai ntiff enjoyed 
sports. She had played tennis, golf, bowling, horseback riding, 
motorcycling, hiking, waterskiing, camping, badminton, jumping on 
the trampoline with her children, and dancing. Since the accident, 
the plaintiff has been unable to participate in any of these 
activities and is by comparison an "invalid" with respect to her 
lifesty 3 e pi: i < :>i: to the accident. 
12. The plaintifffs treating physician, King S. Udall, M.D., 
gave his written opinion in a letter dated approximately r- fl) 
I l l O n t h n r i n r I ••• I J h p f j i I HJ| p 1 .i I Fl 1 i f l I I. I S S U S t t i . *-
percem \at* permanent impairment and disability of net total 
person as a result of the accident. Dr. Udall stated that, as a 
result of the accident, Myr.ii h. Taylor h.id to ,liter her 1 i f P an<j 
career significantly. Because of the accident Dr. Udall states Ms. 
Taylor was unable to work on a full-time basis either lifting or 
providing the usual services of a registered i i/t irse As a result, 
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she did not receive commensurate wages for the amount of time she 
missed as working half-time as she did as a full-time employee. 
Dr. Udall further states as a result of the accident the plaintiff 
has difficulty with her housework and cannot do routine housework 
as before or do anything which involves heavy work using the upper 
extremities. After listening to the proffers of proof and the 
other evidence submitted at trial, the court concurs in the 
findings by Dr. Udall as more fully stated in his October 20, 1992 
letter to plaintiff's counsel, James A. Mcintosh, Esq.. 
13. As a sole, direct and proximate cause of the accident, 
the plaintiff has incurred a loss of wages for th€* period of time 
October 18, 1987, through October 5, 1991, in the amount of 
$65,861.84. This finding is based on the affidavit of Margie Q. 
Richins, dated November 9, 1992. Ms. Richins is the Civilian 
Payroll Supervisor for the Veteran's Administration Medical Center 
where the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, worked for many years as a 
Registered Nurse. 
14. The court finds it was reasonable and necessary for the 
plaintiff to take the depositions of certain persons, to wit, 
Kristi Bringhurst, Jenny Pia, Steve Ebert, Steve Jones, Scott Levy, 
James Levy, Mark Muir, Jeff Gertino, and Heidi Olson. The court 
further finds it was reasonable and necessary for the plaintiff to 
pay the said persons $17.00 each to attend their depositions and 
to pay the amount of $232.00 for the service of subpoenas on the 
said persons together with the further amount of $374.80 to the 
court reporter for taking and transcribing the said depositions. 
The court finds this total of $759.80 is a reasonable and necessary 
-6-
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expense incur ret I Iby the plaintiff in this action and is to be taxed 
as part of the costs to be awarded to the plaintiff. 
15." In addition to the said ^t>b,*61.84 lost wages described 
in paragraph 13, the court finds the plaintiff has also incurred 
the following^special damages from the time of the accident through 
the time of the tri aJ 
(a) Essential Services — $6,2GG„Q0c 
(b) Medical Expenses -- $5,178.75 
(c) Expert Witness Fees to Frank Grant for Accident, 
Investigation and Reconstruction Services — $718.75. 
16. In addition to the ten percent (10%) total person 
impairment ^ disability noted by Dr. King Sc Udall as described 
at i - . . • • ! : :M* sustained injuries to her nose and teeth, 
as more fully described in medical reports from Dr. Bryce D. 
Allred, M.D .t and from her dentists, Vee Boyd Hair, D.M.D., and 
Scott B. Hai i: , D.D.S. . 
17. The plaintiff was able to resume full-time employment at 
the Veteran's Administration Hospital on or about October 5, 1991. 
The sani full 1.1 nif Hin[iloyiiHMil IK-M i^sitaied : change s- * ri»- tvpe and 
nature oi the work plaintiff had been performing prior the 
accident arv: required a career change as ru*>e ^ l y - ^ - - J m Dr. 
Udali* v- ; -. report ami in tin-11 p 1 a i irit; i I * * fc*-^'
 t-v ; , . 
18. The court finds Myra L. Taylor's physical, mental, and 
emotional disabilities will continue for the rest of her natural 
life and w i1 ] i n te rfere w i th he r e I i j o y me f 11 o f ] I fe as a wi£ e and 
a mother, and wi 13 deprive her of the benefits and enjoyment of 
life which she had prior to the time of the accident as more fully 
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set forth hereinabove in these findings. For all of these reasons, 
4
 tyf, tec 
the court finds the plaintiff is entitled to $25O,000vOfr as 
reasonable and full compensation for the general damages she has 
sustained from the time of the accident to the time of trial and 
from the trial through the remainder of her natural life. In this 
connection, the court finds the plaintiff was born on January 28, 
194 3, and at the time of the accident, on October 17, 1987, was 
forty-four (44) years of age. The plaintiff had a life expectancy 
at the time of the accident of approximately thirty-six (3 6) years. 
The court takes judicial notice of the plaintiff's life expectancy 
which can also be verified in the legal encyclopedias such as the 
DESK BOOK in American Jurisprudence "Second Edition" Cumulative 
Supplement issued in April of 1991. The mortality tables are found 
in the said publication as Items numbers 159, 160, and 161. 
19 c The parties have submitted to the court a proposed 
"Stipulation" dated November 19, 1992, which provides for an 
assignment after judgment has been entered of the defendant's claim 
against their homeowners' insurance company for failure and refusal 
to defend the defendants in this instant lawsuit, for failure to 
pay the policy limits of $100,000.00, for any excess judgment which 
might be entered in this action, and for any additional claims 
which the defendants might have against their homeowners' insurance 
carrier. As consideration for the said assignment, the plaintiff 
agrees not to execute on the defendants' personal property. The 
court finds the Stipulation is reasonable and adopts the terms of 
the said Stipulation as though they were fully set forth in these 
findings. 
-8-
0 0 010 9 
20. The court finds there has been no collusion between the 
plaintiff and the defendants with respect to the said Stipulation 
or wit.n respect t© assigning the defendants * r ight.s t:« :> t)l ,e 
plaintiff with respect t© the defendants 1 homeowners 1 insurance 
carrier. The parties have submitted correspondence between counsel 
for the plaintiff and counsel for 1:1 le de fendants as u •, s 
correspondence between counsel for the defendants and the 
homeowners 1 insurance claims office and the attorney for the 
homeowners :| .insurance company. The con ir t: f:i i ids the sa i d doc \ lments 
have kept the homeowners 1 insurance company apprised of this legal 
action and have given the said company every chance to appear in 
this ease and to represent the defei idai its her ei i i The coi ir t fi nds 
the said insurance company has not appeared in this action in an/ 
capacity whatsoever through the date of the trial. 
21. The plaintiff withdrew 1 ieii claim :'::: onitive damages at 
the trial. 
22. The court finds the plaintiff has proved all the 
allegations with respect to each of tl le c] a :i its :i n Coi, mts 1 2 3 , 
4, and 5 of the plaintifffs complaint except for the claim for 
punitive damages against the defendant, Heather Olson, as set forth 
in Count 2 which claim the plaintiff withdrew at trial. 
With respect to the allegations in Count 5 of the 
plaintiff's complaint, the court specifically finds the defendants, 
Ronald He Olson, and his wife, Carol D«, 01 son, were negligent in 
failing to supervise and control the activities m liieii minor 
child Jennifer Heather Olson. The court finds the said parents 
knew the said minor child was taking the Volkswagen car from the 
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parents' residence and had used it on several occasions prior to 
the time of the accident. The court also finds the parents knew 
that their daughter had consumed alcoholic beverages on occasions 
prior to the time of the accident and was in the habit of attending 
parties with friends who the parents knew drank intoxicating 
beverages. The court further finds the parents had the duty and 
responsibility to prevent the minor child from taking the 
Volkswagen automobile which was uninsured and which was not 
registered, but the parents did not take the necessary steps and 
precautions to prevent the minor child from using the automobile, 
either on prior occasions or at the time of the accident on October 
17, 1987. The court further finds the parents' lack of supervision 
and control over the minor child was the sole, direct, and 
proximate cause of the accident for the reasons stated in this 
paragraph and for the other reasons more fully described in Count 
5 of the complaint, all of which the court finds are fully 
established by the evidence in this case. 
24. Section 41-2-115, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides that any negligence of a minor younger than eighteen (18) 
years of age when operating a motor vehicle upon a highway is 
imputed to the person who has signed the application of the minor 
for a permit or license. The said section further provides the 
person signing the application for a permit or a license is jointly 
and severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the 
negligent misconduct. 
25. At the time of the accident as described above in these 
findings, the defendant Ronald H. Olson had signed the application 
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for a permit or license of the defendant minor Jennifer Heather 
Olson. Pursuant to § 41-2-115 the said Ronald H. Olson is jointly 
and severally liable with Heather for any and a] 1 of the damages 
sustained by Myra L. Taylor as more fully described above in these 
findings. 
•' ' 26 c Section 4i-2-116, Utah Code Ax n lotated, 1 9 ^ , a* amended, 
provides that the owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly 
permitting a mi nor younger than eighteen (18) years rf ac- - 3 
operate the v eh i cle 1 lpon a highway or a p«€ rson *ho A • - •• -r 
furnishes the motor vehicle to the minor, are each jointly and 
severally liable with the minor for any damages caused fay the 
negligence -..r: n -> s * >•>- 'eM. . «=?. 
27« The defendant Ronald H Olson is jointly and severally 
liable with his minor daughter Heather pursuant to § 41-2-116 for 
any and all damages negligently caused by the said minor to the 
person of Myra L, Taylor as set forth hereinabove in these 
findings. 
28. The defendants Ronald H Olson .ti I 1 nrol I» 0") .MM u e 
the parents of the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson,, On October 
17, 1987, the said parents were living : -r.e ;ame household with 
the said 1111 noj rhilhl mi M m siii.. ,,;. JO \<\\\\ parents 
negligently permitted their minor daughter to use the Volkswagen 
automobile which was under the control of the said parents. At the 
said tiirv - * • • shoi ild havv •-•,,.« -IV-M: minor 
daughter intended \ or was likely to use the motor vehicle and to 
conduct herself ,r a- activity and in a manner as to create an 
unreasonar , thers. 
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29. The said parents had previously known prior to the said 
accident date about Heather's drinking intoxicciting beverages; 
however, the said parents failed to take adequate precautions or 
to properly instruct their minor child about the dangers of driving 
while under the influence of alcohol. 
30. The parents further failed to take the necessary 
precautions to see their minor child would not take the Volkswagen 
automobile on the highways in an unregistered condition and without 
the vehicle insurance required by the statutes of the state of 
Utah. 
31. As parents of the said minor child Heather, the 
defendants Ronald H. Olson and Carol D. Olson had a duty to 
supervise and control the conduct of the said minor child so as to 
prevent the minor child from negligently harming others or from so 
conducting herself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm 
to others such as Myra L. Taylor. 
32. The said parents knew or had reason to know they had the 
ability to control Heather and they knew or should have known of 
the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. The 
parents knew the automobile did not contain current valid 
registration as required by Utah statutes nor was the Volkswagen 
automobile insured for personal injury or property damage to others 
as required by Utah statutes. 
33. The parents knew the minor child had driven the car 
without registration and without insurance on previous occasions; 
however, the parents did not exercise the required supervision and 
control to stop Heather from using it on the accident date. 
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Rather, they allowed the minor child to have access to the keys to 
the said automobile, to install improper license plates on the said 
automobile, ..mud to otherwise be able to use an J operate the said 
automobile. 
34. The parents also knew that on prior occasions as well as 
on the accident date the minor child Heather had been using license 
plates from her older sister Heidi 8s automobile, the said use being 
in violation.of the state statutes pertaining to motor vehicles. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, the said parents did not; ensure 
Heather would discontinue this practice and the parents thereby 
permitted the minor child to take the Volkswagen on the public 
streets ai id h :i ghways in the state of Utah . • nproper 
registration and without adequate insurance. 
35. The parents knew the minor child had consumed alcoholic 
beverages prior to the accident datec The parents also knew the 
minor child consorted with other friends and acquaintances who were 
accustomed to drinking alcoholic beverages when they were together. 
36. -Notwithstanding this knowledge < Heather's drinking 
habits, the parents allowed Heather to have access to the 
Volkswagen which had invalid license plates, lacked adequate 
insurance, and under circumstances where the parents knew or should 
have known Heather was attending a party where intoxicating 
beverages were going to be consumed and knew or should have known 
that Heather may be driving the motor vehicle after consuming the 
said intoxicating beverages0 
37. The parents had the ability to control Heather's access 
to and use of the said Volkswagen^ and also knew the necessity for 
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exercising the said control; however, they neglected to so control 
or supervise Heather to prevent her from using the said Volkswagen 
under the circumstances set forth in Count 5 of the plaintiff's 
complaint* 
38. The parents were negligent in failing to retain 
sufficient control and discipline over their minor daughter Heather 
and in failing to provide cidequate supervision for Heather to 
insure Heather would not take the Volkswagen automobile under the 
circumstances set forth in the complaint. 
39. This lack of control and supervision on the part of the 
parents constitutes negligence on their part. 
40• The said parent's negligence contributed as a proximate 
and direct cause to the accident on October 17, 1987, as described 
more fully hereinabove in these findings. As a direct and 
proximate result of this negligence on the part of the parents, the 
plaintiff sustained the damages which she claims in the preceding 
Counts in this complaint. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendants and each of them jointly and severally on Counts 1, 3, 
4, and 5 of the plaintiff's complaint for the amount of $77,959.34 
special damages and the amount of $250, OQQ-.flO- general damages, 
together with the amount of $834.80 as costs. 
2. The Stipulation of the parties dated November 19, 1992, 
should be approved by the court and is by reference incorporated 
00 02 
into these conclusions as though it were fully set out herein. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT THIS 19TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of November, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand delivered to the following: 
Michael N. Martinez, Esq. 
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Jdtflm&s 
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EXHIBIT "26" 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — No. 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA L. TAYLOR i 
Plaintiff : 
V • < 
RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D. : 
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER : 
OLSON ! 
Defendants ! 
t FINAL JUDGMENT 
: Civil No. 900907125PI 
: (Judge Timothy R. Hanson) 
The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly for trial 
on Thursday, November 19, 1992, before the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, Judge of the above-entitled court, hearing this case 
without a jury; the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, being present in 
court and represented by the law firm of James A. Mcintosh & 
Associates P.C, a Utah professional law corporation, appearing 
through counsel, James A. Mcintosh; the defendants, Ronald H. 
Olson, Carol D. Olson, and Jennifer Heather Olson being present in 
court and being represented by counsel, Michael N. Martinez; the 
court having heretofore entered a Pretrial Order establishing the 
procedures for presenting evidence at the time of the trial; said 
Pretrial Order being incorporated herein by reference and being 
made a part hereof; the court having received the various proffers 
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Third Judicial District 
of proof, affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence submitted 
by the plaintiff in support of the allegations raised in each of 
the five (5) Counts of her complaint; the court having taken the 
proffer of testimony from the defendants, Ronald H. Olson and Carol 
D. Olson, said proffers being made by their counsel, Michael N. 
Martinez, and approved by the said Olsons; the court having 
published the deposition of all persons heretofore deposed in this 
action; the court having reviewed the said proffers of proof, 
affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence and being fully 
advised in the premises; the court heretofore entered its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, which are by reference incorporated 
herein and made a part hereof; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS A FINAL 
JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, is hereby awarded judgment 
against the defendants, Ronald H. Olson, Carol D. Olson, and 
Jennifer Heather Olson, and each of them jointly and severally, on 
Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the plaintiff's complaint for the amount 
of $77,959.34 special damages, and $250,Q0Ovt>fr general damages 
together with the plaintiff's costs incurred herein in the amount 
of $834.80. 
2o The court approves and adopts the Stipulation signed by 
the parties on November 19, 1992. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT THIS 19TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of November, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT 
was hand delivered to the following: 
Michael N. Martinez, Esqe 
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
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EXHIBIT "27" 
©tf t r i 3«Mrial Pfgtrtct (Eauvi 
Courts Building 
240 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 535-5677 
r iMOTHY R. H A N S O N 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
^fofstnct 
JAH2il3£3 
January 25, 1993 LAKE COUNTY 
James A. Mcintosh, Esq* 
1399 South 700 Est, Suite 17 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Michael N. Martinez, Esq. 
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Re: Myra L. Taylor v. Ronald H< 
Civil No. 900907125 
Gentlemen: 
Olson, et al 
I have had an opportunity t© review in detail the exhibits 
that were offered during the trial in the above-referenced 
matter. I have also reviewed those exhibits in connection with 
the proposed Findings ©f Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the 
Final Judgment submitted by Mr« Mcintosh. Having due 
consideration for the medical information submitted, I am 
satisfied that the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are appropriate in relation to the issue of special 
damages, such as lost wages, essential services and medical 
expenses, and am willing to adopt those provisions of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as the Court's. As to 
general damages, I believe the evidence supports a general 
damage verdict in the amount of $125,000.00, and have made the 
appropriate pencil changes on the original Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment. On page 5, I was of 
the opinion that there should be a change in wording to include 
in paragraph 10 on the second line the statement that the 
plaintiff was in excellent health and vigor, as opposed to "the 
picture of" health and vigor• I have made that pencil change 
as well. 
In reviewing the specific findings of negligence in 
paragraph 7 on page 4 of the proposed Findings, I note that 
subpart (g) suggests that driving a motor vehicle that was not 
insured and also not registered constitutes negligence, and in 
item (h) that driving a motor vehicle with license plates which 
000190 
James A. Mcintosh, Esq. 
Michael N. Martinez, Esq. -2- January 25, 1993 
had not been issued for the automobile Heather was driving also 
constitutes negligence. While such conduct may be in violation 
of state statute, I do not believe that that would be an 
appropriate finding for negligence as to the conduct of 
defendant Heather Olson at the time and place of the accident 
in question. I cannot see how the vehicle being uninsured, nor 
having inappropriate plates in any way contributed to the 
negligent conduct of Ms. Olson's driving pattern up to the 
point of the accident. 
Accordingly, unless there is something that I have 
overlooked, it would appear that paragraph 7(g) and (h) should 
be removed from the Findings of Fact. 
I include the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and the original Final Judgment in Mr. Mcintosh's copy of 
this letter to counsel. Please make the appropriate changes in 
accordance with the pencil changes noted above and found on the 
original documents themselves, and resubmit them, at which time 
the Court would be in a position to sign the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and the Final Judgment immediately. 
All other Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the 
Final Judgment appear to be appropriate in form, and are 
adopted as presented as the Court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment. 
Please feel free to contact me if there are any further 
questions regarding this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Timothy R. Hanson 
District Court Judge 
TRH:jsh 
Enclosure 
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EXHIBIT "28" 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. — No. 2194 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA L 
V 
RONALD 
OLSON, 
OLSON 
. TAYLOR ! 
Plaintiff : 
H. OLSON, CAROL D. J 
and JENNIFER HEATHER ; 
Defendants : 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
• CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 900907125PI 
(Judge Timothy R. Hanson) 
The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly for trial 
on Thursday, November 19, 1992, before the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, Judge of the above-entitled court, hearing this case 
without a jury; the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, being present in 
court and represented by the law firm of James A. Mcintosh & 
Associates P.C., a Utah professional law corporation, appearing 
through counsel, James A. Mcintosh; the defendants, Ronald H. 
Olson, Carol D. Olson, and Jennifer Heather Olson being present in 
court and being represented by counsel, Michael N. Martinez; the 
court having heretofore entered a Pretrial Order establishing the 
procedures for presenting evidence at the time of the trial; said 
Pretrial Order being incorporated herein by reference and being 
made a part hereof; the court having received the various proffers 
Third JoUicU Dishict 
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of proof, affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence submitted 
by the plaintiff in support of the allegations raised in each of 
the five (5) Counts of her complaint; the court having taken the 
proffer of testimony from tl\e defendants, Ronald H. Olson and Carol 
D. Olson, said proffers being made by their counsel, Michael N. 
Martinez, and approved by the said Olsons; the court having 
published the deposition of all persons heretofore deposed in this 
action; the court having reviewed the said proffers of proof, 
affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence and being fully 
advised in the premises; hereby enters its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 17, 1987, ("accident date") the defendant 
Ronald H. Olson was the owner of a 1974 Volkswagen, two-door sedan, 
green in color ("Volkswagen"). Mr. Olson had purchased the said 
Volkswagen from a previous owner Daniel Park Lake. On the said 
October 17, 1987, the Volkswagen was not registered in the state 
of Utah and was uninsured. 
2. On the said accident date the said Ronald H. Olson was 
married to the defendant Carol D. Olson and was living with his 
wife and family at 1930 Logan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108. 
On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson was 
sixteen years of age, having been born on April 28 1971. 
3. On the said accident date, the defendant Jennifer Heather 
Olson ("Heather") was driving the said Volkswagen at approximately 
11:55 P.M. on Yalecrest Avenue (1015 South in Salt Lake City, Utah) 
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at its intersection with 1900 East ("accident scene"). There was 
a "yield" traffic sign facing Yalecrest Avenue at the said 
intersection, which sign required drivers on Yalecrest Avenue to 
yield the right-of-way to persons on 1900 East. 
4 • At the said time and place described in paragraph 3 
above, the said defendant Heather was driving under the influence 
of intoxicating beverages and was driving the Volkswagen with a 
blood-alcohol content of approximately .14 grams in violation of 
§ 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
5. A few minutes prior to the time and place described in 
paragraph 3 above, said defendant Heather was involved in a "hit 
and run" accident in an area less than one mile from the said 
accident scene. This hit and run involved another motorist by the 
name of Michelle Paxton. Heather was being pursued by Ms. Paxton 
through a residential neighborhood at the time she reached the 
accident scene. 
6. At approximately 11:55 P.Me on the said accident date 
and at the accident scene, the plaintiff Myra L. Taylor was driving 
her 1984 Subaru 640 station wagon ("Subaru") in a northerly 
direction along 1900 East Street and in a careful and prudent 
manner. 
7. On or about the said 11:55 P.M. on the said accident date 
and at the accident scene, the defendant Heather negligently, 
("negligence") operated her Volkswagen thereby causing a collision 
with the Subaru being driven by the plaintiff. The specific 
grounds of negligence include, but are not necessarily limited to, 
the following: 
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(a) A failure to keep a proper lookout• 
(b) Failure to yield the right-of-way to Myra Taylor 
who was driving her car on 1900 East. 
(c) Driving too fast for existing conditions. 
(d) Driving under the influence of intoxicating 
beverages with a blood-alcohol content of approximately twice the 
limit established by the Utah statutes for a presumption of driving 
under the influence of intoxicating beverages. 
(e) Failure to take evasive action to avoid the 
accident. 
(f) Failure to keep her motor vehicle under control. 
8. As a sole, direct and proximate cause of Heather's 
negligence, Myra L. Taylor was then and there seriously and 
permanently injured. She suffered bruises, contusions, 
lacerations, shock, headache, muscle spasms, numbness in her joints 
and members, scarring, strains, fractures, and other damages and 
personal injury so as to render the plaintiff partially and 
permanently disabled for the balance of her life. 
9. The plaintiff has suffered a loss of the quality of life 
and enjoyment of life she experienced prior to October 17, 1987, 
and has also suffered mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering 
and other mental and emotional trauma as more fully described in 
the evidence plaintiff provided at trial, some of which is dis-
cussed hereafter. 
10. Prior to the time of the said accident on October 17, 
1987, the plaintiff was in excellent health and vigor. She was a 
healthy mother who had given birth to and raised twelve (12) 
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children. She was accustomed to taking long trips as a family from 
coast-to-coast in the family car. She would drive the family car, 
pack the luggage and the food, work tirelessly and enthusiastically 
completing these tasks as a wife and mother. By comparison, the 
plaintiff is unable to ride in the family car at the time of trial 
without hunching her back and walking bent over because of back 
spasms and pain. 
11. Prior to the time of the accident, the plaintiff enjoyed 
sports. She had played tennis, golf, bowling, horseback riding, 
motorcycling, hiking, waterskiing, camping, badminton, jumping on 
the trampoline with her children, and dancing. Since the accident, 
the plaintiff has been unable to participate in any of these 
activities and is by comparison an "invalid" with respect to her 
lifestyle prior to the accident. 
12. The plaintiff's treating physician, King S. Udall, M.De, 
gave his written opinion in a letter dated approximately one (1) 
month prior to the trial that the plaintiff has sustained a ten 
percent (10%) permanent impairment and disability of her total 
person as a result of the accident. Dr. Udall stated that, as a 
result of the accident, Myra L. Taylor had to alter her life and 
career significantly. Because of the accident Dr. Udall states Ms. 
Taylor was unable to work on a full-time basis either lifting or 
providing the usual services of a registered nurse. As a result, 
she did not receive commensurate wages for the amount of time she 
missed as working half-time as she did as a full-time employee. 
Dr. Udall further states as a result of the accident the plaintiff 
has difficulty with her housework and cannot do routine housework 
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as before or do anything which involves heavy work using the upper 
extremities. After listening to the proffers of proof and the 
other evidence submitted at trial, the court concurs in the 
findings by Dr. Udall as more fully stated in his October 20, 1992 
letter to plaintiff's counsel, James A. Mcintosh, Esq.. 
13. As a sole, direct and proximate cause of the accident, 
the plaintiff has incurred a loss of wages for the period of time 
October 18, 1987, through October 5, 1991, in the amount of 
$65,861.84. This finding is based on the affidavit of Margie Q. 
Richins, dated November 9, 1992. Ms. Richins is the Civilian 
Payroll Supervisor for the Vcrteran's Administration Medical Center 
where the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, worked for many years as a 
Registered Nurse. 
14. The court finds it was reasonable and necessary for the 
plaintiff to take the depositions of certain persons, to wit, 
Kristi Bringhurst, Jenny Pia, Steve Ebert, Steve Jones, Scott Levy, 
James Levy, Mark Muir, Jeff Gertino, and Heidi Olson. The court 
further finds it was reasonable and necessary for the plaintiff to 
pay the said persons $17.00 each to attend their depositions and 
to pay the amount of $232.00 for the service of subpoenas on the 
said persons together with the further amount of $374.80 to the 
court reporter for taking and transcribing the said depositions. 
The court finds this total of $759.80 is a reasonable and necessary 
expense incurred by the plaintiff in this action and is to be taxed 
as part of the costs to be awarded to the plaintiff. 
15. In addition to the said $65,861.84 lost wages described 
in paragraph 13, the court finds the plaintiff has also incurred 
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the following reasonable and necessary special damages from the 
time of the accident through the time of the trial, 
(a) Essential Services -- $6,200000. 
(b) Medical Expenses ~ $5,178.75 
(c) Expert Witness Fees to Frank Grant for Accident, 
Investigation and Reconstruction Services — $718.75. 
16. In addition to the ten percent (10%) total person 
impairment and disability noted by Dr. King S. Udall as described 
above, the plaintiff also sustained injuries to her nose and teeth, 
as more fully described in medical reports from Dr. Bryce D. 
Allredf M.D., and from her dentists, Vee Boyd Hair, D.M.D., and 
Scott B. Hair, D.D.S.. 
17. The plaintiff was able to resume full-time employment at 
the Veteran's Administration Hospital on or about October 5, 1991. 
The said full-time employment necessitated a change in the type and 
nature of the work plaintiff had been performing prior to the 
accident and required a career change as more fully noted in Dr. 
Udall1s medical report and in the plaintiff's own testimony. 
18. The court finds Myra L. Taylor's physical, mental, and 
emotional disabilities will continue for the rest of her natural 
life and will interfere with her enjoyment of life as a wife and 
a mother, and will deprive her of the benefits and enjoyment of 
life which she had prior to the time of the accident as more fully 
set forth hereinabove in these findings. For all of these reasons, 
the court finds the plaintiff is entitled to $125,000.00 as 
reasonable and full compensation for the general damages she has 
sustained from the time of the accident to the time of trial and 
from the trial through the remainder of her natural life. In this 
connection, the court finds the plaintiff was born on January 28, 
1943, and at the time of the accident, on October 17, 1987, was 
forty-four (44) years of age. The plaintiff had a life expectancy 
at the time of the accident of approximately thirty-six (36) years. 
The court takes judicial notice of the plaintiff's life expectancy 
which can also be verified in the legal encyclopedias such as the 
DESK BOOK in' American Jurisprudence "Second Edition" Cumulative 
Supplement issued in April of 1991. The mortality tables are found 
in the said publication as Items numbers 159, 160, and 161. 
19. The parties have submitted to the court a proposed 
"Stipulation" dated November 19, 1992, which provides for an 
assignment after judgment has been entered of the defendant's claim 
against their homeowners' insxirance company for failure and refusal 
to defend the defendants in this instant lawsuit, for failure to 
pay the policy limits of $100,000.00, for any excess judgment which 
might be entered in this action, and for any additional claims 
which the defendants might have against their homeowners' insurance 
carrier. As consideration for the said assignment, the plaintiff 
agrees not to execute on the defendants' personal property. The 
court finds the Stipulation is reasonable and adopts the terms of 
the said Stipulation as though they were fully set forth in these 
findings. 
20. The court finds there has been no collusion between the 
plaintiff and the defendants with respect to the said Stipulation 
or with respect to assigning the defendants' rights to the 
plaintiff with respect to the defendants' homeowners' insurance 
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carrier. The parties have submitted correspondence between counsel 
for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendants as well as 
correspondence between counsel for the defendants and the 
homeowners' insurance claims office and the attorney for the 
homeowners' insurance company. The court finds the said documents 
have kept the homeowners1 insurance company apprised of this legal 
action and have given the said company every chance to appear in 
this case and to represent the defendants herein. The court finds 
the said insurance company has not appeared in this action in any 
capacity whatsoever through the date of the trial. 
21. The plaintiff withdrew her claim for punitive damages at 
the trial. 
22. The court finds the plaintiff has proved all the 
allegations with respect to each of the claims in Counts 1, 2, 3, 
4, and 5 of the plaintiff's complaint except for the claim for 
punitive damages against the defendant, Heather Olson, as set forth 
in Count 2 which claim the plaintiff withdrew at trial. 
23. With respect to the allegations in Count 5 of the 
plaintiff's complaint, the court specifically finds the defendants, 
Ronald H. Olson, and his wife, Carol D. Olson, were negligent in 
failing to supervise and control the activities of their minor 
child Jennifer Heather Olson. The court finds the said parents 
knew the said minor child was taking the Volkswagen car from the 
parents' residence and had used it on several occasions prior to 
the time of the accident. The court also finds the parents knew 
that their daughter had consumed alcoholic beverages on occasions 
prior to the time of the accident and was in the habit of attending 
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parties with friends who the parents knew drank intoxicating 
beverages • The court furttuir finds the parents had the duty and 
responsibility to prevent the minor child from taking the 
Volkswagen automobile which was uninsured and which was not 
registered, but the parents did not take the necessary steps and 
precautions to prevent the minor child from using the automobile, 
either on prior occasions or at the time of the accident on October 
17, 1987. The court further finds the parents1 lack of supervision 
and control over the minor child was the sole, direct, and 
proximate cause of the accident for the reasons stated in this 
paragraph and for the other reasons more fully described in Count 
5 of the complaint, all of which the court finds are fully 
established by the evidence in this case. 
24. Section 41-2-115, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides that any negligence of a minor younger than eighteen (18) 
years of age when operating a motor vehicle upon a highway is 
imputed to the person who has signed the application of the minor 
for a permit or license. The said section further provides the 
person signing the application for a permit or a license is jointly 
and severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the 
negligent misconduct. 
25. At the time of the accident as described above in these 
findings, the defendant Ronald H. Olson had signed the application 
for a permit or license of the defendant minor Jennifer Heather 
Olson. Pursuant to § 41-2-115 the said Ronald H. Olson is jointly 
and severally liable with Heather for any and all of the damages 
sustained by Myra L. Taylor as more fully described above in these 
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findings. 
26. Section 41-2-116, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides that the owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly 
permitting a minor younger than eighteen (18) years of age to 
operate the vehicle upon a highway or a person who gives or 
furnishes the motor vehicle to the minor, are each jointly and 
severally liable with the minor for any damages caused by the 
negligence of the minor in operating the vehicle. 
27. The defendant Ronald H. Olson is jointly and severally 
liable with his minor daughter Heather pursuant to § 41-2-116 for 
any and all damages negligently caused by the said minor to the 
person of Myra L. Taylor as set forth hereinabove in these 
findings. 
28. The defendants Ronald H. Olson and Carol D. Olson are 
the parents of the defendant Jennifer Heather Olson. On October 
17, 1987, the said parents were living in the same household with 
the said minor child. On the said date the said parents 
negligently permitted their minor daughter to use the Volkswagen 
automobile which was under the control of the said parents. At the 
said time, the parents knew or should have known their minor 
daughter intended to or was likely to use the motor vehicle and to 
conduct herself in an activity and in a manner as to create an 
unreasonable risk of harm to others. 
29. The said parents had previously known prior to the said 
accident date about Heather's drinking intoxicating beverages; 
however, the said parents failed to take adequate precautions or 
to properly instruct their minor child about the dangers of driving 
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while under the influence of alcohol. 
30. The parents further failed to take the necessary 
precautions to see their minor child would not take the Volkswagen 
automobile on the highways in an unregistered condition and without 
the vehicle insurance required by the statutes of the state of 
Utah. 
31. As parents of the said minor child Heather, the 
defendants Ronald H. Olson and Carol D. Olson had a duty to 
supervise and control the conduct of the said minor child so as to 
prevent the minor child from negligently harming others or from so 
conducting herself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm 
to others such as Myra L. Taylor. 
32. The said parents knew or had reason to know they had the 
ability to control Heather and they knew or should have known of 
the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. The 
parents knew the automobile did not contain current valid 
registration as required by Utah statutes nor was the Volkswagen 
automobile insured for personal injury or property damage to others 
as required by Utah statutes. 
33. The parents knew the minor child had driven the car 
without registration and without insurance on previous occasions; 
however, the parents did not exercise the required supervision and 
control to stop Heather from using it on the accident date. 
Rather, they allowed the minor child to have access to the keys to 
the said automobile, to install improper license plates on the said 
automobile, and to otherwise be able to use and operate the said 
automobile. 
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34. The parents also knew that on prior occasions as well as 
on the accident date the minor child Heather had been using license 
plates from her older sister Heidi's automobile, the said use being 
in violation of the state statutes pertaining to motor vehicles. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, the said parents did not ensure 
Heather would discontinue this practice and the parents thereby 
permitted the minor child to take the Volkswagen on the public 
streets and highways in the state of Utah with an improper 
registration and without adequate insurance. 
35. The parents knew the minor child had consumed alcoholic 
beverages prior to the accident date. The parents also knew the 
minor child consorted with other friends and acquaintances who were 
accustomed to drinking alcoholic beverages when they were together. 
36o Notwithstanding this knowledge of Heather's drinking 
habits, the parents allowed Heather to have access to the 
Volkswagen which had invalid license plates, lacked adequate 
insurance, and under circumstances where the parents knew or should 
have known Heather was attending a party where intoxicating 
beverages were going to be consumed and knew or should have known 
that Heather may be driving the motor vehicle after consuming the 
said intoxicating beverages. 
37. The parents had the ability to control Heather's access 
to and use of the said Volkswagen, and also knew the necessity for 
exercising the said control; however, they neglected to so control 
or supervise Heather to prevent her from using the said Volkswagen 
under the circumstances set forth in Count 5 of the plaintiff's 
complaint. 
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38. The parents were negligent in failing to retain 
sufficient control and discipline over their minor daughter Heather 
and in failing to provide adequate supervision for Heather to 
insure Heather would not take the Volkswagen automobile under the 
circumstances set forth in the complaint. 
39. This lack of control and supervision on the part of the 
parents constitutes negligence on their part. 
40. The said parent's negligence contributed as a proximate 
and direct cause to the accident on October 17, 1987, as described 
more fully hereinabove in these findings. As a direct and 
proximate result of this negligence on the part of the parents, the 
plaintiff sustained the damages which she claims in the preceding 
Counts in this complaint. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendants and each of them jointly and severally on Counts 1, 3, 
4, and 5 of the plaintiff's complaint for the amount of $77,959.34 
special damages and the amount of $125,000.00 general damages, 
together with the amount of $834.80 as costs. 
2. The Stipulation of the parties dated November 19, 1992, 
should be approved by the court and is by reference incorporated 
into these conclusions as though it wererfully set out herein. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT THIS 27TH DAJT OF JANUARY 1993. 
BY/THE. CPURT 
* 0 ^ . 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of January 1993 a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand delivered to the following: 
Michael N. Martinez, Esq. 
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
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EXHIBIT "29" 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. ~ NO. 2194 ' — 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C. 
A Utah Professional Law Corporation 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 17, Intrade Bldg. South 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 487-7834 
. Third Judical District 
JAN 2 7 1993 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MYRA L. TAYLOR : 
Plaintiff : 
XT < 
V • J 
RONALD H. OLSON, CAROL D. j 
OLSON, and JENNIFER HEATHER : 
OLSON ; 
Defendants : 
i FINAL JUDGMENT 
| VQR^a-^Cflan^. 
Civil No. 900907125PI 
(Judge Timothy R. Hanson) 
The above-entitled matter, having come on regularly for trial 
on Thursday, November 19, 1992, before the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, Judge of the above-entitled court, hearing this case 
without a jury; the plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, being present in 
court and represented by the law firm of James A. Mcintosh & 
Associates P.C, a Utah professional law corporation, appearing 
through counsel, James A. Mcintosh; the defendants, Ronald H. 
Olson, Carol D. Olson, and Jennifer Heather Olson being present in 
court and being represented by counsel, Michael N. Martinez; the 
court having heretofore entered a Pretrial Order establishing the 
procedures for presenting evidence at the time of the trial; said 
Pretrial Order being incorporated herein by reference and being 
made a part hereof; the court having received the various proffers 
of proof, affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence submitted 
by the plaintiff in support of the allegations raised in each of 
the five (5) Counts of her complaint; the court having taken the 
proffer of testimony from the defendants, Ronald H. Olson and Carol 
D« Olson, said proffers being made by their counsel, Michael N. 
Martinet, and approved by the said Olsons? the court having 
published the deposition of all persons heretofore deposed in this 
action; the court having reviewed the said proffers of proof, 
affidavits, medical reports, and other evidence and being fully 
advised in the premises? the court heretofore entered its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, which are by reference incorporated 
herein and made a part hereof; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS A FINAL 
JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The plaintiff, Myra L. Taylor, is hereby awarded judgment 
against the defendants, Ronald H. Olson, Carol D. Olson, and 
Jennifer Heather Olson, and each of them jointly and severally, on 
Counts 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the plaintiff's complaint for the amount 
of $77,959c34 special damages, and $125,000.00 general damages 
together with the plaintiff's costs incurred herein in the amount 
of $834c80o 
2 c The court approves and adopts ytie Stipulation signed by 
the parties on November 19, 1992. 
DONE IN OPEN COURT THIS 27TH DXY OF JANUARY 1993. 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
District Court 
~
2
' atfac*-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of January, 1993, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was 
hand delivered to the following? 
Michael N« Martinez, Esq. 
4479 Gordon Lane, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
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